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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the civil-military relations of the growing U.S. military 
presence in Romania and the implications of this development for bi-lateral relations 
beyond the barracks and the maneuver field. By the implementation of the “Agreement 
Between Romania and the United States of America Regarding the Activities of United 
States Forces Located on the Territory of Romania,” the presence of the American troops 
on Romanian territory will have both positive and negative civil-military consequences. 
The history of U.S. and other foreign bases on European soil and other parts of the world 
in the 20th century sustains this conclusion and provides an area for inquiry. The areas of 
policy, economy and society will raise critical issues because of the social, cultural, legal 
and administrative, and other differences and dissimilar ways of perception and 
understanding of the requirements of strategy and policy.  
The overall goal of this thesis is for those officials responsible for the issues of 
policy associated with the guest forces in the host nation to approach their task best so as 
to avoid or minimize the political and operational negatives, and hence avoid the bi-
lateral problems that have affected host countries elsewhere in Europe as well as the 
wider world, while at the same time emphasizing the positives and lessons learned from 
previous experiences. Such is in the U.S. national interest, as well, and this latter concern 
is no less present in the author’s mind as a guest of the U.S. in the authorship of the 
present study.  
This thesis has the potential to be a small but vital piece in solidifying U.S.-
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A. PURPOSE  
1. Statement of Purpose 
The present study analyzes the civil-military relations of the growing U.S. 
military presence in Romania and the implications of this development for bi-lateral 
relations beyond the barracks and the maneuver field. By the December 2005 
implementation of the “Agreement Between Romania and the United States of America 
Regarding the Activities of United States Forces Located on the Territory of Romania” 
referred to as “Access Agreement” (AA) in the following pages, the presence of the 
American troops on Romanian territory will have both positive and negative civil-
military consequences. The history of the U.S. and other foreign bases on European soil 
and other parts of the world in the 20th century sustains this conclusion and provides an 
area for inquiry. The areas of policy, economy and society will raise critical issues in the 
social, cultural, legal and administrative areas. This will happen because of differences in 
perception and understanding of the requirements of strategy and policy. 
2. Major Questions and Arguments 
This thesis will answer the following overall question: which are the most 
sensitive areas of civil-military concern in the basing of the American troops and what 
are the possible political and social solutions in dealing with them? Another question that 
is relevant to this research: what are the implications for Romanian politics and society of 
the agreed-to presence of U.S. military in Romania? Or, perhaps to state it more simply:  
what are the primary hopes and concerns of Romanian citizens regarding their national 
security and that of Europe in a wider sense? At the same time, this thesis will strive to 




military bases. Finally, this study seeks answers as to how one can reinforce the 
potentially positive aspects of such stationing, while minimizing the potentially negative 
aspects. 
The presence of American troops on Romanian territory should not be seen as just 
a military issue in the operational sense or strictly related to the purview of the Romanian 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) alone. The presence of U.S. troops engages a host of inter 
agency, national and local questions, both internally and externally, as well as matters 
that are social, economic, and financial. Obviously, there is no area of politics and society 
that will not be affected by even a modest presence of U.S. troops in Romania, including 
the central and local authorities who will be involved in this bi-lateral relationship.  
A skeptic may argue that this theme is not really a classic issue of civil-military 
relations as that term is normally used. But the reality is that an interaction between 
Romanian society and the American troops will certainly have implications on Romanian 
civil-military relations and the fate of its young democratic political culture. The issues 
related to the U.S. military may be projected onto its Romanian counterpart, and the 
military in ensemble may be made responsible for any dysfunction, misunderstanding or 
mismanagement. 
This thesis will deal only with the most significant civil-military problems and 
will try to identify those issues at both national and local levels. The research will focus 
on selective contingencies, experiences, and results relevant to the Romanian case.  
It is the belief of this author that the future is strongly anchored in the past, and to 
a certain extent, may be predicted and somehow better controlled if the record of the past 
informs those who must manage the questions of war and peace that are so much a part of 
the violent present.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The search for the sources of success in one case of local civil-military relations 
with U.S. forces rather than that of a more problematic episode requires a focused 
comparison of the respective countries’ experiences of such stationing in the past and 
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present. This comparison will provide the necessary conclusions and lessons learned for 
the Romanian civil political authorities and policy makers, as well as the Romanian 
MOD, in order to avoid problems in the most sensitive areas and make this partnership 
successful.  
Part of the bi-lateral security arrangement, the presence of the U.S. military in 
Romania may have both negative and positive effects, and while the positive 
consequences will generate mutual benefits and shared security, the negative ones may 
cause bi-lateral discordance and opposition from the Romanian population and its 
political actors.  From a U.S. perspective, the basing in Romania might not be as 
welcome, by a part of the civil society, as the Department of Defense has heretofore 
expected and such a disappointment and even backlash would hurt U.S. and NATO 
military effectiveness in a time of crisis. This thesis may not cover all of the general 
aspects and proportionally view both angles (American perspective and Romanian 
perspective) since it has the Romanian authorities as a primary audience, but it will 
capture the most representative ones.  
It is expected that the Romanian MOD will be the most involved institution in 
implementing this bilateral agreement. However, the civil authorities should not leave the 
burden entirely on the shoulders of the military. The Romanian MOD, as a designated 
authority in implementing the AA, should be supported by all of the ministries, 
organizations, and agencies, which have certain responsibilities in specific areas. 
Moreover, a common body invested with the necessary authority should function at the 
right level in order to be able to solve all the obligations assumed by Romania.  
The basing of the U.S. troops is a very important issue, especially regarding the 
relations between the two parties, which is why this relation should function on a 
partnership basis and not on a customer-service provider basis.  
From studying the compromises chosen by other countries in dealing with the 
presence of American troops on their territories, this thesis will identify the most 
successful ways that have been adopted, by identifying the level where leading 
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organizations dealing with such bilateral relations has been placed in the national political 
military system offering the necessary feedback in reforming the existing system. 
C. THE OVERALL GOAL  
Thus, the overall goal of this thesis is for those officials responsible for the issues 
of policy associated with the guest forces in the host nation to approach their task best so 
as to avoid or minimize the political and operational negatives, and hence avoid the bi-
lateral problems that have affected host countries elsewhere in Europe as well as the 
wider world, while emphasizing the positives and lessons learned from previous 
experiences. Such is in the U.S. national interest, as well, and this latter concern is no less 
present in the author’s mind as a guest of the U.S. in the authorship of the present study.  
This thesis has the potential to be a small but vital piece in solidifying U.S.-
Romania relations in both civil and military affairs as they have unfolded since the 1990s. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. General Considerations 
The real question when dealing with a foreign military presence on a national 
territory is whether this policy brings benefits to all parties or not.  
The literature offers a large amount of work dealing with this subject. Especially 
in the mid 90s, after the end of the Cold War, the issue of a military presence on other 
states’ territories attracted more scholarly interest.  
A second main observation suggests that the existing literature identifies mostly 
three areas of impact: security, economics, and societal/environmental themes. 
2. A First School of Thought’s Approach  
There is a school of thought, which claims that the foreign military presence in 
other countries is necessary and is a benefit for both partners. While the hosting countries 
have economic, financial and security advantages, the occupied country satisfies its 
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political, security and military needs, and the relation between the involved countries is a 
symbiosis. Even more, the host nation has collateral benefits in saving money that that 
state should otherwise spend for maintaining its own military forces.  
Harkavy,1 Sharp,2 and Duke3 describe the motivations of a host nation in basing 
foreign troops on their territory in their work.  
a. Economic and Financial Issues 
Harkavy argues that economic incentives drive basing choices.  In 
providing basing rights, foreign aid appeared to be an important ingredient in the 
willingness of Greece, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. Receiving rents for 
bases or even trading favors are part of the equation. The example offered by Sharp 
makes crystal clear that an American withdrawal would impact the German economy, 
since the presence of U.S. troops during the 1990s accounted for 0.5 of its GNP. Clark 
offers a clear picture of the benefits for the Europeans’ economy generated by the U.S. 
military presence: “The numbers come to 65,000 personnel for the Army, 34,000 Air 
Force, 10,000 Navy and Marines, and 3,500 reserves, all embraced within a budget of 
some four billion dollars.”4 Another example from Japan by Masaaki, “The Okinawan 
economy was almost completely dependent upon revenues from activities related to the 
U.S. military...”5 and continuing in the same tone “…Okinawa became an import 
economy dependent upon the U.S. military presence. The authorities saw to it that the 
daily necessities were imported from Japan wherever possible, so that the U.S. dollars 
invested in base construction became a source of foreign currency revenue for the 
                                                 
1 Robert E. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989.  
2 Jane O. Sharp, Europe After an American Withdrawal, Economic and Military Issues, Oxford & New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
3 Duke Simon,, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1989. 
4 Wesley K., Clark, “The Role of U.S. Forces in Europe”, The Future of The American Military 
Presence in Europe, Ed. Lloyd J. Matthews, May 2000, 14. 
5 Masaaki Gabe, "Okinawa Summit No Solution to U.S. Military Base Issues." Japan Quarterly 
47, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 10-16.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 3, 2007). 
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postwar Japanese government through the people of Okinawa.”6 Giarra sustains the 
American presence in Japan, which in his opinion generates not only problems but also 
benefits: “These bases have to be seen locally less as the problem and more as the 
solution, with respect, for example, to development plans and economic expansion.”7 
Fisher's comment is self explanatory when talking about the economic perspective for 
Germans, concerning the downsizing of the American bases: “There would be a 
commensurate loss to the German economy.”8 
Giarra supports his argumentation, regarding the economic benefits of the 
Japanese population, with the fact that rents paid to landowners of domains used by the 
bases are considerable to them, since their property otherwise has no value.  
Giarra also notices that the population concerns, regarding the 
environment, have no support: “Some observers, Japanese and American, insist that the 
fewer Marines on Okinawa the better. Modernization and technological advances may 
promote the trend toward fewer troops in any given unit, but fewer Americans does not 
necessarily equate to a better environment.”9 
b. Hosting Country’s Issues 
However, the countries must understand that this situation is not 
permanent and that they should contribute to the general security, as Gordon sustains: “It 
is time to halt the reduction of resources dedicated to defense—the so-called peace 
dividend—and face up to the reality that in this still dangerous world security never 
comes cheap.”10 
                                                 
6 Masaaki Gabe, "Okinawa Summit No Solution to U.S. Military Base Issues." Japan Quarterly 
47, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 10-16.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 3, 2007). 
7 Paul S. Giarra, "Host Nation Support, Responsibility Sharing, and Alternative Approaches to U.S. 
Bases in Japan."  Naval War College Review 50, no. 4 (October 1, 1997), 49-66, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 3, 2007). 
8 Ian Fisher, "U.S. Eyes a Willing Romania As a New Comrade in Arms.” New York 
Times, July 16, 2003, Late Edition (east Coast), http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed 
August 5, 2007). 
9 Paul S. Giarra. 
10 Philip H. Gordon, "Bridging the Atlantic Divide.", Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 70-
83, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 5, 2007). 
 7
A second image approach is related to security; for instance, from the 
military strategic point of view the presence of the foreign troops has a high level of 
importance in providing security. As well-known journalist John Hamre has asserted, 
“The U.S. Army needs to be in Europe today because it represents the connective tissue 
that holds together the security structure of Europe.”11 The same conclusion is offered by 
Masaaki when talking about the U.S. military presence in Japan “…the U.S. military 
bases in Okinawa are crucial to security in the Far East, including that of Japan.”12   
Furthermore, Giarra intrinsically links the security of Japan with the 
presence of the American troops and its involvement: 
U.S. forces in Japan are critical to that nation's defense as well. The 
support, or lack thereof, of the Japanese government for the American 
bases has important ramifications for the security of Japan and for the 
bilateral relationship. Most broadly, Japan benefits from the global 
missions assigned to U.S. forces based in the country. The fact that 
Japanese support, in turn, is vital to their ability to operate as far away as, 
for instance, the Persian Gulf animates Japanese foreign policy and tends 
to align U.S. policies and actions with Japanese interests. They reinforce 
each other, to Japan's benefit.13 
Part of the host countries’ security issue, the military common training and 
cooperation, building common confidence, as well as the infusion of the new 
technologies for modernizing national armed forces is another of the benefits available 
for the hosting countries. O'Hanlon sees more benefits in extending trust through 
cooperation beyond the bilateral relation in a possible regional partnership when he 
affirms that, “Maintaining a powerful Japan-U.S. alliance not only helps keep both 
countries safe and deters aggression in the region, but also provides a nucleus for military 
collaboration that may be extended some day to involve other countries, possibly 
including China, in a strong multilateral security structure.”14 
                                                 
11 John J. Hamre, “The Future of the U.S.-European Relationship: Framing the Discussion,” The 
Future Of The American Military Presence In Europe, Ed. Lloyd J. Matthews, May 2000, 7. 
12 Gabe Masaaki. 
13 Paul S. Giarra. 
14 Michael O'Hanlon, "A New Japan-U.S. Security Bargain." Japan 
Quarterly 44, no. 4 (October 1, 1997):  12-19. http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed 
August 3, 2007). 
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c. Sending Troops’ Country’s Issues 
A second division in the security realm, views the issue from the sending 
troops’ countries’ point of view. Representative authors are most concerned about 
politico-military interests and the changes in the overall security landscape that a 
withdrawal of the troops may cause. By advertising against a withdrawal, they sustain the 
presence of the foreign military bases on other countries’ territory as necessary and 
beneficial for both parties. 
Mochizuki15 and Giarra16 propose the same idea, when considering the 
U.S. presence in the Japanese strategic area, as an important factor of the security 
strategy for the Asia-Pacific region.  
Involved in the polemic regarding the withdrawal of the American troops 
from Okinawa, Giarra argues against those who promote the disagreement of civil 
population: 
There is no consensus among Okinawans on the bases; since the employment 
of Okinawans on U.S. bases is not inconsequential, there is even a sizable, 
largely silent constituency in favor of the status quo. With their members' 
livelihoods at stake, the base employees' unions want the installations to 
remain, and they did not participate in major demonstrations against the 
United States in the fall of 1995.17 
From the point of view of the host society, this school of thought includes the 
idea that the presence of the military in a foreign country may have additional roles, such as 
building and transforming the society.  These ideas are presented and sustained by scholars 
such as Petra Goedde, John Lamberton Harper, and to a certain extent Victoria de Grazia.18 
                                                 
15  Mike M. Mochizuki, "Toward a New Japan-U.S. Alliance." Japan 
Quarterly 43, no. 3 (July 1, 1996): 4, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 3, 
2007). 
16 Paul S. Giarra. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949, Yale 
University Press, 2003; John Lamberton, Harper, American Visions of Europe, Cambridge University 
Press, 1994; Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through 20th Century Europe, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2005. 
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3. A Second School of Thought’s Approach  
In opposition to the previous opinions, there are scholars who sustain that the 
presence of the foreign troops in a country generates issues that are against the interest of 
both parties involved.  
Judging from the U.S.-Europe perspective, the patterns of interaction of ideas, 
mentality, politics, society, economy, and culture remain generally misunderstood, 
especially in the Euro-Atlantic sphere of strategic studies.  For instance, no one can 
seriously assert that the “globalization” and “Americanization” are new in the manner 
propagated during the 1990s, and to what extent they affected the U.S.-Europe 
relationship.  
The Western democracies have dealt with each other, as they struggle with the 
challenges of collective security, and collective defence in the past, and present. But this 
common path is not all about harmony and mutual agreement; further more, it can be 
iterated that mechanisms of hostile interaction between Europe and the U.S. have existed 
for a considerably longer period than from 1945. From the late-19th century, a permanent 
dispute exists in the ways Europeans regard Americans and vice versa. Patterns of mutual 
perception and misperception have always played a crucial role in shaping of policy on 
the both shores of the Atlantic. 
These ideas are merely presented and sustained by scholars such as, Andrei S. 
Markovits, Philippe Roger, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Timothy Garton Ash,19 who 
provide an overall assessment of the anti-Americanism in Europe.  
In this school of thought, there are two distinctive categories: the first one deals 
with the point of view of the hosting countries and the second one with those that have 
based troops abroad.  
                                                 
19 Andrei S. Markovits, Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2007; Philippe Roger, The American Enemy: The History of French Anti-Americanism, 
Chicago, University of Chicago, 2005; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The 
European Influence on US Foreign Policy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995; Timothy Garton 
Ash, Free World: America, Europe and the Future of the West, New York, Random House, 2004. 
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a. Hosting Country’s Issues 
In the first category and dealing with societal issues, Nelson illustrated the 
skepticism of the Europeans regarding the American commitment in Europe especially in 
the Vietnam War era, when he described the picture of U.S. bases as “becoming stations 
in the route of Vietnam and populated by loutish, hash-smoking, malcontent soldiers.”20 
In the actual period the rising of the opposition to the presence of foreign 
troops in some countries, like Germany for instance, is well captured by Gordon: “The 
September 2002 German election, where for the first time in the postwar period a leading 
candidate concluded that major electoral gains could be had by running against the 
United States, should be taken as a warning that American unilateralism could indeed 
come at a price."21 This kind of reaction might very well have been the result of 
resistance to the American hegemony and affirmation of national independence in 
dealing with the specific issues. 
The opposition to the presence of foreign troops on the national territory 
has came to its zenith in Japan as described by publicists like French, Lacey, and Johnson 
after “…September 4, 1995, when three American servicemen abducted and raped a 12-
year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa.”22 If in Europe the fall of the Berlin Wall was the event 
marking the end of Cold War, in East Asia this was the event that triggered the same 
situation. Not having a political implication, the rape and the events linked to this 
(hesitation of the American military authorities to hand over the suspect) signified the 
end of the Japanese’ patience.  
Regarding this social problem, Sims adds: “Japanese and Western 
historians have said that in the aftermath of World War II, American troops raped  
 
 
                                                 
20 Daniel J. Nelson, A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, Westview Special Studies in 
Military Affairs, Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987. 
21 Philip H. Gordon. 
22 Chalmers Johnson, "Go-Banken-Sama, Go Home!" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52, no. 4  
(July 1, 1996): 22.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 3, 2007). 
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thousands of Okinawan women without reprisals. The historians said that while hundreds 
of rape cases have been documented, most have gone unreported for fear of retaliation 
and shame."23 
The example offered by Lacey is emblematic: “Zenko Nakamura, 53, an 
activist who is fighting the relocation of an American Marine base, said, ‘I'm 
disappointed that the president [Clinton] didn't mention what Okinawans care most about 
-- sexual crimes committed by American servicemen.’”24  
In his appeal for withdrawing the American bases, Pollard describes the 
essence of the population’s anger by saying that “… the history of the U.S. military in 
Okinawa is one of expropriated agricultural lands; crashes and near collisions of jets and 
Osprey helicopters; danger from munitions during live-fire exercises; sexual assault; 
theft; noise pollution near schools; and threats to endangered species of coral, fish, birds, 
and other animals.”25 
In the economical realm, Zimmermann26 pictured the financial 
interrelations and interdependence as well the reluctance of receiving countries in paying 
the price by adjusting their own monetary policies.  
b. Sending Troops’ Country’s Issues 
From the economical point of view, but from an American perspective, the 
presence of the troops abroad has more economic and financial implications and 
disadvantages. Among those who see the presence of troops outside the U.S. as futile, 
Johnson, Mochizuki, O Hanlon, and Pollard are the most representative authors.  
                                                 
23 Calvin Sims, "Marines Apologize to Okinawa Over Sex Case." New York Times, July 7, 2000, Late 
Edition (east Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed August 1, 2007). 
24 Marc Lacey, "Clinton Tries to Ease Anger At U.S. Troops in Okinawa." New York Times, 
July 21, 2000, Late Edition (east Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed August 1, 2007). 
25 Vincent Kelly Pollard, "Withdraw U.S. Bases! Appeal from Okinawa." Review of The Journal of 
Asian Studies 62, no. 2 (May 1, 2003): 563-565.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed 
August 4, 2007). 
26 Phil Zimmermann, Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy and FRG Relations with US and 
UK, Cambridge, 2002. 
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In his suggestive article named "Go-banken-sama, go home!" Johnson 
observes:  
The Cold War is over. Stationing U.S. troops in Japan, mainly in 
Okinawa, is pointless, divisive, and expensive. … All this would serve 
America's interests and return American forces to places where bases have 
been closed, such as Hawaii and California. And it would gain the support 
of the American public because it is a policy toward East Asia that is 
fiscally and morally defensible.27 
Sustaining Johnson' idea, Mochizuki simply noted: “President Clinton 
should take a hard look at the U.S. force structure in Japan. One thing he would discover 
is that 20,000 U.S. Marines are no longer needed there.”28 
Moderate in his approach, O'Hanlon considers that any reduction should 
certainly consider the security related matters: “Anyone who argues for a significant 
reduction in the physical presence of the U.S. Marine component in Okinawa -as I do-
should be prepared to explain how that can be accomplished without harming Japanese or 
U.S. security interests in the region.”29 
The reality shows that the presence of foreign troops on other states’ 
territories generates both positive and negative consequences. At the same time the 
general picture shows that while at the central level, mainly politically represented, the 
attitude may be positive, at the local level the society may encounter different conditions, 
which if not well evaluated may generate opposition in most cases. The discrepancy 
between the political and social is more evident where the central authorities do not back 
up the local ones in dealing with a foreign military presence. It is also true that the level 
of nuisance is directly proportional with the number and size of the bases. Another issue 
that should be mentioned is the discrepancy between the expectations of civil society and 
the reality. The bigger the difference is, the bigger the level of disappointment grows. A  
 
                                                 
27 Chalmers Johnson. 
28  Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon, "The Marines Should Come Home.", The Brookings 
Review 14, no. 2 (April 1, 1996): 10.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 3, 
2007). 
29 Michael O'Hanlon. 
 13
realistic approach from the beginning would certainly offer the opportunity to understand 
the complexity of this subject and identify the communality or differences of countries in 
dealing with the basing of foreign troops. 
4. Overall Literature Assessment  
While a large part of the literature involves extensive polemic, some well 
presented books stand out, written by authors like Duke, Treverton, Zimmermann, 
Williams, Nelson, Harkavy, Goedde, and Sharp. Not all authors agree on the subject of 
maintaining/withdrawal of the foreign bases on/from other countries territories, and the 
description of the causes or possible solutions over the dispute are not always clearly 
enunciated; few authors treat the subject in an impersonal manner, oscillating from a 
positive to a negative approach. Few authors offer any advice that might be used by one 
of the parts. However, a careful reading of the literature can provide data, which, as a last 
resort may help us formulate possible solutions. 
The overall consideration is that the existing literature identifies three areas of 
impact: security, economics, and societal/environmental. This thesis will focus on these 
three areas while dealing with them from the perspective of different countries.  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
1. Methodology  
This thesis will attempt to find an answer to the research question by providing an 
analysis of civil-military relations, as case studies, in countries that have hosted American 
troops on their territories, as independent variables in comparison to the most significant 
areas of concern and their rate of success as dependent variables. The main causes that 
affected the success or failure (less success) in chosen areas, together with the specific 
conditions that have generated a certain pattern identified in case studies will help to 
round up and complete the conclusions and lessons learned. Those will also contribute in 
shaping the final recommendations and proposals to the Romanian authorities. The 
previous successful structures (in terms of organizations) and systems (in terms of 
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communication, flow of information, decision making, control, and execution) used by 
other countries in their relationship with the American troops may help the Romanian 
authorities in remodeling the present structure and system assigned to the implementation 
of the AA.  
As country case studies, Germany, and Japan (Okinawa) have been chosen under 
the following considerations: 
1. These two countries have an extensive experience in hosting American 
troops on their territories. 
2. Both of them have been situated at the boundary of NATO, and similar 
to Romania’s case, this could have generated additional security issues 
and challenges.  
3. These two countries are part of different geographical, strategic areas, 
which creates different problems driven by the zonal conditions. 
4. The two countries are part of two different cultures, which expands the 
area of research by involving more national caveats. 
5. The two countries are part of different political-economic systems, 
which, by diversification, generate a larger number of conclusions and 
lessons learned. 
2.  Sources  
A variety, of as much as possible primary, and secondary scholarly sources will 
be used to present the case studies and support the hypothesis. Whenever possible, 
secondary sources will be traced to primary documents, and the most objective and 
credible primary sources will be used.  
As primary sources in researching this thesis, interviews will be conducted with 
local authorities from the areas where the troops will be located. This will offer a 
perspective from the local community point of view, as well the major expectations and 
uncertainties linked to the presence of the American troops. At the same time, this author 
will try to obtain information directly from USECOM and USAREUR, both being 
involved in the bilateral decision making political-military body, so called the Joint 
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Committee. This approach will try to investigate the American standpoint regarding the 
civil-military relations between the American troopers and the civilians in the bases’ 
areas.  
F. THESIS SYNOPSIS  
This thesis is comprised of five major sections.  The first section will cover the 
general debate and the overall questions and arguments. The second section covers the 
background on the issue: a general introduction of the basing in Europe followed by the 
reasoning of moving the existing bases to the East. The new concept of bases location 
will picture the new approach of the American military authorities dealing with new 
political, strategic and economic challenges in finding viable solutions. A retrospective of 
the recent Romanian concerns regarding the presence of the American troops will set up 
the scene for further, more detailed discussions.   
The third and fourth sections address the issues of Japanese and German 
experiences in hosting American troops on their territories. A careful analysis of the 
positive and negative aspects in the security, economic and social/environmental realms 
reveals the general lessons learned and conclusions as well as the particularities of each 
country in both civil and military relations.  
The fifth and last section summarizes the implications that both the civil and 
military authorities should take note of and recommends specific actions and measures 
that both may take in minimizing the negative and maximizing the positive aspects of the 






























II. THE RE-STATIONING OF U.S. MILITARY BASES IN 
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: ROMANIAN EXPECTATIONS AND 
CONCERNS ABOUT POLICY AND STRATEGY, IN DETAIL   
Even an all-powerful America will need Europe's political support, 
military bases, cooperation in international organizations, peacekeepers 
and police, money, diplomatic help with others, and general good will.30 
Philip H. Gordon 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the background to the re-stationing of American troops within 
Europe since the mid 1990s. In particular, this chapter discusses the new garrisons in 
Romania, under the American “lily pad” basing concept, taking into account the new 
security and defense challenges in the Southeastern European area and its glacis. The 
overall picture is then completed through an examination of Romanian society and an 
appreciation of the most important issues: the civil society and the basing of allied troops 
on national territory.  
The American military relocation in Europe occurs as part of the reformed 
security approach in the face of asymmetrical threats to the NATO of today. The present 
examination of the location of troops at the Black Sea coast, NATO’s Eastern border, will 
certainly reveal politico-military, military strategic, and economic issues, and calculations 
made by American political and military institutions.  The desire to reorganize U.S. bases 
in continental Europe has been an old one, yet given powerful, new energy by the post 11 
September 2001 transformation of U.S. forces, which included the putative abandonment 
of the kinds of garrisons as still found in the Federal Republic of Germany in favor of the 
kinds of bases and facilities connected with U.S. forces in the Pacific realm, i.e. the so-
called “lily pad” concept of a stripped down infrastructure. To be sure, a handful of 
political, strategic and economic issues are connected with this ideal as applied to the real 
world context of Romania in NATO and the EU. 
                                                 
30 Philip H. Gordon. 
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The makers of strategy in the U.S. Department of Defense have envisaged the 
“lily pad” basing concept as a new formula for enabling an effective operational response 
of the U.S. military forces, in wartime, across the face of the globe. The new system 
should make the positioning of materials and equipment, training and common military 
exercises easier for the troops without the unnecessary expenses and political burdens of 
the system forged in the 1950s. 
The new basing conception may be, in short, described as follows: 
As the Army transforms to an expeditionary force, a new concept called 
“lily-pad” basing is being developed for basing troops overseas. Under 
this concept, the United States would not have permanent, large-scale 
military installations in another country. Instead of building its own bases 
as it has in the past, the Army would use other countries’ existing 
facilities. It would have only a skeletal staff and an agreement with the 
host country that the base could be used as a forward operating base in a 
time of crisis. These “lily-pad” bases would be austere training and 
deployment sites often in areas not previously used for U.S. bases.31 
An understanding of the AA (Access Agreement as defined in Chapter 1) official 
framework and the steps made towards its implementation will help us to determine the 
level of involvement of the political and politico-military levels in the formalization of 
this partnership and its success in practice.   
A retrospective of the recent Romanian expectations and concerns regarding the 
presence of the American troops will set the stage for a further, more detailed discussion 
in the following chapters. 
Romania, as the vanguard of both NATO and EU in the new century, has to deal 
in the Black Sea region with a variety of asymmetric challenges and threats, starting with 
Russia’s hegemonic tendencies and its political, military and economic countermeasures, 
and ending with the proliferation of terrorist activities, drugs, arms and human 
trafficking. Furthermore a correct evaluation of Romanian expectations and concerns will 
ensure “food for thought” and further focusing in the discussions in the next chapters. 
                                                 
31 David C. Chandler, JR, “‘Lily-Pad’ Basing Concept Put to the Test”, Army Logistician, March/April 
2005, Vol. 37 Issue 2, 11-13, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=16343
151&site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed January 10, 2008). 
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It should be said that the garrison of the Mihai Kogalniceanu (MK) base has 
received special attention in this chapter, being the first and most important location 
where the American forces will be based. The opening of the MK military base will be 
examined within the assessment of other possible locations for the American military, 
bases to be used in Romania.  
Furthermore, one should note that the overview of the news and information 
presented by the Romanian and international mass media comes primarily from the June-
September 2007 period when the MK base opened and the first military common 
exercise, “Proof of Principle” organized under AA’s auspices took place. By doing so, 
the author tried to capture the most representative information, which in his opinion 
should illuminate the most accurate public attitude concerning the public opinions and 
sentiments toward the establishing of the first American military presence on Romanian 
territory.  
B. THE AMERICAN MILITARY RE-STATIONING WITHIN THE 
CONTEXT OF A NEW EUROPE  
In the wake of the present crisis, the location of American troops in Romania 
represents a new approach in dealing with the asymmetrical threats, which NATO 
encounters today. The location of troops at the Black Sea coast, NATO’s Eastern border, 
has many politico-military, military strategic, and to a certain extent, economic 
implications that demand special analysis.  
From the political-military point of view, this relocation occurs amid the 
enlargement of NATO, the construction of the wider European Union and the rise of 
jihadist terrorism in the 21st century. Esther Schrader,32 a journalist with the Los Angeles 
Times, reports that the rise of the opposition to U.S. policy and strategy among the 
Western European countries and the openness of the new post-1999 NATO members in 
hosting the American troops will result in certain changes of NATO’s military bases in 
                                                 
32 Esther Schrader, "After the War; U.S. Expedites Reshuffling of Europe Troops; The Pentagon 
Pursues a Leaner, Faster Force at New Bases in the Former East Bloc. Publicly, Officials Deny any Link to 
Iraq War Politics”:[HOME EDITION], Los Angeles Times, May 1, 2003, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 4, 2007). 
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Europe. It is a fact that the actual split of Europe was rooted in the past opposition of 
"Old Europe" (citing U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s words33) concerning the 
war in Iraq. In the same article, she notes that in the wake of the initial phase of the Iraq 
campaign in 2003 that “privately, however, senior military and civilian officials at the 
Pentagon say the speed with which the Defense Department is moving forward with its 
plans in Europe is being driven in a large measure by tensions with Germany, France and 
Turkey.”34 
George Allen, a former American statesman and journalist, offering the same 
point of view, has remarked that: 
Now is the time for the US to re-evaluate its bases in Europe. It should do 
this not to punish any ally, who did not agree with it, or simply to reward 
its newest allies, but to serve its own strategic interests. The new 
democracies of Europe offer the opportunity, strategic advantage and 
shared values that will help us to win the next conflict - or deter it 
altogether.35 
Secondly, the relocation of the American troops occurs as part of a new military 
strategy, which is in accordance with the new American foreign policy of promoting the 
democratic values in the world. The future involvement of the Alliance could be summed 
up simply: “If the U.S. and its allies are to prevail in a Global War on Terror it will most 
likely be involved in more Iraq -and Afghanistan-type scenarios in the future.”36  
Part of this new thinking advocating the re-basing of the American troops, and 
figuring the changes within Europe’s relations, Jeffrey Fleishman adds that “yet it is clear 
that Bulgaria and Romania, which are closer to the Middle East and the Caucasus and 
                                                 
33 Gregory R. Copley, "The new U.S., the New Europe, the New NATO, and New Centers of 
Gravity", Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, April 1, 2003, 3, 12, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 4, 2007). 
34 Esther Schrader. 
35 George Allen, "American Soldiers Should Be Moved to the East": GEORGE ALLEN: [London 1st 
Edition]. Financial Times, May 6, 2003, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 5, 
2007). 
36 Peter A. Wilson, John, Gordon IV, and David E., Johnson, "An Alternative Future Force: Building A 
Better Army", Parameters, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 (Winter 2003–04), 28; U.S. Department of Defense, 
Quadrennial Defense Review: February 2006, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 
9. 
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supported the U.S. war in Iraq, are Washington's newest darlings in Europe. Germany, 
which houses 84% of all U.S. troops on the continent, has lost much of its strategic 
cachet.”37 
Copley has embraced the same idea when capturing the strategic importance of 
this movement to the East: “Strategically, this will make the new strategic alignment - in 
a sense, a 'new NATO' far more strategically responsive to the Middle East and 
Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Maghreb (North African states).”38 
He also noted: 
The United States Government is working toward completing plans for the 
movement of virtually all of its forces based in Germany [more than 
112,000 U.S. troops are based in Europe and about 80% of them spread in 
Germany] to new bases in the Balkans: in Serbia-Montenegro, Bulgaria 
and Romania. The move has profound political, strategic and economic 
consequences, including formalizing a schism in NATO which will 
ultimately lead either to its reduction in scope or a redirection of its 
activities.39  
Trying to find an answer to the question “Can the Army’s new method of 
expeditionary operations be supported using the 'lily-pad' basing concept?”40 triggered 
new experimentation in Eastern Europe, in 2005, as presented by Captain David C. 
Chandler, JR, the commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 37th 
Transportation Command, in Kaiserslautern, Germany:  
Soldiers of the 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) in Kaiserslautern, 
Germany, sought to answer that question. Their task was to deploy several 
hundred soldiers from Illinois to an austere location in Eastern Europe; 
provide those soldiers with food, fuel, and supplies; and allow them to 
train in preparation for a notional follow-on deployment to a combat or 
peacekeeping theater of operations. The operation took place in the Novo 
                                                 
37 Jeffrey Fleishman, "U.S. Forces in Europe Set Sights East, South; Realignment Plan Would Mean 
Drastic Changes for the Continent and the Troops Stationed There:"  [Home Edition]. Los Angeles Times, 
May 30, 2003, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 5, 2007). 
38 Gregory R. Copley. 
39 Ibid. 
40 David C. Chandler, Jr. 
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Selo Training Area in central Bulgaria in July and August 2004. About 
1,300 soldiers, contractors, and host nation workers participated.41 
And the answer was: 
The lessons learned during this exercise will play a key role in conducting 
future exercises and planning for future basing in Eastern Europe. From its 
experience in Bulgaria, the 37th Transportation Command determined that 
it could adapt quickly to handle such missions in the future. The Bulgarian 
military and civilian communities were eager to work with U.S. forces. 
Their flexibility helped make the operation a success in both training and 
international relations. Task Force Log also showed that the Army’s 
expeditionary force concept could be supported logistically and 
operationally.42 
A third implication points to the economical aspects of relocation.  
As William Safire, a well known American author and political columnist, 
iterated, starting in the mid 90s, the U.S. was attached to the idea of reducing military 
expenses not only by closing military bases on American territory but also by reducing 
the deployment of its own troops in Europe. As an alternative, redeploying a certain 
amount of troops in less expensive areas, and improving the stationing and rotation 
planning, could be considered. And, as the author states, there are feasible solutions:   
By cutting the number in half, by rotating the troops every six months, 
thereby obviating the need for dependents' schools and extensive support 
facilities; and by moving the bases south and east toward low-cost 
Hungary, southern Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, the Defense 
Department could spread our military techniques and equipment 
throughout the alliance and train with fewer environmental constraints at 
far less cost.43 
Summarizing all these three categories of consideration, George Allen concluded 
the following ways of action:  
The first one is represented by positioning the troops closer to the present 
military threats from Middle East and Caucasus, being well understood 
that southern and eastern borders of Europe are the new boundaries for the 
                                                 
41 David C. Chandler, Jr. 
42 Ibid. 
43 William Safire, "Surprising Germany": [Op-Ed], New York Times, February 10, 2003, Late Edition 
(east Coast), http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 4, 2007). 
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terrorism. The second one is defined by the fact that despite German and 
French opposition of hosting US troops on their territory, countries like 
Romania are welcoming them. In such countries the political will and 
governments are backed up by the will of their population. And the third 
but not less important the bases located in this part of the world are cost-
effective. … A garrison near Bucharest would cost less than one near 
Bonn.44 
C. MOVING EAST – THE U.S.A. “LILY PAD” BASING CONCEPT 
APPLIED TO EUROPE 
The future troops’ basing in Eastern Europe has many putative strategic 
advantages. The Pentagon's strategic planning has envisioned the recent expansion of its 
interests across Central Asia, and in this new context, the relocation into Eastern Europe 
will enhance the possibilities for action, and “…the U.S. military will span the globe as 
never before.”45 This idea is not new since the U.S. forces spanned the globe in the 
1950s, but reiterate the need of a better representation on the European continent in 
accordance with the new U.S. strategic interests.  
Ian Fisher noted the idea expressed by Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields, deputy 
commander of the United States Marines in Europe, that ''Iraq did provide an opportunity 
for Romania to demonstrate its capabilities, more so its willingness, to cooperate … [a]nd 
Romania stepped up to the plate ''46 and then he assumed:  
The next step may be more permanent bases here [i.e. SE Europe]. 
Nothing is official and military officials here and at the Pentagon stress 
that planning is in its earliest stages. But, in short, the plans envision a 
reduction in the forces in Germany in favor of smaller bases in Eastern 
Europe, Central Asia, the Far East and Africa -- all filled with rotating 
troops poised to strike quickly. The model is quite different from the 
permanent communities in Germany; soldiers would likely arrive alone, 
living in spartan quarters … Officials say that up to 3,000 American 
soldiers could operate there at a time.47 
                                                 
44 George Allen.  
45 Esther Schrader. 
46 Ian Fisher, "U.S. Eyes a Willing Romania As a New Comrade in Arms." New York 
Times, July 16, 2003, Late Edition (east Coast), http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed 
August 5, 2007). 
47 Ibid. 
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According to the former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Marine Gen. 
James L. Jones, former commander of U.S. forces in Europe, 2003, the vision of the new 
bases in Europe, presented by Esther Schrader, is the so-called "lily pad" distribution: “… 
the new bases, ports, airfields and training grounds would be staffed with limited 
numbers of highly mobile units that would be deployed without their families for six-
month rotations. They would be able to jump from country to country on a moment's 
notice.”48 ---An assertion that may or may not be true in fact. Such bases could also be 
used for positioning materials and equipment and for training and common military 
exercises as well. Schrader then cites the same military official: 
I don't think we're talking about building another Ramstein [i.e. the major 
USAF base in western Germany] or another ... large installation where you 
have the small-town USA come with it, like families and schools and 
everything else," Jones said in Washington this week. "But what we're 
trying to do is develop a family of bases that ... can go from being cold to 
warm to hot if you need them, to be very efficiently and economically 
built.49 
Situated at the same pole, Jeffrey Fleishman in his May 2003 article, "U.S. Forces 
in Europe Set Sights East, South; Realignment plan would mean drastic changes for the 
continent and the troops stationed there” presents the same point of view when citing 
another military officer:   "’We're not going to build any more little Americas,’ said 
Wald, deputy commander of the U.S. European Command. He was referring to the 
sprawling bases, such as those near Heidelberg and Ramstein that provide 130,000 U.S. 
military dependents with playgrounds, schools, supermarkets and family housing 




                                                 
48 Esther Schrader. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Jeffrey Fleishman. 
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D. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES 
FORCES LOCATED ON THE TERRITORY OF ROMANIA 
1. General Considerations 
In the last decade, the civil-military relations in Romania underwent significant 
and radical changes associated with the end of the Ceausescu regime and the enlargement 
of NATO and the EU.   Democratically elected civil authorities gained control over the 
military system, which changed the basis of the civil-military relations from the 
parameters of the Warsaw Pact to those of NATO. Since 1989, when important steps 
have been made toward the country’s democratization, the external policy was 
concentrated on Romania’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic organization and European 
Union. These two main organizations were regarded by Romanian elites as the only ones 
that could help Romania in its development and to gain its rightful place within the 
European community. These aspirations of becoming a western country and a free 
democracy have been regarded by Romanians as primary goals after fifty years of 
communism and Soviet influence, and the only way of assuring the future of the country.  
Through accession to NATO in 2004 (and sequentially to EU in 2007), Romania 
has achieved not only its necessary level of security, but also the possibility of playing an 
active role on the European continent and in the world.  
As previously stated, the basing of American troops in Romania takes place under 
new circumstances that envisage the new challenges of NATO in accomplishing its new 
role and mission, according to a new strategic planning, and in a new dimension of 
European political changes. Romania, as many other countries, has supported the War in 
Iraq, which, Ian Fisher51 noted, has provided an opportunity to demonstrate its capacities 
and its willingness to be integrated in NATO and closely cooperate with the American 
troops.   
 
                                                 
51 Ian Fisher. 
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These new conditions extrapolated to the Romanian society may generate new 
challenges to the civil military relations and result in a new framing of Romania’s 
international relations and security. 
2. The Formal Framework   
It is clear that the relocation of the U.S. bases, in Romania, has Romanian 
political support in the realm of the parties and public opinion, as expressed by the 
Romanian Minister of the Defense: “The signing of the 2005 Access Agreement 
concerning the use of military facilities in Romania by the USA armed forces was a 
political decision of undeniable importance, which gave fresh impetus to the development 
of bilateral relations.”52 The international press captures the same idea: “Local opinion 
polls show that the hospitality of these governments reflects the will of their people.”53 
The political support made possible the negotiation and signing of an important set of 
documents related to the AA ruling this bilateral relation and setting the conditions and 
rules governing the presence of the American troops in Romania. 
An important step was the set up of the Joint Committee, the official document 
being signed from the Romanian side by the State Secretary Corneliu Dobritoiu in the 
beginning of summer 2007, at the U.S. European Command HQ in Stuttgart. The creation 
of this body made possible the civilian oversight of the activity, allowing for common 
Romanian-American consultation regarding the different application domains of the AA. 
At the same time, this organization ensures the implementation of the bilateral agreement. 
Under this committee a number of subcommittees and working groups, comprised of 
specialists and experts from the entire governmental institutional interagency 
constellation, will work together with the American counterpart to facilitate American 
troops’ training and instruction. Additionally an interdepartmental commission at the 
State Secretary level was formed in order to conduct better and more timely responses to 
the American requests.  
                                                 
52 Nine O’clock, “Minister of National Defence, H.E. Mr. Teodor Melescanu: Romania - US Military 
Cooperation Witnesses Significant Growth” published in issue 3967 at 2007-07-04. 
53 George Allen. 
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The accord between Romania and the USA regarding the activities of the 
American forces stationed in Romania will be enforced by an inter-
ministerial committee made up of 14 secretaries of state from almost all 
the ministries and the head of the Central Office for Special Matters. The 
establishment of the new structure was approved, by decision, at the 
Government meeting on Wednesday. “The committee will work as a 
forum of dialogue and decision-making of the representatives of the 
institutions with competence in the field, for the purpose of facilitating the 
implementation of the Accord, and will have the role to organise and co-
ordinate all activities for implementing it,” reads a Government press 
release.54  
 
Figure 1.   Joint Committee Interrelationship 
State Secretary Corneliu Dobritoiu explained: “This commission has been formed 
to support the American partners’ requests, which may cover a large diversity of 
domains, from custom procedural regulations, environmental protection, work and 
                                                 
54 Nine O’clock, “Inter-Ministerial Committee for Enforcement of Romania- US Accord,” June 15, 
2007. 
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employment procedures, penal jurisdiction, and others, which are not in the MOD’s 
competence.”55 The same official has pointed out that at the MOD level, two specialized 
organizations are functioning in order to ensure the smoothness of the cooperation 
process.  
 
Figure 2.   Romanian MOD relationship flow 
One of them which functions at the Department for Defence Policy and 
Planning’s level, the Coordination and Monitoring Center of the Access Agreement 
Implementation, represents the MOD’s interface with the American partner and the 
national institutions; and the second one, the Technical Secretariat at the GS level, holds 
responsibility at the military working level for the direct liaison with the military 
components and cooperation for accomplishing the necessary support for the training and 
basing activity. As shown on the presented charts, the Romanian MOD has developed a 
                                                 
55 Razvan Belciuganu, “Vin Americanii!” [The Americans Are Coming!], Jurnalul National, July 18, 
2007, http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/97430/vin-americanii (accessed August 5, 2007).  
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network at the national level (Fig. 1), which makes possible the involvement of all the 
responsible ministries and national agencies in relation with the American partner 
through a Joint Committee, and at the MOD level (Fig. 2), an internal relationship flow, 
which is able to aggregate all the subordinate military structure in providing the 
necessary support. The network at the national level involves all three related levels: 
political, political-military and military. 
This structure ensures the involvement of the national policy makers, the related 
agents of the executive power and the MOD’s internal structure. The design of this 
system is to ensure the civil control, oversight and the efficiency of the process as the 
required trinity of the civil-military relations in achieving the civil paternity and the 
transparency of the military actions in relation to the implementation of the AA. Another 
positive aspect for implementing such a framework is the fact that this makes possible the 
access to all the resources, political tools, and decisional factors, which otherwise may 
hamper the implementation process. 
3. The Implementation Process 
Parts of the implementation process of the AA, 19 (or according to other latter 
sources 20) separate domains of discussion and negotiation have been identified by the 
MOD as designated authority together with EUCOM. This process was necessary to 
harmonize the provisions of the AA with the Romanian laws and legislation. Those 
domains were: 
o Joint Committee;  
o Command & Control Relationships;  
o Movement of vessels, vehicles and aircraft;  
o Foreign criminal jurisdiction and military discipline;  
o Real estate;  
o Claims procedures;  
o Official tax exemption;  
o Custom procedures;  
o Delivery and support of medical services;  
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o Mortuary affairs services and the U.S. armed forces regional medical 
examiner;  
o Military service/support activities;  
o Security;  
o Communications;  
o Environment matters;  
o Contracting procedures and status of contractors;  
o Local civilian labor rights;  
o Aerial training;  
o Land maneuver and training; and,  
o Pre-positioning of defense equipment, supplies and materiel.  
The negotiation of these domains followed the same path by involving the 
respective responsible institutions (ministries, agencies, organizations) at the national 
level, for assuring the necessary expertise and for creating the related responsibilities. In 
this process some of Additional Implementation Arrangements are already in place, 
signed and functional, and some of them are still in the signing or negotiation process.  
Referring to the negotiation process the Nine O’clock publication has iterated: 
Corneliu Dobritoiu, the chief of the Defence Policy Department of the 
Ministry of Defence, and General-Major William Catto, Chief of Staff of 
the United States European Command (EUCOM), signed last week eight 
implementation arrangements. They are part of the Agreement between 
Romania and the United States regarding the activities of American troops 
stationed on our territory. According to a MoD press briefing, by signing 
these documents, the framework for the planning, organising and 
conducting training activities has been established in accordance with the 
Romanian legislation. Also settled was the way in which specific 
implementation problems would be applied as part of the Access 
Agreement signed on December 6, 2005 and ratified by Law 268/2006.56  
The situation of these arrangements was presented in the Stars and Stripe military 
publication as it stood in mid-August of 2007: 
                                                 
56 Nine O’clock, “Romania-US Military Partnership, Reinforced” July 24, 2007. 
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“Even as the first rotation of U.S. troops arrives in Romania as part of a historic 
deployment, the former Soviet bloc nation and the U.S. are working out details on how 
their shared military facilities will operate for years to come. Eight agreements were 
signed last month in Bucharest, the Romanian capital, while another nine have been 
agreed upon by negotiators.”57 
In the same article, a detailed list of what was concluded is provided with some 
additional explanations: 
Agreements signed by the U.S. and Romania for military training in Romania and 
some of the areas they cover: 
o Land training: Training that can be done, ordnance used. 
o Air training: Airspace rules, safety procedures, training calendar. 
o Medical: Governs who can treat whom, as well as hospitalization, 
payment and insurance issues. 
o Mortuary affairs: Performance of autopsies; issuance of death certificates; 
custody and disposition of bodies. 
o Security: Gate access, ID cards, use of firearms, surveillance, rights to 
arrest. 
o Communications: Radio frequencies, construction of receiver sites off-
post. 
o Environment: Pre-usage site surveys, hazardous materials storage, 
disposal and cleanup, real estate management. 
o Command relationships: Interactions between U.S. and Romanian 
commanders, areas of responsibility.58 
… and what is coming next: 
Agreements made but not yet reviewed and signed by proper authorities 
include: 
o Criminal jurisdiction.  
o Claims.  
o Tax exemption.  
o Customs.  
o Integrating of military support activities (postal, etc.).  
o Contracting.  
o Local-national labor.59 
                                                 
57 Charlie Coon, “Agreements Set for Romania Deployment”: [European edition], Stars and Stripes, 




It should be noted that there is an increased interest shown by the civil society 
around this activity, and at the same time, in response to that, the openness of the military 
institutions in informing the public. The transparency adopted by the Romanian MOD 
ensures the civilians to have direct access to the process and offers the necessary 
information in assessing the achievements in implementing this bilateral agreement.  
At the national political level, the AA is viewed as a contextual component and as 
a follow up of the Romania-U.S. Strategic Partnership signed ten years ago on 11th of 
July 1997 by the former Romanian President Constantinescu and President Bill Clinton, 
which elevated the relations between the two countries. The strong commitment made at 
that time by Romania made possible the definitive conversion of the Romanian society in 
its way of building a strong democracy and the definitive rupture with and withdrawal 
from the Russian sphere of influence. 
The importance of the AA is not only critical from the practical point of view, but 
also from a political and psychological point of view, as American Ambassador, 
Taubman, states in the July 4 edition of the Azi: “this year the common Romania-
American military facilities will function, a tangible symbol of a solid alliance between 
our countries.” 
E. OPENING THE FIRST BASE  
1. Possible Locations for the American Troops   
The initial evaluation and offer of the possible locations for the American troops 
on the Romanian territory included the air bases from Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK), 
Fetesti, Buzau, Timisoara (Giarmata), Campia Turzii (Luna), the training area from 
Babadag, and the maritime base from Constanta (see Fig. 3).60 
The AA also includes some other facilities offered for common use by the 
Romanian troops and the American counterpart at Cincu, Smârdan, and Malina, which 
                                                 
60 Snapshot from Vasile Popa, “Redislocarea Bazelor Militare ale SUA in Europa de Est-Romania,” 
Bucuresti: Editura Universitatii Nationale de Aparare, 2005, 
http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/redislocarea_bazelor_militare_ale_sua.pdf (accessed August 3, 2007). 
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are training sites used in the past by Romanian Armed Forces. All of these locations 
presented attractive geographic, strategic-military, and social-cultural characteristics. 
 
Figure 3.   Possible locations for the American troops on the Romanian territory 
Their infrastructure has been identified as adequate for the purpose of basing 
American troops, requiring minimum investments for setting up or modernization. These 
locations have optimal storage capacity, are connected to the transportation network 
(road, rail, air, and naval), and allow the set up of a logistic system in a very short time, 
having a broad presence of private companies and entrepreneurs in their area. The areas 
where these are located have natural water sources and are not exposed to natural hazards 
(earthquakes, hurricanes, inundations, etc).   
The American counterpart showed particular interest in the locations particularly 
situated in the Southeastern part of Romania (Dobrogea), which includes all of the 
requirements for the American troops: good training facilities, live-fire ranges, good 
accommodation facilities, and good recreation resorts. Additionally, the MK and Fetesti 
airports, Constanta seaport and rail hub, permit a quick inflow and outflow of troops in 
emergency cases, plus this area being the nearest located to the Black Sea allows the 
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interconnection with the other bases from Turkey, Bulgaria, and even the Middle East. It 
should be added that Dobrogea is closest located to the troubled areas from Transdnistria, 
Middle East, Caucasus, and Balkans.   
2. The “Mihail Kogalniceanu”(MK) Military Base 
The MK base, which includes facilities both for the U.S. Army and Air Force, a 
compound including a former military garrison (the 34th Mechanized Brigade) and an 
airport (both for military and civil purposes) used by the Romanian armed forces, has 
been the first base to be open in Romania. 
The consideration of using Romania for basing troops first came in the spring of 
2003 when Turkey decided against it involvement in Iraq. The MK Airport was a viable 
alternative solution, for refueling and supplying of the American troops, to the Turkish 
facilities. 
The newspaper Stars and Stripes cited by the Romanian mass media, asserts the 
fact that “Romania has put at the U.S.A.’s disposal its aerial space during the Iraq war, at 
a critical moment when Austria and Turkey have refused that, and Romania has 
supported the Iraq and Afghanistan missions with troops.”61 The same source added: 
“Romania, … has sustained an intense lobby in the last few years for obtaining not only 
American funding, but also Washington’s favors, proving herself an exemplar ally in the 
war against terrorism.”62  
The first contingent of the U.S. military forces was scheduled to arrive in the 
second half of the summer of 2007. Part of the bilateral agreement was to grant the 
Americans access to some of the Romanian Armed Forces’ fire ranges and to initiate 
common instruction and training with the Romanian military personnel. The first planned 
common exercise was called “Proof of Principle” and was scheduled to take place 
between August-October of the same year.  
                                                 
61 Alina Neagu, “Stars&Stripes: Militarii Amerciani Incep sa se Familiarizeze cu Practicile Corupte din 
Romania”, [Stars&Stripes: American Soldiers are Familiarizing with Corruption Practices in Romania], 
HotNews.ro, http://www.hotnews.ro/articol_86292-Stars-Stripes-Militarii-amerciani-incep-sa-se-
familiarizeze-cu-practicile-corupte-din-Romania.htm (accessed October 10, 2007). 
62 Ibid. 
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The coming of the first soldiers at the MK military bases near Constanta has not 
passed unnoticed: “The arrival of these soldiers is an important political and military 
event, given that Romanian soldiers will have the opportunity to train next to their 
American colleagues at the highest NATO standards,”63 said Minister of Defence Teodor 
Melescanu. Because the Romanian public perceived that Romania was offering its bases 
to the American military, an explanation was needed. The State Secretary Corneliu 
Dobritoiu, who wanted to make clear the real scope of the American presence, made this 
public:  
… there will be no American bases on the Romanian territory. Even very 
often there are opinions expressed by different people that there will be 
U.S.A. military bases on Romanian and Bulgarian territory, this is 
completely out of discussion; what this is all about is about common 
instruction and training for the American troops together with the military 
of these two countries, which provide the basing facilities. Romania 
retains the ownership of all the terrains, military bases, and other facilities 
that are going to be used.  As part of the deal the U.S.A. having access to 
these facilities may modernize them according to their standards and 
minimal life conditions.64 
The common training of the Romanian troops with their American counterparts, 
as an essential benefit for the Romanian Army, has received special attention from the 
civilian society and the Romanian mass media. The common military exercises 
“Carpathian Summer 2007”65 and “Proof of Principle”66 have received vast attention and 
space in newspaper columns. It is worth mentioning the Stars and Stripes: “Both 
countries want to build their military ties, and that goal goes beyond the colonels and 
officers to the ground - pounding Army grunts not too far removed from boot camp. 
During the Proof of Principle Exercise, Romanian and U.S. troops are integrated, not 
                                                 
63 Alecs Iancu, “Defence Minister: US troops to Arrive in Constanta by End of August”, Nine O’clock, 
June 21, 2007. 
64 Razvan Belciuganu. 
65 An off station training exercise in Romania at the Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase that involved Airmen 
from Ramstein Air Base, and took place at the end of July 2007. 
66 The bulk of the nearly 900 American troops taking part in the exercise came from the Idar-
Oberstein, Germany-based 1st Battalion, and 94th Field Artillery. The Romanian soldiers were from the 
341st Infantry Battalion. 
 36
segregated as they often are during multinational training events. They are sleeping, 
eating and training together every day until the closing ceremony in late October.”67  
According to the first estimate made by the American and Romanian parts, the 
MK base should accommodate, on a regular basis, no more that 2000 soldiers. 
Information disseminated from a variety of sources may present a different view as is the 
case of information provided in the Romanian newspaper Adevarul: “The Pentagon will 
constitute a number of brigades comprising of about 4000 men, will send an 
expeditionary Corps in Romania, to Constanta, and another one in Bulgaria.”68 This kind 
of information is ambiguous and may imply the fact that in Romania will be stationed 
about 4000 American troops, and judging by the title (U.S. expeditionary Corps at 
Constanta) someone may draw the conclusion that the purpose of the American troops’ 
presence in Romania is to be used for combat missions. Another source estimates the 
presence of the American troops at 3000: “From 2005, when the Romanian state signed 
the accord for hosting American military forces on its territory, numerous investments 
have been made at the Kogalniceanu base, which is designated to accommodate 
approximately 3000 U.S. Army soldiers.”69 The newspaper Azi in its early August 2007 
edition published the same amount. 
The number may vary and it could be that in the future there will be some new 
estimates, which may be needed to cope with the real strategic needs of the Pentagon. 
There are some discrepancies between different mass-media sources, which may puzzle 
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F. ROMANIAN EXPECTATIONS  
1. General Issues 
The overall assessment of the feelings of the Romanian civilian society regarding 
the American presence in their country can be described by the administrative 
representative of the county [Constanta] that will host most of the troops: “’The major 
concern is to speed up the Americans' coming here,’ said Gheorghe Martin, the prefect of 
the Constanta area. ‘We've been waiting for the Americans for 50 years. Now that they 
are here, can we really ask ourselves if they are welcome?’”70 This question is really 
embedding the aspirations for the good of the Romanians, especially in economical terms 
as well as the intrinsic concerns of the relationship. Mr. Martin’s allusion has its roots in 
the stories passed from generation to generation about the fact that during WW II, 
Romanians were expecting the American troops to liberate them. Unfortunately it did not 
happen, so the frustration of being left to Russian discretion was also passed from a 
generation to another.   
In a study released by the Romanian National Defense College, Vasile Popa71 
analyzes the different perspectives of the U.S. troops’ relocation to Romania’s national 
territory. When talking about advantages, the author mainly deals with the new geo-
strategic implications driven by the troops’ proximity, and their central positioning from 
a zonal, continental, and global perspective in relation to the new areas of NATO’s 
interest. This aspect has been already covered in the second part of this chapter. At the 
same time, he parallels his conclusions to the fact that the presence of the American 
troops will provide the necessary security for making Romania a stable country and, 
implicitly, more attractive to foreign investments. Gregory R. Copley is attached to the 
idea that the American presence at the Black Sea coast has implications in certain areas  
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71 Vasile Popa, “Redislocarea Bazelor Militare ale SUA in Europa de Est-Romania”, Bucuresti: Editura 
Universitatii Nationale de Aparare, 2005, 
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such as security when he argues that, “… more significantly, the deployment of U.S. 
forces in the Balkans would provide a level of U.S. political support and, in a sense, 
protection of the host states.”72  
Copley also argues that the relocation of the American bases to Eastern Europe 
has certain economic implications: 
Most of the 65,000 Army troops in USEUCOM have been based in 
Germany. It is anticipated that as many as 40,000 could be based, in the 
future, in the Balkans, providing a significant economic injection into the 
local economies, quite apart from infrastructural development (and the 
additional impact of Air Force and Naval basing).73 
The improvement in the security is intrinsically related to the economic activity 
growth at both national and local levels and will represent the focal point of this part of 
the chapter.   
Obviously, the cooperation and interoperability through common training of the 
Romanian military with the U.S. troops will be achieved. The advantages of this bilateral 
military relationship are expressed in both international and national mass media. The 
Romanian newspaper Jurnalul National of July 2007 published an article called “Vin 
Americanii!”74 [The Americans are coming!], presenting both the economical and 
military advantages related to this issue. 
2. The Economic Expectations at the National Level 
In his 4th of July speech, the American ambassador at Bucharest, Mr. Taubman, 
pointed out that the actual Romanian-American partnership-- beyond the opportunity of 
common training of the two armed forces-- has further implications not only in the 
security realm but also in the economic one. He said that, “Every month, an increasing 
number of American companies come to Romania; more American investors declare  
                                                 
72 Gregory R. Copley. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Razvan Belciuganu. 
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their trust in Romania’s future.”75 And on the same occasion, Taubman declared: “I have 
expressed this opinion before, but I want to stress it again: America has no better friend 
than Romania.”76 
At the same time, Romanian premier, Calin Popescu Tariceanu, stressed the 
importance of the Romanian-American Trade Chamber (AmCham), a new forum that has 
made its contribution to the rising economic growth Romania has enjoyed in the past few 
years, and its goal of promoting new investments and economic partnerships.  
In the last ten years, Romania has experienced a series of American investments, 
and a series of American companies have opened their business in Romania, especially in 
the food area. As the Romanian President Traian Basescu declared, this process “has 
been developed and still is developing, not only what we have now from the beginning, 
McDonald's, Pepsi Cola, and Coca Cola, which have strong investments in our country, 
but also the soft industry, even we talk about Oracle or Microsoft, and we hope that in a 
very short time, a matter a few weeks, one of the most important of the American 
construction holdings will be represented on the Romanian market.”77 Most probably the 
Romanian president was referring to RMS Investment Ventures, whose president recently 
declared: “We committed ourselves to open a 100 million [dollars] investment, which 
will start the American business’s snow ball in Romania.”78 The Romanian president has 
also pointed out, on different occasions, that Romania gains from the American presence 
not only talking from a military perspective, but also from an economic point of view. 
“Romania’s efforts, some publicists say, has been rewarded with a 10 years agreement 
signed with Washington from two Romanian bases to be used by Americans, which 
presumably involves 100 million dollars in investments.”79  
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3. The Economic Expectations at the Local Level 
The areas where the bases will be located will have some economic advantages. 
This is regarded as a positive development, and the Americans should know that this is 
what locals would expect.  
According to State Secretary, Corneliu Dobritoiu, “the economic benefits will be 
first of all at the local authorities’ level: local contracts for goods and services, the local 
employment for functioning of the base, and for necessary construction of the local and 
zonal infrastructure’s elements. At the same time, the American presence will help on 
promoting tourism capabilities of the zone, with a substantial impact for the near 
future.”80 The MEDIAFAX press agency has opined that, “The deployment of forces at 
Kogalniceanu brings jobs for 550 Romanians, with another 50 jobs possible as 
supplementation as soon as the operations start.”81 
In the year 2007, some money has already been injected at the local level, for a 
series of constructions and infrastructure improvement, and the plans were expanded as 
more troops were coming. In the second half of 2007, The United States was more and 
more involved in the preparation process of the designated bases (especially the MK Air 
Base), according to the arrival schedule of the troops.  For modernizing the facilities that 
will be used by the American troops, “a 35 million dollars budget has already been 
approved, on top of another 28 million. Since the beginning, at Mihail Kogalniceanu, 30 
million dollars have been spent for modernizing the runway.”82 Maybe at the macro level 
these sums are not very significant, but they make a difference at the micro level, playing 
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G. ROMANIAN CONCERNS   
1. Background 
Referring to the above-mentioned study, Popa approaches the vulnerabilities of 
Romania and the main ones are envisioned as being the following: 
a.  Deterioration of Romania’s Zonal and Continental Relation 
In this context, Popa sees the positioning of the new bases as a counter 
measure to the Russian Federation’s growing control and hegemonic aspirations over hot 
spots such as Transdnistria, Chechnya, and Abkhasia.  
The Russian interest in this part of the world is aimed at the control of 
natural resources and especially of that of energy resources. In this context the Russian 
reaction will be one of opposing the proximity of NATO troops to its borders and sphere 
of influence. The nuclear proliferation may increase in the Black Sea’s area, and a 
possible rocket missile threat may be directed towards Romanian territories. Romania 
will represent in this equation the vanguard of both NATO and EU, being situated at the 
contact between those organizations and Russia’s hemisphere of influence.  
It is the belief of this author that, on the European continent, a pro-
American Romanian policy may alter the relations between Romania and those EU 
countries opposing the U.S.’s hegemonic tendencies (Germany, France, and others).   
b.  Terrorist Threats on National and Local Security 
This subject envisions two main issues: 
(1) Reorientation of the terrorist activities towards Romania as 
a follow up of the closer U.S.-Romanian collaboration. 
After Romania joins the EU in 2007, the activity of illicit 
organizations of drug, arms, and human trafficking will intensify on Romanian territory, 
which will continue to represent the main segment of the second Balkan route toward the 
EU. Popa is of the opinion that the terrorist organizations will take advantage of chemical 
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and biological weapons’ development, using these kinds of weapons as a primary means 
in their attacks against the U.S.’s partner states. At the same time the author draws 
attention to the necessity of improving defense against cyber and informational attacks.   
(2) Possible terrorist attacks targeting the military bases or 
other strategic objectives. 
The same study mentions that after 2007 the flux of immigrants 
entering Romania will grow, increasing the possibility that more terrorists will 
successfully cross the borders thus increasing the risks of terrorist attacks. Those attacks 
may target the American bases and national strategic objectives. 
c.  Social [and Environmental] Issues 
Formation of a black market (drugs, arms, human trafficking) around the 
bases and local security degradation is seen as the main problem. The study estimates that 
around the American military bases a “colorful fauna” comprising drug dealers, arm and 
human trafficking brokers may appear, gravitating towards the “prosperity” mirage of the 
Americans. This situation may negatively influence the local society and may generate 
the extension of drug use among the civilians. At the end of the road, local security may 
be affected by the struggle between different gangs for controlling the local market.  
It is the opinion of this author that the environmental issues are very 
closely linked to the social ones, and because of that, they should be evaluated together.  
These three main points may constitute the framework for a succinct 
analysis regarding the possible threats and problems Romania may face in the context of 
hosting American troops on its territory. 
2. Deterioration of Romania’s Zonal and Continental Relations 
a.  Black Sea Region 
The Black See region is now seen as the main route of terrorism, drugs, 
human trafficking, and weapons of mass destruction’s transit to Europe and the Western 
World. In this context the U.S. is very concerned about limiting these threats and building 
 43
a defensive common policy. The actual situation in this area is not as simple as it may 
appear, especially because of the most recent developments. And the fact is that today 
Turkey, an old American ally, has joined its efforts with Russia in blocking American 
influence and involvement in the area. This new Turkish policy has to be placed in the 
context of the Montreux Convention, back in 1936. According to this, Turkey retained 
control of Bosforous, and any war ships not belonging to the riverane states are not 
allowed to stay in the Black See area more than 21 days. As is understood, the American 
presence in Romania and Bulgaria is limited to an Army representation, missing a Navy 
component. In this context, as noted by Barcin Yinanc in the Turkish Daily News, the 
Americans try to neutralize the Montreaux Convention’s regime through support received 
from these countries and more than that, Romania is seen as “…assuming the role of the 
Trojan Horse at the Black Sea coast.”83 The American initiatives to combat terrorism by 
extending the allied “Active Endeavor” operation in the Black Sea area has been 
frequently rejected by the Turkish-Russian tandem. More than that, this situation has put 
more pressure on the NATO-U.S.-Turkey relations.  Turkey has based its explanations on 
the fact that the naval forces present in the Black Sea area are enough to perform their 
job, and the extension of the NATO presence in this area is redundant. As a follow up, in 
2004 the BLACKSEAFOR initiative was created, representing the common efforts of six 
neighboring states in this area, compensating the necessity for action and common 
planning.    
Turkish support to the Russian opposition is even more difficult to 
understand because Russia will certainly try to maintain its influence in the area and to 
counter Turkey’s objective of becoming an energetic center and playing a role in the 
routing of resources from the Caspian Sea area to Europe. It is clear that Turkey sees-- 
through an increased American influence in this area-- the “diminution” of the Montreaux 
Convention, or even the necessity followed by the possibility of reviewing it, which 
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“Ankara would avoid with any price.”84 It is paradoxical to see Turkey backing up the 
Russian policy in this area, when it is remembered that one of the reasons that Turkey 
joined NATO was the contest of the Convention by Russia. Since the Soviet Union’s 
disintegration, Turkey has regularly tried to involve the U.S. in the region to 
counterbalance and reduce Russia’s influence on the ex-soviet countries. But today 
Turkey acts in an opposite manner, maybe fearing the American involvement and access 
in the Black Sea’s regional affairs. Most probably Turkish interests are driven by “so 
little to gain, and so much to lose” toward the American interference in this area, when 
considering the fact that a revision of the Montreaux Convention may re-discuss the 
status of Bosforous, and an American involvement in the area would place Turkey in a 
position as a second role player regarding the energy market and the policy decision 
making process.  
The Romanian position has been re-iterated by the president to the 
country’s commitment, and “…he is convinced that together with the American and 
European partners this region will be transformed in a security, and democratic zone, and 
will represent a future alternative source of energy for Europe.”85 
This mixture of economic and political interests, which drives the actions 
of the countries in this area, creates even more complications concerning the regional 
relations’ landscape. The historical agreements and relations that played a role in defining 
the countries’ relations for more than fifty years are not anymore valid. It is obvious that 
Romania tries to rearrange these through the American prism, but this new approach will 
inevitably generate further tensions and contradictions. 
’I think it’s in our interest (to join with the U.S.),’ the country’s then-
defense minister told National Public Radio in 2003. ‘I think the risk for 
our national security coming from the area of the Middle East or Central 
Asia or the Black Sea implies that we should take responsibilities in that  
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region and participate in international relations … This is very important 
for a country that is defining its political role in the world, its strategic 
role, its military role.86 
b.  Russia 
When referring to the zonal international relations, the Romanian mass 
media has captured the new swing of the Russian politics towards the basing of the 
American troops in Eastern Europe. A July 2007 edition of the Tricolorul87 raises 
concerns regarding the Russian opposition to the new bases in Romania, while in the 
same month the Romania Libera newspaper published an article called, “Rusii nu digera 
bazele SUA” [The Russians do not digest the U.S. bases]. Citing the Russian Prime-vice-
premier Serghei Ivanov, the Romanian newspaper Azi88 presents the Russians’ opinion 
that the new bases in Romania represent a new “Wall of Berlin” built by Americans in 
this part of the world. Russia’s suspension of its participation in the CFE (1990 
Conventional Forces in Europe treaty) has triggered headlines such as, “[Putin, re-begins 
the Cold War.]”89 According to the State Sub-secretary for European Affairs, Daniel 
Fried, “the existence of American bases in Romania and Bulgaria are not against CFE 
treaty.”90  
The “military bases in Romania” theme was discussed in the June 2007 
pages of Romania Libera (“Prin Ochii Lor” [Through their eyes], News In (“Bazele SUA 
din România şi Bulgaria au contribuit la decizia Rusiei privind CFE – RIA” [U.S.A.  
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bases from Romania and Bulgaria have contributed to Russia’s decision regarding CFE]), 
Adevarul (“Rusia întoarce spatele NATO” [Russia turning its back to NATO]), and many 
more.   
Esther Schrader captures the anachronism of the situation succinctly, 
“With its clear military supremacy, the Pentagon feels free to flex its muscle with little 
regard to the diplomatic consequences of moving into Russia's backyard …”91 The 
situation may evolve, since the presence of the bases in Romania affects Russian 
interests: “Moscow's opposition to U.S. bases in Eastern Europe is likely to be overcome 
in the longer run. This will further exacerbate Russia's already acute perceptions of 
NATO as an obstacle to restoring its military might and global influence.”92  
Similar opinions have been found in other mass media sources such as: 
Azi93 (17 July 07 edition), Realitatea TV (14 June 07 08.21 emission), Cotidianul94 (15 
June 07 edition), etc.  
Russia sees the opening of the new bases in a larger context, which is 
linked to the new plans of anti-missile capacities in other European countries. “The 
presence of so many U.S. troops in Europe has triggered open criticism from the 
Kremlin, which recently accused the U.S. of embarking upon a new arms race by setting 
up bases in European countries and by planning to install elements of an anti-missile 
shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.”95  
In speaking about the Russian opposition to the opening of the new 
military bases in Romania, Defence Minister, Teodor Melescanu,  
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… reiterated that the arrival of American troops in Romania will not 
present any security risks for Russia, on the contrary, it is likely to 
increase regional security. Melescanu added that Moscow’s objections 
against the presence of American troops in Romania must not be discussed 
through press statements or reports, but in the NATO-Russia committee, 
which has already had a meeting on the issue last week.96 
In a recent interview, State Secretary Corneliu Dobritoiu, declared that 
there is a direct link between the presence of the American troops on Romanian territory 
and national security: “… no matter the size, the American presence in a zone brings 
security and safety.”97 Referring to the concerns of different countries he added: “I do not 
think that the presence of 1700 people in any zone may change the zonal balance of 
power, especially when we talk about the presence of people with standard equipment, 
and no sophisticated ones.”98 The State secretary was certainly referring to the 
discussions held in Wien within the frame of the CFE treaty, and especially to the 
Russian delegation’s position regarding the touch of the Russian zonal interests brought 
by the American presence. The Romanian official considers that the presence of the 
American troops would actually increase the zonal security, including Russia.  From a 
theoretical point of view, the presence of the U.S. military may inflict additional security 
risks in this region, “but presently there is no information about any possible 
concretization of such kind of risks, especially taking into account that this kind of thing 
did not happen until now in Romania.”99 
In a July edition, the Romania Mare, in the article “Yankei, căraţi-vă 
acasă!” [Yankees, go home!] used a more radical tone, adding that the American 
presence on the Romanian territory is nothing trouble because besides the danger of 
terrorist attacks, now Romania has to face the strong riposte of Russia, which “has put 
Romania on its black list.” In the same article the author asks: “Wouldn’t it have been 
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better to keep our neutrality? Now, Romania is a bumper between two unmerciful nuclear 
forces, which observe on each other to strike decisively: America and Russia.” 
c.  Russia’s Supporters 
The Russian position may be supported by Ukraine, which may fear that 
in the context of NATO-Russia quarrel, “its own dispute with Romania regarding the 
status of the Insula Serpilor [Snakes Island]”100 may be brought up. 
The decisions Russia makes these days may pull back the European 
security achievements. The Romanian TVR1 TV channel has broadcasted the idea that 
Russia will seek support on the Asian continent to counterbalance the American military 
expansion in the Black Sea area: “military analysts foresee the formation of a new 
alliance of forces in the Caspian-Caucasian zone, as a counterbalance to the presence of 
American troops in Romania and Bulgaria.101 McDermott sustains this hypothesis in his 
article about the SCO [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization] Peace Mission 2007 
exercise: 
Vitaliy Shlykov, a member of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council in 
Moscow, advanced the view that Peace Mission 2007 must be understood 
in the wider strategic context of the difficulties that emerged in Russia’s 
relationship with the West. President Putin had promised unspecified 
countermeasures should Washington proceed with plans to base 
components of its missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. Shlykov suggested: “The claims of the United States and NATO 
to primacy in the world should have some counterweights. There is no 
doubt that today Russia needs allies, especially in a region as complex as 
Asia. In this sense, the statement by the chief of the General Staff can be 
viewed as a perfectly normal reaction by the Russian authorities to the 
mounting tension in the world. Not a single state can get along today 
without allies. We are responding to America’s aspirations to world 
hegemony by various means, of which the infusion of the SCO military-
political vector is just one” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 10, 2007).102 
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d.  Issues Over Energy and Natural Resources 
The importance of the Black Sea region also has economic valences and 
involves energy related interests, as discussed by Mr. Bruce Jackson: 
Today, the member states of the European Union import approximately 
50% of their energy needs; by 2020 imports will rise to 70% of 
consumption. This increase will be delivered to Europe across and around 
the Black Sea region, on routes such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. 
These facts so impressed the heads of state of member states of NATO 
that at the Istanbul Summit in July 2004 the NATO Joint Communiqué 
recognized that the Black Sea region was an essential part of Euro-
Atlantic security.103 
The Russian interest in this part of the world is aimed at the control of 
natural resources and especially at those of energy resources. “A major focus of Russian 
policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus has been to gain more control of natural 
resources, especially oil and gas, in these areas.”104 In this context, the cards played by 
Russia in Europe are not only political or military, but also economic. Since Europe is 
dependent on the Russian exports of energy, natural gas, and oil, Moscow has found 
political leverage in conditioning the distribution and the terms of contracting its 
resources.  
Recent situations when, due to “uncontrolled accidents,” the delivery of 
natural gas was stopped, became clear indications of Russia’s interests, intentions, and 
“solutions” in delivering political messages to the “naughty” neighbors. Regarding this 
new situation the Romanian president, Traian Basescu, has addressed the Romanian 
position: “’we will never accept the idea of using the energy as an instrument of political 
pressure’ ….a direct allusion to the ‘on-off faucet’ strategy, which Russia uses in its 
energy related relations with Europe.”105 As an energy resources owner, Russia gained an 
important upper-hand in its relations with the most influential European countries. Giving 
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favors or punishing countries with high-energy prices is another policy maker on the 
European continent. “Moscow succeeded through the energetic contracts made with some 
important states of the European Union, to ensure not only its budget consolidation, but 
most of all resurrection of its great power status.”106 Some authors are of the opinion that 
through this policy, “Russia intends to deepen the schism between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
Europe feeding the disputes, destabilizing and twisting the political-economic landscape 
of the continent.”107  
It might be that someone may argue either Russia is playing “hard ball” or 
even is bluffing about any possible countermeasures; in any case Russia’s position 
complicates the things in the Black Sea area. For sure, Putin knows that “nice guys finish 
last” and will continue to complicate the political, economic and military issues in this 
area. 
3. Terrorist Threats on National and Local Security 
When speaking about the local security of the new bases, the American side is 
more precocious and skeptical in advancing a low security threat level. The American 
standpoint is that it is important to raise the issue that the American troops may represent 
a target for terrorist attacks, and such a situation will certainly affect part of the civilian 
population. Even in the operational concept, the new basing framework has more value; 
the bases’ vulnerability is much higher just because they are reduced, as Fleishman 
suggests: “Smaller, more scattered bases would give the U.S. quicker access to a wider 
swath of the world, but they may antagonize militant organizations that view them as 
symbols of American hegemony. U.S. officials are concerned about the possibility of 
making U.S. troops more vulnerable to terrorist attacks….”108 
In the same realm of international relations and security, another concern is that 
the bases in Romania will be used for launching attacks against Iran, which will 
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contribute to the degradation of security. A January 2007 edition of Romania Libera109 
launched the supposition that the new bases in Romania would be used for attacking Iran. 
The same suppositions are made under the title “Evenimentele se precipita: America vrea 
sa atace Iranul de pe teritoriul Romaniei!” [Precipitate course of events: America wants 
to attack Iran from Romanian territory!], by the newspaper Tricolorul in its July 2007 
editorial. The same newspaper made public the information that large quantities of 
military equipment are stocked on Romanian territory and, according to their sources, the 
purpose of this is not for training but for war.110 The Romania Mare agreed: “military war 
equipment and ammunition necessary for the hot zones from East and Middle East may 
be observed inside of the airport [MK] perimeter.”111  
The situation is unrelieved since the American approach to this issue, even based 
on diplomacy, does not exclude such a possibility. Relevant to this point is the Kessler 
presentation of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s point of view:  
A day before a deadline for Iran to suspend controversial nuclear work, 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Thursday sought to allay fears 
here and in other European countries that the United States plans to use 
bases in Europe to attack Iran." I know this is on people's minds," Rice 
said at a news conference after attending a meeting of NATO foreign 
ministers. While all options remain on the table, she said, "We are 
committed to a diplomatic course that should, with enough unity and with 
enough strength and with enough common purpose, make it possible to 
convince the Iranian government to change its course."112  
The new mutations in the Turkish policy towards Iran, after the latter seemed to 
reverse its own policy and began to back up Turkey’s bombardments of PKK in the north 
of Iraq, may complicate relations in the Middle East. As shown in a recent poll, the 
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Turkish people have changed their favorable position regarding Iran, with about 10% in 
less than two years.  As inserted below, Iran may struggle for a new ally in this part of the 
world especially now when the U.S.-Turkey relations seem to cross a rather difficult time 
over the Armenian Genocide Resolution issue, which recognizes the deportation of 
Ottoman Armenians during World War I as genocide.  
Since the Iraq war, however, Iran has recalibrated its Turkey policy. In an 
effort to break its own growing strategic isolation, Tehran has wooed 
Ankara on a number of fronts. Iran has not only ceased supporting the 
PKK, it has begun to actively combat the group. According to media 
reports, Iran frequently bombs PKK camps inside Iraq. Turkish sentiment 
toward Iran has warmed up significantly in response: according to a 2006 
poll by the German Marshall Fund, 43 percent of Turks hold favorable 
feelings toward Iran, compared to 34 percent in 2004.113 
And the picture would not be complete without mentioning the recent Russian 
threats made in connection with its suspension of participation in CFE.  “Evgheni Volk, 
the Heritage from Washington Foundation president [chairman] believes that Moscow is 
heading towards a new Cold War: ‘Russia’s threats have materialized, and Russia may go 
further on and reposition the targets for its nuclear missiles in Europe, as it did back in 
the 70s.’”114 Besides being a direct response to the new American projects in Poland and 
Czech Republic, the actual threats in fact include Romania and Bulgaria. “On the 
background of the rising critics made by the Russian president Vladimir Putin regarding 
the American expansion in Europe, at the Vienna conference on revising the CFE treaty, 
Russia advances the problem of U.S. bases in Romania and Bulgaria, with Putin 
repeatedly denouncing their installation in Romania and Bulgaria, and recently 
threatening these two countries as being in the collimator of the Russian missiles.”115 
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The words of a former NPS student, Adriana Murariu, very well describe the 
actual situation that Romania faces today in defining its zonal policy in the context of the 
attributes and responsibilities assumed as a member of NATO and EU.  
Romania is situated in southeast Europe, in a region that has been 
repeatedly torn apart by insecurity and instability. In this highly security-
challenged environment it is difficult to maintain a consistent foreign 
policy without losing some of the imperative attributes that make the 
difference between being a reliable partner and a swing one. Maintaining 
the country’s dignity, pride, and honor, while preserving its specific 
characteristics, and still being able to influence the decision process, 
requires integrity, which, unfortunately, is often not an attribute of 
international relations.116 
The AA bilateral agreement, even though partially under the NATO umbrella 
generates additional challenges, which, as already shown in this part, complicate the 
political, diplomatic, military, economic, and security landscape in the Black Sea region. 
Respecting the agreements, norms and responsibilities derived from its multidimensional 
membership qualities will certainly interfere with others’ interests and cause reactions 
from neighboring countries, especially Russia. As already shown in the beginning of this 
chapter, Romania may face challenges not only from the East but also from West. It 
might be very simple to put it in the way that “the friends of my enemies, are my 
enemies” when thinking of the dissentions between U.S. and the “Old Europe,” and 
figure out that Romania may be challenged by some of the EU’s members in its political, 
economical, and other fields related integration. 
Performing the responsibilities assumed subsequently in 2004 (NATO 
membership), 2005 (AA), and 2007 (EU membership), Romania peruses its policy of 
becoming a trustworthy and reliable ally and partner, in a very volatile environment.  
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4. Social and Environmental Issues 
a.  Wrong Start or Bad Luck? 
The preamble of a possible civil-military conflict on the local level, has 
been largely treated by national and local press, such as, Cotidianul,117 Evenimentul 
Zilei,118 and press agencies, such as ROMPRES,119 MEDIAFAX,120 and TV stations, 
such as, PROTV121 and REALITATEA TV122 when two American soldiers were 
involved in a fight in the Constanta area. The Stars and Stripes, talking about the same 
incident, reported: “The cultural exchange got off to a rocky start, though. In June, a 
major and a master sergeant with the U.S. Southern European Task Force, in Romania for 
a week as part of an advance party, made headlines after an incident in a bar that in the 
Americans’ view started because of a scam.” The incident started when the American 
servicemen, refused to pay the bill after having a few shots in a bar, arguing about the 
fact that the amount was too high for the quantity and the quality of served products and 
services. The soldiers were “evacuated” by the bodyguards, after some verbal and 
physical wrestling.   
The presence of American troops in Romania is covered by the newspaper 
Romania Mare in a more radical and pessimist tone, in its July 2007 edition, in the article 
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“Yankei, căraţi-vă acasă!” [Yankees, go home!]. The American presence is seen as the 
generating cause of inevitable “drunkenness, rapes, fighting, scandals.”  
b.  Corruption and Countermeasures 
The corruption, as a social phenomenon, has not been overlooked. Stars 
and Stripes has published the information that “according to Transparency International’s 
2007 report, Romania is the most corrupt country in European Union.”123 In relation to 
this aspect, in a most recent article hosted by the same publication, it deals with a special 
case where there are suspicions that the Americans have been overcharged: “That 
apparent endemic corruption may be one reason why two unprepossessing wooden 
observation towers, recently placed on a firing range now used by American soldiers in 
an exercise of U.S. Army Europe’s Joint Task Force East, cost 13,000 euro — or more 
than $9,000 each. Or maybe not. ‘Lumber is expensive,’ said Troy Darr, JTF-E 
spokesman.”124 In this context the American representatives at the military bases sites 
took additional measures, which sometimes imposed on the wrong people, may hamper 
the good relations with local contractors. Even though this case was a typical press “fire 
alarm,” the disagreement was closed by the declarations of the U.S. Army’s 
representative: “’Preventing fraud is a key concern for the Army regardless of where we 
conduct contracting operations,’ Bruce Anderson, a U.S. Army Europe spokesman, wrote 
in an e-mail. ‘We remain vigilant for any indications of fraud. To date, we are aware of 
no indications of contractor fraud within JTF-East.’”125 
According to the same publication “…it has been recommended to the 
American personnel from Mihail Kogalniceanu, not to use their credit cards, restrictions 
on going outside the base, and participation to only officially organized trips to the 
area.”126 This kind of behaviour will certainly be noticed by the local community and may 
generate wrong interpretations, as Americans thinking about themselves being a 
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“superior race,” who do not mix with the locals. Such behavior offers an unwelcome 
contrast to the behavior of U.S. troops in the golden age of such stationing elsewhere in 
Europe in decades past. 
c.  Nobody Should be Above the Law 
Other publications do not welcome American troops, reminding the 
population of the tragic car accident in which the well-known Romanian singer Teo Peter 
died, an accident where an employee of the American Embassy in Bucharest was 
involved. The titles like “Romania invaded by a 1000 colleagues of Teo Peter’s killer” or 
“U.S. soldiers who break the law cannot be trialed”127 and “U.S. soldiers enjoy immunity 
before the Romanian laws”128 are certainly aiming at the fact that the American, 
Christopher VanGoethen, who was involved in the accident and apparently guilty, 
escaped Romanian justice by being brought back to America for trial, escaping a prison 
sentence. “For the American soldiers, Romania represents NML, which means ‘No 
Man’s Land’…”129 said the newspaper Cronica Romana. And the same publication 
concludes: “For any kind of ‘indiscipline’ the American soldiers may be prosecuted only 
over the ocean, by the American martial courts, which, of course cannot punish them in 
favor of some ‘collateral victims’ from Eastern Europe. The concrete proof, the un-
revenged death of Teo Peter, still stands.”130 A similar case happened five months later 
when another American military personnel, Steven Craig Fischer, crashed into an old 
person on a marked crossing. The victim died the second day in the Constanta hospital. 
Similar to the first case, the second American left Romania after three weeks with no 
restriction. 
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d.  Environmental Concerns 
Environmental protection is another interesting area of discussion. Some 
of the authors have taken this area into consideration as being another important criterion 
in the U.S. decision-making process of redesigning the American military presence in 
Europe. 
But U.S. military dollars and jobs will gradually leave Germany and may 
become windfalls for economically struggling Eastern European countries 
that are more politically welcoming and have less strict environmental 
laws. The Pentagon has long complained of the millions of dollars it 
spends each year to comply with environmental regulations.131 
Even though Fleishman’s note presents a relatively positive approach to 
the permissively environmental legislation in Eastern Europe, it may trigger disputes in 
the future when these countries align their policies to European standards. Some of the 
first signals regarding the environment have already been inserted in the Romanian 
publications. The newspaper Tricolorul has shown that ”the American bases installation 
in Romania and hosting military common exercises could produce a lot of damage to 
Romania, judging not only from a international military perspective but also in the realm 
of public security and healthiness.”132 The author counts all possible hazardous 
implications further along in the article: pollution, vibrations, phonic pollution, and all 
possible range of accidents from possible plane crashes or aviation and artillery live fire. 
The author is also concerned about the closeness of the military ranges to the Danube 
Delta ecosystem protected by international laws. 
e.  The American Bases - a Hazard for Romania 
It can be said that some publications may use information solely for the 
purpose of producing sensational news. In any case it seems that everything linked to the 
American presence, especially around the opening day of the first base, captures the 
attention of a large number of newspapers, TV channels and radio stations. There is no 
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chance that an emergency landing at a military base would pass unnoticed. And certainly 
the space used and the amount of the information factors would double. This was the case 
of the incident that happened on the 24th of July 2007, during the common military 
exercise, “Carpathian Summer 2007,” when an American C-130 Hercules airplane 
emergency landed due to technical problems. The explanation offered after the exercise --
that the incident was part of a rescue mission simulation-- was received with skepticism, 
and only few newspapers have hosted this variant. The incident itself was interpreted on a 
large scale, and the titles of the articles are enough to picture the entire range of feelings: 
“Two American planes have urgently landed in Romania,”133 “Failed Mission,”134 “A 
U.S. Air Force plane landed urgently on Mihail Kogalniceanu airport,”135 and “American 
planes 'out of order'”136, or “U.S. ARMY aircraft have been giving us headaches 
lately”137, as well as “Worries for a Hercules C 130”138 and so on and so forth. From 
these titles alone, one may imagine different sentimental inducements felt by the public 
at-large: compassion, guiltiness, anger, confusion, fear for safety, annoyance, and so on. 
In such an environment, the worries of some of the local politicians about 
the possibility of plane crashes may sound justified: “[because] not everybody is happy 
about the arrival of ‘Uncle Sam’s’ soldiers. In a recent press conference, the PRM leader 
from Constanta, Radu Comaneci, expressed his worries about the risks of airplane 
incidents, which may “generate real catastrophes for locals.”139 
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f.  Easy Money Syndrome 
The rising of prices in the real estate business represents another aspect of 
the social implications. This issue is possible when one takes into consideration the 
increased purchasing power of the Americans, and the fact that some locals may make 
calculations of making quick money based on the assumptions that the American guest 
will be “forced” to pay higher prices for those terrains or facilities situated in the vicinity 
of the base or valuable through their exclusivity. According to the Gardianul, “…for 
terrains the square meter’s price has risen over 100 times in the last four years.”140 This 
situation would be good for doing business, but certainly will eliminate the 
competitiveness on the local market since none can compete with the Americans. Until 
now, nobody was interested in acquiring properties in Mihail Kogalniceanu; however, the 
American competitiveness may generate negative feelings and anxiousness vis-à-vis the 
idea that the Americans dictate the prices and terms in the local real estate business. The 
same publication asserts that, “[f]or the local people, the opening of the base brings the 
hope of overnight profits.”141 
Another aspect of the relation between the civil society and the American 
soldiers, which may actually generate conflicts, is represented by the perception of the 
Americans’ ease with which they spend money. Just a small segment of the local 
population may be able to afford to spend the amount of money that a regular American 
soldier can afford. This “easy come, easy go” attitude may generate envy. A series of 
articles already point in this direction. An article in the newspaper Azi brought the 
following news: “... the American soldiers are ready to spend a lot of money for feeling 
the sea breeze. They have laid their eyes on a luxury residential complex, a couple of 
steps away from the beach in Mamaia resort. It is about 46 luxury villas, surrounded by 
high concrete fences.”142 As everybody may notice the word “luxury’ is repeated to make 
the point very clear that the Americans are aiming high. The second information to notice 
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is that “high concrete fences” surround the villas. Why? To ensure privacy, so the 
ordinary people cannot glance inside? These are the kind of thoughts that may cross 
people’s minds, making them feel helpless and “small.” For sure, this kind of media 
opinion does not do any good toward building a mutual trust and cooperation. And when 
this kind of information is completed with titles like “The American soldiers socialize 
with the ‘parachutes’143 from Constanta”144 the recipe for failure in the civil-military 
relations is guaranteed.  
g.  Other  
Some of the news may even induce feelings of paranoia within the society, 
talking about spying, surveillance and underground missions of the surveying aircrafts 
and helicopters: “Our sources have notified us about the fact that the Americans do 
nothing else but practice economic espionage and identification of the strategic 
perimeters.”145 
The presence of the American troops in this part of the world is based on 
large public support, but the officials have to be aware that there is always a part of 
civilian society which will oppose it.  
Knowing the political affinity of the countries in this part of the world, it 
may be worthwhile to cite Kessler’s description about the Bulgarians’ opposition to the 
American presence on their territory:  
Rice will sign an agreement Friday with the Bulgarian government to use 
three military bases in its territory, part of a plan to shift U.S. troops from 
large bases in central Europe to smaller bases closer to the Middle East.  
Nearly 5,000 protesters marched on the U.S. Embassy Thursday to 
denounce the agreement. Opinion surveys indicate that a majority of 
people here oppose the deal.146 
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H. SUMMARY 
As identified in this chapter, location of the American troops in Romania takes 
place under specific conditions and creates radical changes on the European continent. 
The opposition among the Western European countries and the openness of the new 
NATO members in hosting the American troops has triggered certain changes of 
NATO’s military presence in Europe. The tensions between the U.S. and Germany, 
France and Turkey on one hand, and on the other hand the necessity for getting American 
troops closer to the Middle East and the Caucasus, together with the fact that the eastern 
borders of Europe are the new boundaries for terrorism, had imposed the adoption by the 
Pentagon of a new realignment plan, which meant drastic changes for the continent and 
the troops stationed there. Of course, beyond the political and strategic reasons are also 
economic interests in reducing the costs for the basing of the American troops, which 
would be possible by using cheaper locations in Romania and Bulgaria.   
The new conditions extrapolated to the Romanian society may generate new 
challenges to the civil-military relations and result in a new framing of Romania’s 
international relations and security. 
The political support made possible the negotiation and signing of the AA, and an 
important set of documents related to the AA ruling, the Romania-U.S. bilateral relation.  
The development of a network at the national level made possible the 
involvement of all the responsible ministries and national agencies in relation with the 
American partner through a Joint Committee, and at the MOD’s level an internal 
relationship flow, which was able to aggregate all the subordinate military structure in 
providing the necessary support. This new cooperation and control system has made 
possible the civil control, in achieving the civil paternity and the transparency of the 
military actions in relation to the implementation of the AA. Another positive thing in 
building up such a framework is the fact that this makes possible access to all the 
resources, political tools, and decisional factors, which otherwise may hamper the 
implementation process.  
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The opening of the MK military base should be seen as an efficient 
interconnection system with the other bases from Turkey, Bulgaria, and even the Middle 
East, and for no reason should it be seen as a supplement or a replacement of the bases 
from Turkey. It is the obligation of Romanian military policy to promote this idea taking 
into account the new context of Turkey’s zonal and continental relationship with the U.S.  
It should be made very clear by the military informational sources about the status 
of the common use of the military site by both American and Romanian armed forces.  
The fact that Romania retains the ownership of all the terrains, military bases, and other 
facilities that are going to be used should be made very clear to the civilian mass media 
and population. The necessity of transparency and correct informing of the civilian 
population on the scope and number of the American troops in Romania is very important 
and should be the attribute of the military press.  
The Romanians intrinsically relate the improvement in the security generated by 
the presence of the American troops to the economic activity growth at both national and 
local levels, and less to other asymmetric threats.  
Regarding the foreign investments associated with the presence of the American 
troops in Romania, it should be said that maybe at the macro level these sums are not 
very significant, but they make a difference at the micro level, playing a major role in 
developing the local areas and providing jobs and increasing the level of local business. 
The American counterpart should be aware that any misunderstanding or syncope in this 
area might generate a degradation of the civil-military relations, in a sense that the 
American presence could be seen as a burden and not as an advantage.  
Another conclusion is that the cooperation and interoperability through common 
training of the Romanian military with the U.S. troops represent another positive aspect  
of this partnership, and the Romanian military should take full advantage of this 
opportunity. A rotation of the Romanian troops involved in the common training 
activities would be a good idea.   
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While the Romanian expectations are most revealed in the economic realm, the 
Romanian concerns are concentrated in three main areas: deterioration of zonal and 
continental relations, terrorist threats on national and local security, and social and 
environmental issues. 
In the realm of the zonal and continental relations, it should be mentioned that 
Romania, as the vanguard of both NATO and EU, has to deal in the Black Sea region 
with different asymmetric challenges and threats, starting with the Russian hegemonic 
tendencies and political, military and economic countermeasures, and ending with a 
possible proliferation of terrorist activities, drugs, arms and human trafficking. The 
increase of nuclear proliferation in the Black Sea’s area, and rocket missile threats 
represent another major threat. Since Europe is dependent on the Russian exports of 
energy, natural gas, and oil, Moscow may use the energy as an instrument of political 
pressure. This will certainly generate future challenges for our country. It should be also 
mentioned the fact that a pro-American Romanian policy may alter the relationship 
between Romania and those EU countries in opposition with the U.S. (Germany, France, 
Turkey, and others).  The AA bilateral agreement, even though partially under the NATO 
umbrella generates additional challenges, will certainly complicate the political, 
diplomatic, military, economic, and security landscape in the Black Sea region. 
Regarding the internal and local security, the American troops may represent a 
target for terrorist attacks, and such a situation will certainly affect part of the civilian 
population. In this context the central and local authorities should pay increased attention 
to this aspect, and take the appropriate measures for improving the security. The idea that 
“things such as terrorist attacks never happened before in Romania” could be a bad 
excuse for not acting. 
The presence of the American troops in this part of the world is based on large 
public support, but the Romanian officials have to be aware that there will always be a 
part of civil society opposed to it. It should be noted that there is an increased interest 
shown by the civilian society around this activity. At the same time in response to that, 
the openness of the military institutions in informing the public should continue. 
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All levels of the Romanian society should be aware of the fact that the presence of 
the American troops on Romanian territory will have both positive and negative civil-
military consequences. The history of U.S. bases on European soil and other parts of the 
world sustains this conclusion and provides an area for inquiry. There will always be 
areas of policy, economy and society that will raise critical issues because of the social, 
cultural, legal and administrative, and other differences and dissimilar ways of perception 
and understanding of the requirements of strategy and policy.  
The study of the Japanese and German experiences, and a careful analysis of the 
positive and negative aspects in the security, economic and social/environmental realms 
will reveal some general lessons learned and conclusions as well as the particularities in 
both civil and military relations. Some of them may be valuable for Romania in learning 
how to manage the good things and avoid bad experiences.  
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III. THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN AND 
THE SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS: 
OKINAWA CASE STUDY 
We Americans like to believe that Japan remains our closest of friends. 
The U.S. security treaty with Tokyo is, as former Ambassador to Japan 
Mike Mansfield said, the United States’ ‘most important bilateral 
relationship in the world, bar none.’ We depend on Japan not only to buy 
our Treasury bills and supply us with Toyota hybrids but also to be our 
land base to contain the potential ambitions of China.147 
Michael Zielenziger 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S.-Japan security alliance is one of the few actual alliances that has lasted 
more than 60 years. During this period this alliance went through many ups and downs, 
which make this case one which is worth studying. The literature in this field is very well 
represented offering a tremendous amount of knowledge. A study of the Japanese 
experience of host nation posture, especially in Okinawa, and a careful analysis of the 
positive and negative aspects within in the security, economic and social/environmental 
realms will reveal some general conclusions about the experience of stationed U.S. 
forces. Further, this case speaks to the particularities in both civil and military relations, 
which in the last chapter may help in drawing valuable conclusions and lessons learned 
for Romania’s case.  At the same time, one should keep in mind those specific aspects of 
history, policy, and strategy that make such a comparison somewhat unconventional for 
an analysis of the host nation relations to stationed U.S. forces.  One might object that 
studying an extra European case is unwarranted, what with the practice of NATO and 
whatever putative differences operate between one side of Eurasia from the other.  
However, since the model of the U.S. forces in Asia loomed large in the arguments of the 
U.S. re-stationing concept of the time between 2002 and 2005, a European might do well 
to consider this particular case and its important political details.  
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A retrospective view of the historical background of the U.S. military presence in 
Japan starting with the post WW II period and the analysis of the legal framework of the 
American military’s presence in Japan will ease the understanding of the past’s influence 
and the defining of the formal, and to a certain extent informal, relations between the 
U.S. and Japan at the official level, and between the U.S. military presence and the 
civilian society. The struggle of the Japanese society toward becoming a “normal nation” 
will complete the general security landscape and will help one to understand the most 
recent actions of the Japanese government. 
The size of the financial Japanese contribution through the Host Nation Support 
(HNS) to the overall financial issues of basing the American troops in Japan will allow 
one to draw conclusions regarding the development of this bilateral relationship. The 
roots of the HNS, in connection with the political process in the realm of the society’s 
perceptions, and its evolution in the realm of argumentation for continuing or reducing 
Japan’s financial contribution, may complete the picture of the alliance’s trajectory and 
future possible developments.  
The study of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, both under the American 
administration and the Japanese after the 1972 administration and its influence on the 
rising of national sentiments is relevant in understanding the local feelings, position, 
support or opposition to the American presence.  
The literature’s arguments of maintaining versus reducing the presence of the 
American bases are valuable in defining the political context of the security requirements 
and challenges for the U.S., Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region.  By implication, these 
records have something to say to those who are unaware of the political issues of 
allowing the U.S. forces to be stationed on national soil and can act as a stimulus for 
reflection in the hope of managing or lowering the inevitable frictions in such bi- and 
multi-lateral relations.  
The interests of the U.S. and Japan and their accompanying convergence or 
divergence, are in fact, political backgrounds of the future of the alliance between Japan 
and the U.S. An important impact in re-defining the security alliance has the local 
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administration and society’s opposition to the military presence especially after the end of 
the Cold War and the 1995 time period. The arguments and events that triggered the 
process of rethinking the bases of the bilateral U.S.-Japan security partnership are 
important in drawing additional and completing the conclusions.     
A special attention in this analysis is paid to Okinawa’s dilemmas (in contrast to 
those of Korea, or formerly the Philippines or the case of the former West Germany), 
through the lens of public opinion and the central and local press’ and mass media’s 
influence on it. The complexity of the Okinawans’ concerns and problems caused by the 
presence of the military bases, their impact, explanation, and relevance in shaping the 
relations of the locals with the American servicemen, together with issues linked to the 
necessity of changing the legal status of the American presence in certain areas (mostly 
related to the Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA]), are important points in 
understanding the past evolution, the actual status, and to a certain extent the future of the 
American-Japanese human relationship. 
There are methods of policy to improve the current situation, which require 
special attention from both the U.S. and Japan up to the senior-most political levels. The 
Security Alliance is too important for these two countries and for the Asia-Pacific area to 
be adrift. Both countries have much more to gain from this bilateral relationship, which is 
very important for closer cooperation in the future, and the identification and appliance of 
viable solutions to the problems that this partnership faces, as this chapter argues.  
In writing this chapter, this author, among other sources, has built on some of the 
findings, interpretations, conclusions, and proposals formulated by two former Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) graduates, as well as on their personal observations and 
experiences from being deployed in Japan: Keith W. Allen (2003), and Giuseppe A. 






B. THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE 
1. Historical Background of the U.S. Military Presence in Japan after 
World War II 
The political and social community of fate between Japan and the U.S. armed 
forces well predates the U.S. occupation of Japan in the wake of the Second World War.  
Indeed, the arrival of U.S. naval vessels in what had heretofore been a closed society 
marked a milestone in modern Japanese history. It was Commodore Perry and his "Black 
Ships," in their mission to open Japan, which “encouraged modernization and the 
introduction of Western culture”148 in this country. 
Matthew C. Perry's mission to Japan in 1852-54 may have been America's 
greatest diplomatic triumph of the 19th century. Perry succeeded not only 
in his primary mission of obtaining a treaty with the previously isolationist 
Empire of Japan (the Treaty of Kanegawa), which included Japanese 
agreement to care for shipwrecked sailors and establish coaling stations 
for American ships, but he also opened the door for a future U.S.-Japan 
trade relationship.149 
For the purposes of this study, however, the presence of the American bases in 
Japan is essentially related to the World War II aftermath. “Literally and figuratively, the 
American bases in Japan are a legacy of World War II. When the conflict ended, U.S. and 
Allied forces occupied Imperial Japanese Army and Navy bases on the four main islands-
Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu-and on Okinawa.”150 
The defeat in the war in the Pacific left Japan in a precarious condition. During 
this war about 700,000 civilians were killed, “all of Japan’s major cities, except for 
Kyoto, were destroyed by Allied bombings,”151 the industry was destroyed, and the 
agriculture suffered a large step backward. The Japanese society suffered from the lack of 
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basic products, and the population was starving. When the allied forces took over the 
country, starting in September 1945, the population was tired of war, morally devastated, 
and the political class was incapable of ruling the country. “Policy for the occupation of 
Japan was governed by the Allied Far East Commission, which was established in 
Washington, D.C. in early 1946. The three primary objectives of the occupation were: 
demilitarization, democratization, and rehabilitation of society.”152 
Politically, Japan was put under the supervision of an Allied Council, whose main 
task was to provide advice on policy execution to the occupation forces. The preeminent 
figure of that period-- “General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander 
of Allied Powers (SCAP) and was responsible for overseeing the occupation.”153 The 
imprint of his personality influenced the reforms and political decisions until 1947. His 
major contribution was reflected in the adoption of the Japanese constitution, especially 
for the provisions of article 9 on the 3rd of May 1947. Since then its provisions have 
shaped the Japanese view of the world and war. This article stated: 
…aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes. In order to accomplish the aim …land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.154 
As a direct consequence, over the last 60 years Japan has relied on the American 
presence on its territory, which fully assumed the responsibility for Japan’s national and 
regional security.   
Until 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was enforced, Japan was under 
the Allied Occupation. But this was not the case for Okinawa, which, not unlike the four 
power sovereignty in Berlin (and earlier in Vienna and Trieste) continued to be, until 
1972, under direct U.S. administration. “The U.S. government explained that it was 
necessary to maintain the U.S. military presence there in the interest of peace and security 
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in the Far East-including Japan, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula.”155 The U.S. military 
presence in Okinawa was also viewed as a "cork in the bottle,"156 for preventing Japan 
from rearming or becoming a military power and returning to militarism.  
Paul Giarra, a well-known specialist in Japan’s policy and former head of DOD’s 
Japan Desk, emphasized the importance of Okinawa in the equation of the American 
presence in this part of the world:   
Whatever the rationale, the United States deployed its armed forces in 
Okinawa for the defense of Japan and the rest of the Far East and 
distinguished Okinawa from the rest of Japan to give them greater 
freedom to act. Even after Okinawa's reversion to Japanese administration 
in 1972, the island prefecture has maintained its crucial role as "host" to 
the U.S. military and a key element in Pentagon strategy.157 
In the years to come after 1972, Okinawa gradually became the most populated 
part of Japan with stationed U.S. forces, especially because of Tokyo’s policy of 
relocating the troops from the mainland bases and their consolidation on Okinawa.  The 
conflicts in that area that involved the U.S. also influenced the numbers and the 
positioning of the American troops on Okinawa: 
After the end of the Korean War, the United States substantially reduced 
its military forces from Japan's main islands in 1957 and 1958 as a 
prerequisite to extension and revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 
1960. Some of those troops were reassigned to Okinawa, … During the 
Vietnam War, the functions of the U.S. bases in Okinawa were reinforced, 
which contributed to further concentration of the U.S. forces in Japan in 
Okinawa-a situation that has continued to this day.158 
But these actions, beyond increasing the number of troops stationed on the island 
triggered the process that made possible the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. 
In the late 1960’s, Japan’s support for U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam 
drew criticism from students, the media, and large segments of the 
population. This resulted in almost daily protests throughout Japan. In 
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1969, the Nixon administration responded to the protests by announcing 
the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. This decision “healed a 
festering wound and demonstrated that the United States had no territorial 
ambitions in the Pacific, in stark contrast to the Soviet Union, which 
continued tenaciously to hold on to the Northern Territories.”159 
2. The Legal Framework of the American Military’s Presence in Japan 
After termination of the Allied Occupation through the San Francisco Treaty, the 
legality of the American presence in Japan had its roots in the provisions of the security 
treaty signed in 1951 and the 1954 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).  
In 1960, the 1951 treaty was modified, the Mutual Security Treaty (signed on 19 
January 1960) was ratified, and basically, since then, 
… remains in force up to the present without any revisions afterwards, 
stipulates that the U.S. has an obligation to support Japan if Japan is 
attacked (Article V). Japan has an obligation to provide the U.S. with 
"facilities and areas" in Japan, so that the U.S. forces can protect Japan 
and maintain international peace and security in the Far East (Article VI). 
Japan has also an obligation to support the U.S., if the U.S. bases or the 
U.S. forces operating in the “territories under the administration of Japan,” 
are attacked (Article V).160 
The “facilities and areas,” in other words, designates the military bases and 
ultimately the rights for basing to the U.S. troops.    
The same year SOFA161 was agreed upon between the U.S. and Japan stating the 
use of “facilities and areas” in Japan by the U.S. military. This document also regulates 
“…the legal status and other administrative matters of the U.S. forces and their personnel 
stationing in Japan. SOFA is a bilateral administrative agreement under Article VI of the 
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Security Treaty, which obliges Japan to grant the U.S. the right to ‘the use by its land, air, 
and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.’”162 
The use of the bases by the American troops is not unrestricted, as 
Japan reserves the right to veto major American deployments into the 
country, operations from it, and major changes in U.S. equipment there. In 
an exchange of notes dated 19 January 1960, the day the Mutual Security 
Treaty was signed, Japan stipulated and the United States confirmed that 
"concerning the implementation of Article VI [of the Mutual Security 
Treaty, i.e., operations not directly in the defense of Japan]: Major 
changes of the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, 
major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in 
Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan 
other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the 
subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.163 
Anyone talking about this alliance should envisage the asymmetrical aspects, 
which are rooted in the Japanese constitutional constraints dictated by the provisions of 
Article 9.  At the same time anyone should notice the special zonal security environment, 
and the sensitivities between Japan and Korea and China regarding past Japanese 
militarism. Last, but not least, the anti-militarism and anti-war sentiments of the Japanese 
civil society, which play a significant role in the political behaviour of this country are 
beyond legal obligations of any treaty or modification of a treaty dealing with military 
matters. 
As a result, non-military contributions of Japan including the provision of 
land for the U.S. forces and military contributions of the U.S. including 
maintenance of deterrence against enemy forces have dominated the 
security relationship. Having this clear demarcation both as a cause and an 
effect, military cooperation did not begin until the late 1970s and the 
scope of cooperation was limited.164 
In July 1954, in its attempt to institute its own self-defense capabilities, Japan 
created its Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces (SDF). But it took another 40 years 
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for Japanese political decision-makers to legalize the official framework of supporting 
the U.S. troops in the vicinity of Japan, which is a very sensitive area. 
For example, the Japanese government adopted the Constitution which 
prohibits the use of force other than solely for self defense. Until the late 
1990s, the Japanese government did not have a legal framework to support 
the U.S. forces in a conflict near Japan, because of the difficulty to make 
such a legal framework under the Constitution. In a sense, by establishing 
the legal framework and relaxing the Constitution’s constraint on the use 
of force in the 1990s, Japan increased its autonomy.165 
3. Debate on the U.S.-Japan Alliance, in the Context of the Japanese 
Struggle of Becoming a “Normal Nation” 
Since after the Cold War, defining the national security in the regional context has 
been more difficult for Japan, a country that struggles to find its place and role in the 
world. The absence of a common enemy, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, made 
more and more officials and academics foresee a possible disagreement in the near future 
between U.S. and Japanese over the regional and security issues. The absence of an 
imminent threat questions the need of any security alliance, and particularly the U.S.-
Japan alliance; “’Justifying policymaking by saying no threat is visible will gnaw away at 
the roots of the defence alliance,’ Tomohisa Sakanaka, head of the Tokyo-based Research 
Institute for Peace and Security, cautioned in a recent newsletter.”166 Beginning in 1990 
the U.S.-Japan alliance went through increasingly hard times especially due to the fact 
that by the disintegration of the Soviet Union the alliance lost its principal mission. The 
new situation required a reassessment of the alliance’s core missions. One main inquiry 
that began to concern the Japanese public was the continued necessity of a large U.S. 
military presence in Japan. Moreover concerns about the way this alliance would work 
during wartime were raised: “… the security alliance is a consultative relationship with 
no unifying apparatus for wartime decision-making.”167 
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The restrictive provisions of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution contrast with 
the economical power of the country and to a certain extent limit its diplomatic and 
political influence in relation to the outside world. While the economical power situates 
Japan at second place in the world-- its political influence is diminished. If gaining 
political influence was not a priority during the Cold War, when the primary objective 
was economical reconstruction and growth “…under the security blanket of the U.S.-
Japan Security Alliance,”168 currently Japan concentrates on gaining its rightful place in 
the world’s hierarchy. Japan is determined to become a “normal nation” in order to 
achieve “the international respect and power it feels it deserves.”169 
The Japanese started to realize that the only possibility for gaining this respect is 
to change the perception that Japanese security and diplomatic policy are subordinated to 
the United States. According to Giuseppe A. Stavale, a former NPS student, Japan started 
also to realize the differences: 
This alliance, however, put Japan in a position where its foreign policy 
was subordinated to that of another country. Japan realizes that this is in 
part due to the security alliance not being reciprocal with the United 
States, as it is between the United States and the members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).170 
The necessity of modifying the legal bases, which regulates Japan’s national 
security, has recently been a priority of the Japanese officials. Official statements have 
also targeted the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.  
At the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 
September 2001, the participants made statements about Article 9 and its influences on 
the collective defense as well as implications in the future of the U.S.-Japan Security 
Alliance. Talking about Japan’s rights in building a collective self-defense, despite the 
ban self-imposed by Article 9 of the constitution, former Prime Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa called for ending those restrictions “…in the interests of a more effective 
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Japan-U.S. alliance and a greater ability to adapt to changing realities.”171 At the same 
conference, in his official statement, Shintaro Ishihara the Governor of Tokyo asked for 
end of the Security Alliance and for reassessing the bilateral partnership. 
To apply the metaphor of a book to Japan’s postwar history, we can call 
the years up to the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty the prologue, 
and the 50 years from its signing to the present the first chapter. It seems 
about time to start shaping the next chapter of our postwar history…Japan 
can take the initiative in proposing to the United States that the two 
countries annul the Japan-U.S. security treaty…We should change the 
treaty so that the Japanese people are in an equal partnership with the 
Americans in a way of which they can be proud.172 
Japan seeks to increase its influence in Asia as part of its political objective, and 
will challenge the American interests in this area. “Japan needs to strike a politically 
sustainable balance between its bilateral priorities vis-à-vis the United States and its 
regional interests.”173 Under this scenario, “…Japan would maintain strong defense ties 
with the U.S., but also seek to expand its influence in Asia by charting a security policy 
that might, at times, be at cross-purposes with Washington.”174 
There are three main objectives that Japan is pursuing on the way to becoming a 
“normal nation.” First, special attention is paid in Japan regarding the future of its 
national defence, including the revision of its constitution. A second objective aims to 
achieve a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Third, Japan would 
consider the transformation of the Japanese Defense Agency into a full ministry. 
Interpretations of the constitutional provisions that ban Japan from being 
proactive in relation to its legal rights for self-defense that is granted to all nations under 
the United Nations’ charter became more realistic and attempted to reinterpret Article 9. 
According to James Brooke, “The peace constitution does not mean that the country has 
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to be pacifist. Just to be on the receiving end of an attack is not what our Constitution had 
in mind. Just to wait for another country’s attack and lose thousands and tens of 
thousands of people, that is not what the Constitution assumes.”175 
Relying on other actors to provide security is seen by Shigeru Ishiba as a national 
irresponsibility: “Japan is waking from a prolonged state of heiwa boke, or peace senility, 
induced by more than half a century of the United States taking on the role of Japan’s 
ultimate protector.”176 
The Japanese politicians envisage that “…gaining a permanent seat on the 
Security Council is the quickest way for Japan to gain the respect and power they believe 
they deserve.”177 The former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali foresaw that 
including Japan on the Security Council may have positive results; “… he believes 
Japan’s permanent seat could have a stabilizing effect on U.S. hegemony, and advance 
the cause of democratization.”178 But for the politicians it is obvious that “[a]s long as 
Japan’s security and diplomatic policy are beholden to the United States, it is unlikely it 
will gain sufficient support from other nations to achieve its permanent seat.”179 
Part of the becoming a “normal nation” process includes an increased will of 
Japan to use its Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) for missions other than those 
directly related to homeland defense. Over the last 15 years, the use of the SDF has 
assumed more missions in U.N. peacekeeping, counter-piracy operations, and support for 
the U.S. War on Terror. These new roles have contributed to higher visibility in the world 
and increased legitimacy of the use of the Japanese military.  
Despite the fact that many Japanese are in opposition to the development of SDF 
and assuming the likelihood of more offensive missions, and believing that it is in 
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violation with the constitution, the SDF benefits from having one of the largest military 
budgets in the world.  Despite the fact that Article 9 prohibits the use of SDF for 
offensive military operations, in the last period the SDF conducted bilateral and 
multilateral military exercises with the U.S. and other nations for practicing and 
maintaining its skills. One of the major discussions in Japan debates the support provided 
by SDF to U.S. troops in Afghanistan.  
This new approach has zonal echoes, since Japan’s neighbors still remember the 
Japanese imperialism and its expansionist policies. Despite these reactions, “[h]owever, a 
growing number of Japanese citizens feel the SDF support operations are necessary if 
Japan wants to become a 'normal nation' and maintain its influence on the international 
stage.”180 
C. JAPANESE HOST NATION SUPPORT AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 
1. Japanese Host Nation Support (HNS) Roots and Evolution 
Under the provisions of the security treaty Japan has no obligation for sustaining 
the stationing of the American troops on its territory. “Simply put, Japan provides bases 
to the U.S. without cost to the U.S., and the U.S. pays the cost for operation of forces in 
the bases. This forms the basic principle of the cost sharing between the U.S. and Japan 
about the U.S. stationing forces.”181 But starting in 1978, Japan’s Host Nation Support 
(HNS) started as an exception to this principle, as a part of burden-sharing by paying 
some of the operational expenses related to the presence of the U.S. forces in Japan. 
These costs represented expenses that had to be done in local currency, such as paying 
the salaries for the Japanese civilian workers employed by the U.S. military bases. These 
costs were related only to peacetime support and, to a certain extent, were aiming to 
decrease the costs for maintaining the military bases. Since then those costs continued to 
increase until the mid 1990s, additional costs such as utilities expenses (electricity, water 
and gas) being added. Starting in 1978 the HNS for the U.S. forces in Japan has been 
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negotiated on a step-by-step basis every five years and concluded by adoption of special 
agreements through so-called Special Measures Agreements (SMA).  
Figure 4, a snapshot from Tatsuro Yoda’s work Recalibrating Alliance 
Contributions,182 shows the evolution of HNS, which continually increased until 1995. 
 
Figure 4.   Host nation support as percentage of Japan’s GDP (1978-2003) 
Related to the evolution of HNS, Figure 5183 shows the evolution of local labor 
cost and its share between the U.S. and Japan. Japan’s share continuously increased, and 
by 1995 reached the 100 percent limit. 
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Figure 5.   Local labor cost (converted to dollars) and its shares by the U.S. and Japan 
(1978-2002) 
The first resolution to share part of the costs was made by the former Minister of 
the Defense Agency, Kanemaru, who decided to pay part of the salaries of Japanese 
civilians working with the American bases. First explained as “Omoiyari Yosan” 
(Omoiyari means sympathy and Yosan means budget in Japanese), this cost sharing 
appeared as part of the defense budget for supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance. The former 
minister took advantage of a semi-legal artifice, “Omoiyari,” which expressed Japanese’ 
sympathy for the U.S. efforts in protecting Japan from an external military aggressor. 
This was semi-legal since under the SOFA provisions there were no legal obligations for 
Japan to make any financial contribution. 
Related to this issue, Okazaki Hisahiko, a former diplomat and ambassador, wrote 
an opinion article in a newspaper: 
The "omoiyari" budget was conceived in the realization that Japan, being 
unable to cooperate with the U.S. through the use of force, should 
cooperate financially as much as possible. I do not think that this money-
centered approach can be continued indefinitely because the alliance could 
be endangered if Japan watched from the sidelines when U.S. soldiers 
shed their blood in a military crisis in a surrounding area. In the present 
circumstances, however, money is the only thing Japan can provide in 
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place of a direct military contribution. We should realize the grave 
implications of stinting on such financial support. 184 
2. Reducing Versus Maintaining the HNS 
The public opinion around this issue has changed since 1978. Some people think 
that the Japanese financial contribution is too thin in comparison to the security 
advantages, others argue in favor of decreasing or even terminating this financial burden. 
Tatsuro Yoda, citing Michael Green, who is a political scientist and expert on Japanese 
politics, said that at the Council of Foreign Relations that he 
… touched on the HNS negotiation in his comment on events on U.S.-
Japan relations in the 1st quarter of 2000. He defends the HNS arguing 
that the size of HNS is only less than 0.25% of the Japanese government’s 
budget, the USFJ [the U.S. Forces in Japan] uses most of the HNS for 
paying the salaries of Japanese workers at the U.S. bases in Japan and uses 
a very small proportion of the HNS for building recreational facilities.185 
The majority who argues against the Japanese HNS contribution recalls the fact 
that “Japan does not have any obligation under the security treaty and the Status of 
Forces Agreement to support the USFJ financially. Within the people identified with 
those types of negative views, some ask for revision of HNS, including a decrease of the 
size, while others ask for its end.”186 
In a 1998 article in Foreign Affairs, Hosokawa Masahiro, a former Japanese 
Prime Minister, while recognizing the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, 
advocates for the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Japan and downsizing of 
HNS: 
As the common threat presented by the Cold War diminishes, it is natural 
for the Japanese people to be skeptical of the U.S. military presence. The 
American military bases cost Japan $4 billion annually. If foregone rent 
and other revenues are included, Japan’s annual burden jumps to $5 
billion, at a time when the Japanese government faces a serious financial 
crisis. In terms of cost-sharing, Japan bears the largest burden among U.S. 
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allies for maintaining U.S. forces, with Germany and South Korea paying 
$60 million and $290 million, respectively. By a 1995 Special Measures 
Agreement, Japan is committed through the year 2000 to pay the salaries 
of 24,000 civilian employees at the bases, the utility costs, including 
energy, water, and communications, and most of the construction 
expenses. This burden to Japanese taxpayers hangs like a darkening cloud 
over the future of the alliance. Japan should honor the 1995 agreement but 
put America on notice that it will not renew the agreement in 2000. It is 
the business of statesman, not bureaucrats or generals, to plan for the 
future. The U.S. military presence in Japan should fade with this century’s 
end. The time has come for the leaders of Japan and the United States to 
discuss an alliance fit for the next century.187 
In his work, Tatsuro Yoda presents a position of the Japan contribution according 
to the Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense 2003 published by the U.S. 
DOD. According to this source, “the size of Japan’s HNS ($4.62 billion) is largest among 
all the U.S. allies and much larger than that of Germany ($862 million) or South Korea 
($805 million), which are the second and third largest contributors respectively.”188 
According to Yoda “[t]he large sizes of HNS for those countries reflect the size of U.S. 
stationing forces: 71,434 in Germany, 39,691 in Japan, and 37,972 in South Korea as of 
December 31, 2001. Japan’s share of U.S. stationing costs (79 percent in 2001) is also 
high compared to other U.S allies, for example, Germany (21 percent) or South Korea 
(39 percent).“189 Figure 6190, shows that Japan has the highest contribution among the top 
10 U.S. allies.   
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Figure 6.   Size and share of U.S. overseas stationing costs paid by allies (top 10 U.S. 
allies with high share of stationing costs, 2001) 
In 2004, in a speech to journalists, Lieutenant General Waskow, Commander of 
the U.S. Forces, accentuated the importance of NHS to the USFJ: 
Now let me talk about us – the men and women of the US Forces, Japan. In 
support of our security relationship, the US has more than 58,000 military 
personnel assigned to Japan. These military members are supported by 
approximately 5,500 DoD civilian employees and more than 25,000 Japanese 
workers. When you add in another 52,000 family members to our overall 
population, you can see that we have nearly 140,000 people devoted to the 
Japan – U.S. security alliance. U.S. forces are dispersed among 88 facilities 
on Honshu, Kyushu and Okinawa. The cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan 
is well in excess of $8 billion a year. Of this amount, the government of Japan 
generously pays approximately half of the cost – in excess of $4 billion a 
year.191 
Beyond all these opinions, the fact is that over the past sixty years, “Article 9 has 
provided the political cover for Japan to rely on the American security umbrella for its 
protection, while concentrating its finances on economic development.”192 
The U.S. defensive umbrella has enabled Japan to limit its defense burden to 1% of 
its GNP since 1976. This allowed Japan to focus its resources on economic growth.193 This 
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allowed for the ensuring of political stabilization in Japan, which was one of the central 
themes of the United States’ policy in Japan after WW II. 
D. OKINAWA’S BURDEN 
1.  U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa Between Years 1945 - 1972 
Okinawa, the largest island of the Ryukyu Islands, is Japan’s most southwestern 
prefecture. The Ryukyu Islands is comprised of more than 60 other smaller islands, 
which are also part of the Okinawa prefecture. Okinawa, which is the most important 
island in the archipelago, has a slim shape, measuring about 135 kilometers, and its 
wideness varies between 4 to 28 kilometers. “The name ‘Okinawa’ has an interesting 
origin: the word itself means ‘sea rope.’ The early inhabitants visualized Okinawa, when 
viewed from a distance, as looking like a piece of rope floating on the ocean.”194  
Okinawa is the most heavily populated island of the Ryukyu Archipelago. “The 
principle economic activities are agriculture, fishing, food processing, and the 
manufacture of textiles and pottery. U.S. military bases and tourism are also important to 
the economy. Naha, on the southern end of the island is the most populous city and major 
port.”195 
In the history of World War II, the Battle of Okinawa from 1945 is remembered 
as one of the major battles of the war and the bloodiest one in the Pacific. The records of 
this battle state an estimate of over 120,000 killed, of which about 100,000 were civilians. 
These figures represent over one third of the total of the island’s inhabitants at the time. 
Okinawa was the only place where there was a land battle in Japan during WW II and 
what remains in the Okinawans’ common memories that "[t]he Okinawa victims were not 
only killed by bombs and shells, but also by the Japanese military.”196 At the end of WW 
II the Japanese government used Okinawa as a shield for protecting the mainland. “The 
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long, bloody Battle of Okinawa left enduring scars on the memories of the people of 
Okinawa. Adding to the betrayal, the U.S. military administration of Okinawa continued 
until 1972 with Japanese government approval. All this history is still deeply etched in 
the collective memory of the people of Okinawa.”197 
From an historic perspective between Japan and Okinawa,  
[t]his background is in many ways a history of discrimination against 
Okinawans by the rest of Japan-a discrimination felt strongly by the many 
older Okinawans who have lived through it. It may be said that Okinawa, 
like Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, was a victim of Japanese 
colonialism, for the Japanese government was brutal in its subversion of 
the indigenous culture and language of Okinawa and in forcing the people 
of Okinawa to assume a Japanese identity.198 
Okinawa was left under the authority of the U.S. military after 1951, when Japan 
regained its independence by concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S. 
Japan Security Treaty. By the time Japan was joining the World community, Okinawa 
was transformed into an advance post in fighting the spreading communism from Asian 
countries such as Soviet Union, China, and North Korea.  
2. U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa after the 1972 Reversion to Japan 
The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty started in 1965 when the former 
Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato who “… visited Okinawa and began to press for the 
return of Okinawa to Japan. Okinawa's reversion to Japan was realized on May 15, 1972. Still 
25 years since the reversion to Japan, Okinawa, occupying only 1% of the land area of Japan, 
is the location of 75% of the U.S. military bases in Japan. There remain many issues 
concerning the bases.”199 
Even after 1972, Okinawa remained the place with the heaviest concentration of U.S. 
military bases in Asia. The military bases occupy up to 19.3 percent of the total area of the 
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island of Okinawa, and here are stationed more than 50 percent of the total U.S. military 
personnel deployed in Japan. According to the New York Times July 21, 2000 edition, 
“The islands, which have a population of 1.2 million, are home to about half of the 
45,000 United States military personnel in Japan. Okinawans maintain that they bear an 
unfair burden because their island, which is less than 1 percent of Japan's total area, 
contains 75 percent of the United States military facilities in the country.”200 But the 
military presence is not limited only to bases; “Together with the more familiar military 
bases are other facilities that include jungle warfare training sites, communication 
stations, recreational facilities and housing compounds.”201 
 
Figure 7.   The footprint of U.S. military bases on Okinawa today or in former times 
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Figure 7202 shows the footprint of the U.S. military bases, training camps and 
other facilities on Okinawa Island, and other close locations. Giuseppe A. Stavale, citing 
USFJ Online [home page on-line] shows that actually the number of Americans in 
Okinawa tends to increase when taking into account other categories; “The total number 
of U.S. military personnel on Okinawa fluctuates slightly, but tends to be under 30,000 
active-duty members with about 24,000 family members and civilian personnel.”203  
When one thinks about Okinawa’s history and corroborates it with the total 
numbers of the American troops present on this island, one may understand why 
Okinawans “… see themselves as a Japanese colony leased to the United States.”204The 
burden of Okinawa may also be figured when taking into account that even though this 
island accounts itself only for 0.6 percent of the total landmass of Japan, it actually 
provides a 23.5 percent of the total land required for U.S. bases in Japan. 
Okinawans feel that the rest of Japan has solved the problem of hosting American 
bases by putting this burden on their shoulders: 
While the rest of Japan expresses sympathy for Okinawa, it espouses a 
not-in-my-backyard attitude towards relieving Okinawa of some of the 
U.S. military bases. Over the years, Okinawans have called this unequal 
distribution of forces, consumption of scarce land, incidents and accidents 
involving U.S. military personnel and other problems, real or invented, a 
“burden.” Okinawans assert that they have shouldered an unequal share of 
the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, which provides a security blanket for all 
of Japan, for too many years and that this burden must be lessened if not 
equally shared by mainland Japan.205  
There are more and more voices that are claiming a change of security’s approach 
in the frame of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, a reduction or a complete withdrawal of 
the American troops from Okinawa. These arguments started after the end of the Cold 
War and have amplified over the years.   
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Back in 1996, the U.S.-Japan summit between President Bill Clinton and Prime 
Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro was the first high-level meeting to re-address the issues of 
Japan’s security:  
Despite the rhetoric about regional security, Clinton and Hashimoto did 
very little to map out a joint security strategy for the Asia-Pacific region. 
Just confirming the objective of regional stability is much too vague to 
guide concrete policy. Given the uncertainties, an American military 
presence in the region remains an important component of such a strategy. 
But while necessary, this presence is by no means sufficient to deal with 
the complex challenges that confront the region. A more comprehensive 
approach is required that integrates diplomatic and economic instruments 
of policy as well as military ones. An effective U.S.-Japan strategy for 
regional security must address three critical tasks: deterrence, crisis 
response and crisis prevention through mutual reassurance and threat 
reduction.206 
The rhetoric around this summit also included sharp controversies: “President 
Clinton should take a hard look at the U.S. force structure in Japan. One thing he would 
discover is that 20,000 U.S. Marines are no longer needed there”207 – affirmed Mochizuki 
and his collaborators. “The Cold War is over. Stationing U.S. troops in Japan, mainly in 
Okinawa, is pointless, divisive, and expensive”208 – added Chalmers. The same author 
accused the U.S. of a kind of political myopia failing to act in accordance with the new 
political landscape: “The end of the Cold War in East Asia differs from Europe in that the 
Soviet Union acquiesced to its loss of 'superpower' status; in contrast, the United States 
has chosen to act as if nothing much has changed.”209 
Even though the security treaty was seen as important for both countries and 
“…essential to Japanese security, yet Okinawa pays the highest price for it.”210 Okinawa 
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has borne the defense burden not only for Japan, but also for the entire Far East. “It is 
thus not surprising that the people of Okinawa have found this burden oppressive and 
have sought a full withdrawal of U.S. forces from their islands.”211  
3. Pros for Maintaining the American Bases  
First of all, there are opinions that regard the American military presence in Japan 
as a direct factor for guaranteeing the security of Japan itself and for keeping the zonal 
balance of power. Usually those advocating these things invoked the importance of the 
security alliance for both countries, and for the East Asia and Pacific region. Paul Giarra 
is one of the preeminent voices in the choir:  
These bases, in any reasonable calculus, are essential to the current and 
future security equation of the region. They are vital to the defense of 
Japan, to the security and stability of East Asia, and to American security 
and political and economic strategy both in East Asia and globally. The 
value and indispensability of the Japanese bases-which represent, aside 
from the fixed-in-place U. S. forces in South Korea, the last major 
concentrations of U.S. military power between Guam and the Persian 
Gulf-balance the powerful American contributions to the security 
relationship, and they give substance to Japan's role as an alliance 
partner.212 
The same analyst sees this alliance as a primary source for reinforcing the 
bilateral relations between Japan and the U.S. and, to a certain extent, the support of the 
American bases is a valuable tool for projecting the interests of Japanese foreign policy: 
U.S. forces in Japan are critical to that nation's defense as well. The 
support, or lack thereof, of the Japanese government for the American 
bases has important ramifications for the security of Japan and for the 
bilateral relationship. Most broadly, Japan benefits from the global 
missions assigned to U.S. forces based in the country. The fact that 
Japanese support, in turn, is vital to their ability to operate as far away as, 
for instance, the Persian Gulf animates Japanese foreign policy and tends 
to align U.S. policies and actions with Japanese interests. They reinforce 
each other, to Japan's benefit.213 
                                                 




Michael O'Hanlon, extending the idea of the alliance, intrinsically linked to the 
stability of the “Asia-Pacific region” by looking at this issue through a magnifying glass 
of possible future benefits in constructing trust and cooperation in this part of the world: 
The U.S. presence in Japan has been fairly lean for quite a while, 
especially when viewed against the importance of the alliance to both 
countries and the volatility of much of the Asia-Pacific region. 
Maintaining a powerful Japan-U.S. alliance not only helps keep both 
countries safe and deters aggression in the region, but also provides a 
nucleus for military collaboration that may be extended some day to 
involve other countries, possibly including China, in a strong multilateral 
security structure.214 
Revitalization of the bilateral alliance and promotion of defense cooperation, as 
well as the potential of multilateral cooperation, were seen by other authors as crucial in 
dealing with the zonal security challenges.  
In Japan, an aversion to military involvement and an obsession with 
economic expansion impede the nation's ability to pursue a more balanced 
foreign policy that synthesizes sober geopolitical analysis and the potential 
of multilateral cooperation. In this sense, the challenge of East Asian 
security is as much a problem of American and Japanese domestic politics 
as of international relations.215 
The military presence in Japan has more direct implications for the U.S. itself and 
the projection of its political and security policy regarding the Asia-Pacific area. To a 
certain extent, even America’s credibility is at stake: 
For the United States, American forces in Japan and Okinawa are 
emblematic of the American determination to preserve the advantages and 
political leverage that come from keeping its military forces forward 
deployed. Basing U.S. forces in Japan keeps American defensive 
boundaries on the Asian littoral instead of in the eastern Pacific. 
Strategically, the United States cannot afford to withdraw significant 
forces from Okinawa, for which no realistic and viable alternative exists. 
American influence and political and security policy in Asia depend upon 
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these forces remaining where they are. To agree to remove or reduce those 
forces would put American credibility at significant risk.216 
In this context Giarra is of the opinion that, “[w]ithdrawal of these forces would 
do more than complicate the local strategic situation, causing consternation throughout 
the region and necessitating recalculation of the American role.”217 
Talking about Okinawa in the security context “…the U.S. military bases in 
Okinawa are crucial to security in the Far East, including that of Japan.”218 
However, for Okinawa the “pros” are not all about security. The most important 
advantage is related to the economic side. Taking into account that the island’s economy 
relied chiefly on agriculture and tourism, “[t]he Okinawan economy was almost 
completely dependent upon revenues from activities related to the U.S. military until 
reversion to Japanese administration.”219 After WW II “…Okinawa became an import 
economy dependent upon the U.S. military presence. The authorities saw to it that the 
daily necessities were imported from Japan wherever possible, so that the U.S. dollars 
invested in base construction became a source of foreign currency revenue for the 
postwar Japanese government through the people of Okinawa.”220 
The economical benefits that Okinawa enjoys in hosting the American troops are 
quite significant. Unfortunately after more than 60 years of U.S. presence on the island 
there are fewer and fewer of those who remember the days before the arrival of the 
Americans. People live routinely with the presence of the bases and cannot imagine how 
things could be without them; “…overwhelming majority of Okinawans do not realize 
the direct, tangible benefits of having U.S. forces stationed on Okinawa.”221 Giarra argues 
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that “[t]hese bases have to be seen locally less as the problem and more as the solution, 
with respect, for example, to development plans and economic expansion.”222 
At the local level the reality is that,  
[o]ver 12,000 Japanese nationals on Okinawa are employed on U.S. 
military bases, either funded by the Government of Japan or the United 
States government, or through non-appropriated funded (NAF) activities, 
such as Morale, Welfare, Recreation (MWR) and other similar 
organizations. For the most part, these are well-paying jobs with 
handsome benefits and are fiercely competed for by the local populace. 
There are many other tangible economic benefits that Okinawans do 
appreciate and enjoy which is a direct result of U.S. forces being stationed 
on Okinawa. It is estimated that the U.S. military presence injects about 
$1.4 billion into the Okinawan economy or at least 5 percent and as much 
as 10 percent of Okinawa’s Gross Prefectural Product (GPP).223 
Okinawans see the dark side of this presence more and more and request the 
reduction or even the termination of the bases on their island. The opinions aren’t 
however unanimous: '''People living near the bases feel the most opposition,' said 
Seizaburo Miyagi, a 65-year-old survivor of the war who spoke in his small tatami 
factory. 'Of course you will hear some people speak out against the Americans, but 
everyone doesn't feel that way.'"224 
4. Arguments for Downsizing the U.S. Military Presence 
In the past the American military presence in Japan had not suffered large 
fluctuations and “[a]s in Europe, in Japan the massive postwar American presence 
diminished only slowly. Any consideration of large-scale withdrawals ended with the 
onset of the Korean War and the militarization of Cold War containment.”225 Any 
fluctuation in this timeframe marked the developments driven by the confrontation 
between the world’s superpowers; it was the case of the Vietnam War when the 
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American presence in Japan decreased in the beginning as a follow up of massive 
deployments in supporting the war, and then increasing back due to the redeployments 
from the war.     
A short look over the military presence in Japan will help in understanding the 
dynamics of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The analysis uses the data available in Figure 8226 
and specially deals with the period of the Vietnam War and early 2000.  
 
Figure 8.   Number of facilities and acreage of the U.S. bases in Japan (1967-2001) 
As a first observation it may be noticed that the number of facilities and acreage 
of the U.S. bases in Japan decreased until 1972 due to the deployment of troops in the 
Vietnam War. Year 1972 has special significance for Okinawa, being the year when this 
part of Japan was reverted to Japanese administration. The process started “[i]n the late 
1960s, [when] Japan’s support for U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam drew criticism from 
students, the media, and large segments of the population. This resulted in almost daily 
protests throughout Japan. In 1969, the Nixon administration responded to the protests by 
announcing the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty.”227 But the reversion 
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process had its disadvantages for Okinawa, because “[t]he number of facilities and 
acreage increased after the jurisdiction of Okinawa returned from the U.S. to Japan in 
May 1972. The Japanese government provided a part of the land for U.S. bases after the 
return of jurisdiction.”228  
From 1972 until the late 70s there was a reduction trend on the number of 
locations and use of the land by the American bases but “…reduction was due to 
consolidations of bases and returns of areas which were not critically important to the 
activities of the stationing forces.”229 
After this period the American presence diminished only slowly without 
spectacular changes until mid 1990s. This period is important because it marks the 
establishment of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November 1995. 
There was also a major political advance on the reduction of U.S. bases in 
the mid 1990s. After the anti-U.S. bases protests spread in Okinawa in 
September 1995, the U.S. and Japan established the Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November, 1995. As a major item for 
reduction, the U.S. and Japan agreed in April 1996 that the U.S. would 
return the Futenma Air Station in Okinawa “within the next five to seven 
years.” The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) approved the SACO 
final report on the reduction of U.S. bases in Okinawa in December 1996. 
According to the SACO final report, approximately 21 percent of the total 
acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use 
facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.”230  
Even though there wasn’t too much progress made in putting the adopted 
decisions in practice, the establishment of SACO marked a new era in the presence of 
American troops in Japan. It proved that both countries were open to discussing the issue 
of the bases and to taking into account the public demands for reduction. 
Although the U.S. and Japan agreed on the return of U.S. bases totaling in 
5,002 ha (about 50 square kilometers), there was not much progress after 
the SCC in 1996. Among the 11 areas to be agreed to be returned, only the 
Aha Training Areas (480 ha), and part of the Camp Kuwae (38 ha) were 
already returned as of June 2004. The return of the Futenma Air Station 
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deadlocked because of the opposition in Okinawa to the relocation plan 
accompanying the construction of a sea-based facility.231 
Even though the committee made the decision in December 1996 to return 
Futenma within the next five to seven years, at the term expiration in December 2003, the 
issue was still pending.  
The creation of SACO also had another effect: while discussing the reduction it 
was difficult to bring up any further discussion about increasing the area for the bases in 
the future, taking into account the opposition of local government and people. 
5. Okinawans’ Opposition to the Presence of American Bases 
The Okinawans opposition to the presence of the American bases on their land 
has roots back in 1953 when, the “U.S. Civil Administration began land expropriations in 
support of the strengthening of the bases. The Okinawan resistance to the land 
requisitions was strong, igniting an "island-wide struggle" whose momentum continued 
to gather steam under the "Reversion Movement."232 Back in 1972 the decision made by 
the Japanese government in granting additional land for basing the American troops was 
part of a trade to reduce the bases on the mainland of Japan, which also hurt Okinawa’s 
feelings. The issue is that such decisions were made up side down without taking into 
account what Okinawans really wanted and want: “… 'I am worried that leaders like 
President Clinton will come to Okinawa and make a speech thanking Okinawans for 
accepting the military bases,' Mr. Tamaki [Yashikazu Tamaki, an Okinawan 
assemblyman] said. 'That would be like rubbing salt into the wounds of Okinawans, 
because the reality is, we don't want the bases.’”233 
The Tokyo administration began to realize, especially after 1995, the fact that the 
Japanese opposition grew stronger fed by the historical context and the events which 
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marked people’s lives, as was the case “… on September 4, 1995, when three American 
servicemen abducted and raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa.”234 
Gabe Masaaki observed that “[t]he intensity of the Okinawan outcry belatedly 
stirred the Japanese government into the realization that it could no longer hope to 
maintain U.S. bases in Okinawa against popular sentiment.”235 The protest against the 
American presence in Japan grew in intensity after the end of the Cold War and reached 
its zenith in 1995. After this year the Japanese society began to sympathize with 
Okinawans, and question the reasons of the American presence: “Demands for a 
withdrawal of U.S. bases, however, now also come from mainland Japan. ‘The bases are 
here for political reasons - to scare other countries in Asia,’ says Yoshiko Matsuda, a nun 
from Tokyo who came for the protest.”236 
The echoes questioning their presence in Japan, and demanding the withdrawal of 
the troops, were heard from the other side of the Pacific as well: “All this would serve 
America's interests and return American forces to places where bases have been closed, 
such as Hawaii and California. And it would gain the support of the American public 
because it is a policy toward East Asia that is fiscally and morally defensible.”237 
After 1995 a few of the American and Japanese analysts agreed on a necessary 
gradual downsizing. Terashima Jitsuro, in a more moderate manner, "…proposes that 
Japan consider a gradual scaling down of the U.S. military presence in Japan…”238 – 
while Michael O'Hanlon opined: “I believe that the United States should offer to 
fundamentally restructure its Marine Corps presence in Okinawa Prefecture.”239 
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At the end it must be said that there is no full consensus between the Okinawans 
regarding the withdrawal of the bases from the island. There are at least two categories 
that are either silent or supporting the current situation: the workers employed with the 
bases and some of the landlords of the expropriated lands.  
The first category “[w]ith their members' livelihoods at stake, the base employees' 
unions want the installations to remain, and they did not participate in major 
demonstrations against the United States in the fall of 1995.”240 And the second category, 
the landlords receiving rents, especially when their property has modest inherent value,  
[o]wners of otherwise worthless land depend upon these payments, 
sometimes exclusively, and they do not want the land returned. Even when 
the property does have value, there is seldom consensus on its future use 
among the hundreds of landowners of large tracts. These resist return as 
well, since rent received is better than the certain impasse that would 
follow reversion.241 
At this point it should be added, for the sake of accuracy, that the opposition 
against the military bases has not reached an overwhelming majority in the polls back in 
1995; “[a] non-binding, prefecture-wide referendum was held in Japan's Okinawa 
Prefecture on reviewing the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. Only 53% of those 
voting agreed with the referendum.”242  
E.  OKINAWA’S DILEMMAS  
1. Public Opinion in Okinawa 
In Okinawa the public opinion is sensitive to events that happen around the 
military bases.  Giuseppe A. Stavale caught this aspect very well in his thesis. The main 
argument that the author brings to attention is the so-called “connect-the-dots” 
experience, which affects Okinawans’ judgment. He defined this attitude as follows: 
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… Okinawans will see [a] case as the latest in a long string of similar 
incidents and accidents, some of which, from the Okinawan perspective, 
had been brushed aside and gone unpunished by American officials acting 
in accordance with an antiquated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).243 
A second argument brought to attention refers to the press attitude and role in 
influencing public opinion. As already argued in chapter 2 of this thesis mass media has 
an important role in influencing the public and creating an opinion, which most of the 
people will follow. The same author emphasized the following: 
The Japanese media, particularly on Okinawa, warrant attention as they 
are likely to degrade the views towards U.S. forces. “The influence of the 
press on Japanese public opinion and also on political circles is 
substantial…”244 Professor Robert D. Eldridge of Osaka University 
recognized the tendency of the local media in Okinawa to report 
effectively from the “viewpoint of local residents, particularly under 
adverse conditions,” but added that constant reporting of only negative 
issues and no coverage of issues that would place U.S. forces “in a 
favorable light” open the Okinawan media to claims of being biased.245 
Ilene R. Prusher sustained the same point of view, citing the words of 
“Kyunosuke Meguni, an Okinawan political analyst … ‘Most of the crimes in Okinawa 
are committed by native Okinawans. If a woman goes to the police to report an assault 
committed by a Japanese man, it will only make three lines in the newspaper.’”246 
The opinion of John W Kingdon is very much applicable to the Okinawan society, 
which is very sensitive to any unusual event, or an official or changes of status related to 
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Problems are often not self-evident by the indicators. They need a little 
push to get the attention of people…. That push is sometimes provided by 
a focusing event like a crisis or disaster that comes along to call attention 
to the problem, a powerful symbol that catches on, or the personal 
experience of a policy maker.247 
The following Figures 9248 and 10249 will help in drawing some conclusions. 
 
Figure 9.   Number of newspaper articles on anti-American sentiment in Japan (1985-
2002) 
As noted, in Figure 9, which presents the dynamic of the number of anti-
American articles in the Japanese press between 1985 and 2002, there are few peaks. The 
first one in the 1990s is directly linked to the Gulf War and represents the receptivity of 
the society to this worldwide event. The anti-Americanism has a direct correlation to the 
anti-war sentiments of the society. The second peak in 1995 is an immediate consequence 
of the rape of a schoolgirl by three U. S. servicemen. The same anti-American sentiment 
associated with an anti-war reaction may be observed in 2001 when Operation Enduring 
Freedom was initiated.   
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Figure 10 shows the number of newspaper articles written on the HNS in the 
Japanese mass media between 1984 and 2002. It is easy to observe that interest is much 
higher in 1987, 1988, 1990, 1995, and 2002, the exact years that the SMAs had been 
discussed and approved in the Japanese Diet (the Japanese legislature). This second 
diagram adds more proof to the fact that Japanese public opinion is event-driven. On the 
other hand, the more attention the press pays to an issue directly linked to the American 
military bases or security treaty, the more the attention of the public-at-large on that 
specific issue grows. 
 
Figure 10.   Number of newspaper articles on Host Nation Support (Asahi newspaper, 
1984/1-2002/6) 
The subjective way that the press presents that issue induces a specific 
understanding or related sentiments. Giuseppe A. Stavale offers a good example in his 
thesis:  
Okinawans and mainland Japanese alike are not familiar with the details 
of the SOFA and are thereby prejudiced against U.S. military presence 
when they hear or read pejorative details such as the “refusal” of U.S. 
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military authorities to transfer custody of a suspect without reporting the 
context of the refusal or the procedure agreed to in the SOFA.250 
Up to this point, this subchapter has presented the way Okinawans perceived and 
dealt with the problematic issue of the American military presence on their island. 
Despite the fact that there were misunderstandings and exaggerations along time, there 
are still problems that affect the civilians and the normal activity around the American 
bases, and they cannot be overlooked. In the following section, this author will try to 
survey the multitude of events and incidents that normally occur in any military activity. 
He will try to present the most significant ones that left a deep trace in people’s 
conscience or influenced the Okinawan sentiment towards the American personnel.  
2. Okinawan Community’s Concerns and Problems 
Vincent Kelly Pollard synthetically presented the problems Okinawans faced: 
… the history of the U.S. military in Okinawa is one of expropriated 
agricultural lands; crashes and near collisions of jets and Osprey 
helicopters; danger from munitions during live-fire exercises; sexual 
assault; theft; noise pollution near schools; and threats to endangered 
species of coral, fish, birds, and other animals.251 
This excerpt summarizes in just a few words over 60 years of American military 
presence’s history, revealing the social and environmental problems that occurred during 
this period.  
There is a long list of authors and articles that are treating this subject. In the 
following pages those, which are most representative, are presented. 
Thom Shanker, talking about the social problems, wrote: 
The governor of Okinawa petitioned Defense Secretary Donald H. 
Rumsfeld … to reduce or relocate American military bases on this 
strategic Japanese island, and urged removing large numbers of American 
marines to reduce crime here. The Okinawa petition contends that 5,157 
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crimes were committed between 1972 and last December [2002] by 
American troops, the Pentagon's civilian employees working here or their 
dependents. Of those, 533 were ''heinous crimes such as murder, robbery 
and sexual assault,'' the Okinawa government said.252 
Ilene R. Prusher, talking about Okinawans’ feelings towards the American 
troopers explained, “…that many here don't think that thousands of young U.S. soldiers 
make good neighbors. The local grievance list is long, including environmental pollution, 
a high crime rate, and a longing for the return of lush hilltops and beachfront property 
that are taken up by the bases, which cover 10 percent of the Okinawan land.”253   
“On Okinawa, more than elsewhere, in addition to occupying existing bases U.S. 
forces constructed extensive facilities on property expropriated from local 
landowners.”254 
Some of the authors are of the opinion (as previously presented under pros for the 
presence of the bases) that there are people in Okinawa who are “happy” to receive rents 
for their expropriated lands, yet there some others who would like to have their land 
back: 
Though Mr. Tzukiyama and some 3,000 others here receive government 
compensation for territory that was confiscated for the bases, he says 
they'd rather have their land back. "We have to rent the land we live on, 
and my house is too small," says Tzukiyama, holding his nine- year-old 
son's hand. When he was that age, he says, American troops raped a 
schoolgirl he knew.255 
Special attention has been paid in the literature to the rape case that happened in 
the fall of 1995. The incident triggered a huge wave of protest and was the trigger for the 
establishing of SACO in November 1995. As a second consequence the Okinawans 
started to ask for the revision of SOFA, which in their opinion allowed felons who 
committed such crimes to escape unpunished: “The size of the demonstration in October  
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1995, to protest the incident and to ask the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement 
was the largest in Okinawa, 85 thousands, after the return of Okinawa to Japan in 
1972.”256 
The size and intensity of protests made analysts attribute global valence to this 
event, as Chalmers Johnson did:  
The Cold War in Europe ended in 1989 when the people of Berlin defied 
their overlords and began to dismantle the wall that divided their city. The 
Cold War in East Asia began to end six years later, on September 4, 1995, 
when three American servicemen abducted and raped a 12-year-old 
schoolgirl in Okinawa.257 
Referring to this kind of crime, “Japanese and Western historians have said that in 
the aftermath of World War II, American troops raped thousands of Okinawan women 
without reprisals. The historians said that while hundreds of rape cases have been 
documented, most have gone unreported of fear for retaliation and shame.”258 Even more 
so, there were people who saw the sexual crimes in Okinawa as occupying the first place 
in the crime’s hierarchy; “Zenko Nakamura, 53, an activist who is fighting the relocation 
of an American Marine base, said, ''I'm disappointed that the president [Clinton] didn't 
mention what Okinawans care most about -- sexual crimes committed by American 
servicemen.”259 
For a certain segment of the population, the way the Americans behaved or made 
their presence acknowledged, played an important role in defining their position or better 
said opposition: “[s]till, for many Okinawans, reservations about the American bases 
come down to their seeming domination of the landscape and the nuisances that creates: 
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the thudding clatter of helicopter blades, the roar of jets taking off and landing, and the 
lumbering trucks that aggravate the traffic congestion here.”260 
Not as a direct consequence but probably influenced by the presence of the bases, 
“[t]he island also has its share of social problems. Okinawa's unemployment rate is twice 
the national average. It has Japan's lowest household savings rate and lowest per-capita 
income, and highest teenage pregnancy and divorce rates.”261 
To all these issues the miscommunications or wrong signals sent by officials may 
crucially influence the public opinion and make decisions for the “undecided people”: 
In the midst of all this bad news, the Marine commander for Japan, Lt. 
Gen. Earl Hailston, inadvertently stoked local anger when an e-mail 
message to his officers was leaked and published in a local newspaper. It 
denounced Okinawan political leaders who ''falsely claim to be our 
friends,'' calling them nuts, ''and a bunch of wimps.'' For Gov. Keiichi 
Inamine, a conservative politician who has long been considered a 
supporter of the United States presence in Okinawa, General Hailston's 
remark was the last straw. 262 
But the problems of Okinawans are not only about social and environmental 
issues; they are present also in the economic area. 
Until 1972, the year of reversion to Japan’s administration, the Okinawan 
economy revealed a fragile economic structure, which was very much influenced by and 
dependent on the revenues directly linked to the bases activities.  “This structure was 
artificially inflated after the war as a result of construction for the U.S. military bases in 
anticipation of an extended U.S. presence in Okinawa. In essence, Okinawa became an 
import economy dependent upon the U.S. military presence.”263 Okinawa became an  
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instrument in Tokyo administration’s hands for making money, a source of foreign 
revenues from the U.S. expenses necessary for constructing, maintaining and sustaining 
its military bases.  
After reversion, “…the Japanese government formulated an economic 
development program for Okinawa under the slogan of – ‘Construction of a Peaceful and 
Cheerful Okinawa.’ The 10-year program-currently the third-was intended to raise the 
prefecture's per capita income, then slightly less than 60 percent of the national average, 
and to restructure the prefecture's economic base to encourage expansion of local 
manufacturing capabilities.”264 This modus operandi had its benefits in the beginning; 
“That money has helped improve infrastructure and educational, medical and other 
welfare facilities. But, instead of encouraging a self-sustaining industrial sector, it has 
made Okinawa's economy heavily reliant on public works subsidies.”265 As a direct 
consequence, “…the prefecture has depended upon capital investment from the central 
government. [and over the years] Okinawa has almost no significant manufacturing 
industry, while its service sector, largely dependent upon sales of imported goods, and its 
construction industry, which depends upon public works projects, are disproportionately 
overblown.”266 
Very often, local officials blamed the U.S. military presence of being the source 
of all their problems: “In his petition to Mr. Rumsfeld, the Okinawa governor wrote that 
‘incidents and accidents caused by U.S. military personnel, and environmental problems 
stemming from the bases, have created enormous impact on people's lives, while the 
facilities became the outstanding hindrance to urban development and economic 
promotion.’”267 
The tourism in Okinawa was not very well developed, because of the island’s 
exposure to hurricanes, but it was still part of the local economy. After 9-11, the  
 
                                                 
264 Paul S. Giarra. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Thom Shanker.  
 105
Okinawans were concerned about a reduction of their profits from tourism, due to the fact 
that this activity was “vulnerable due to the fear of terrorism directed at the U.S. military 
bases.”268 
3. Issues Related to Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA).  
As already presented under the previous section of this thesis, the incidents and 
accidents caused by the Americans and their activity related to the bases have generated 
calls for the reduction of the burden on Okinawa and the revision of the SOFA. A very 
good reference on the subject is the thesis of Keith W. Allen a former NPS student: 
Several air accidents have killed Okinawans and several prominent crimes 
by U.S. service members, including the 1995 and 2001 rapes of Japanese 
citizens, have inflamed the calls for decreasing the U.S. military burden on 
Japan and a reform of the Status of Forces Agreement to allow Japanese 
prosecution of any military member accused of a crime against a Japanese 
national.269 
Okinawans were particularly concerned on the retention, custody, and handling of 
the suspects involved in the incidents because “Okinawans will see the case as the latest 
in a long string of similar incidents and accidents, some of which, from the Okinawan 
perspective, had been brushed aside and gone unpunished by American officials acting in 
accordance with an antiquated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).”270 
According to Miyagi Etsujiro, after the rape in September 1995, 
Okinawans are particularly critical of Article 17, Clause 5(c) of SOFA, 
which concerns the custody of American suspects. Japan has jurisdiction, 
but if suspects are in the hands of U.S. authorities, they remain with them 
until indicted by Japanese authorities. Okinawans argue that all suspects 
over whom Japan has jurisdiction should be handed over to Japanese 
authorities on arrest to expedite investigation and to place suspects under 
restraint as stipulated by Japanese law. In the past, three American 
suspects, while in custody on a U.S. base, fled to the United States, where 
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they were arrested months later. This raised Japanese suspicion that 
pretrial custody on base may be too loose.271 
After the 1995 protests caused by the rape incident, “U.S. authorities agreed to 
transfer the custody of individuals suspected of having committed heinous crimes, such 
as murder and rape, prior to indictment by Japanese courts, called ‘sympathetic 
consideration.’”272 Both the Japanese and U.S. authorities agreed to revise the SOFA and 
the way it was implemented. Unfortunately, due to the differences on the concerned 
parties’ views, and to the dissimilar perceptions regarding the scope and the way of 
revising this document, this is still a pending issue and too little has been accomplished.   
Related to the SOFA reformation, other complaints of Okinawans refer to the 
U.S. authorities’ immixture in the sovereignty of Japan. A good example is “…the crash 
of a Marine Corps CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter on August 13, 2004 and the 
subsequent handling of the crash scene. Again, OPG [Okinawa Prefectural Government] 
officials and the media criticized the U.S. military for its handling of the incident and 
accused the U.S. side of infringing on the sovereignty of Japan by not allowing Japanese 
authorities to examine the wreckage, which was on Japanese territory.”273  
The conflict has been fueled in the past by the way the Okinawans’ complaints 
were treated and the way the answers were submitted back to the complainers.  
These bureaucratic responses were perceived as the standard and stagnant 
party line attached to lofty ideas that hold no significant meaning to the 
common Okinawan. As a result, some Okinawans felt that their 
complaints were not taken seriously. Today, many Okinawans still feel 
that their complaints are not taken seriously, which may contribute to 
consternation among a larger segment of the Okinawan community when 
another incident or accident occurs, no matter how significant or whether 
real or invented.274  
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F. MEANS OF POLICY TO IMPROVE THE HOST NATION/STATIONED 
FORCES RELATIONSHIP 
From studying the available literature on the Okinawa case six main possible 
ways were identified for improving the bilateral U.S.-Japan relations on the security 
alliance, the image of the American military presence in Okinawa, and the relations with 
the local authorities and the civil society.  
• A better promotion of the political, military strategic, and zonal security 
importance of the bases; 
• Gradual reduction of the American presence; 
• A stronger cooperation with the Japanese Self-Defense Force; 
• Positive contribution to the local economic development; 
• Promotion of a “good neighbor” policy and improvement of communication 
with the local community; 
• Improvement of the U.S. personnel policy and cultural awareness. 
1.  A Better Promotion of the Political, Military Strategic, and Zonal 
Security Importance of the Bases 
The key for continuing an effective American military presence in Okinawa (and 
Japan) is a successful reconciliation process between Tokyo’s central authorities and 
Okinawa’s local administration. As long as there is friction between the decisions taken 
in Tokyo and the local administration’ willingness to implement them, the presence of the 
American troops will be undesirable, and the local societal resistance will continue to 
increase.  
The fact that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is in benefit of both countries must 
become a central theme on both governments’ political agenda. The public should know 
and be convinced on the fact that this alliance “…concurs on the threats to the national 
interests of both nations and that a strong security alliance must be maintained to guard 
against those threats and maintain stability in East Asia.”275 During the years the 
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American presence in Japan has been a successful political and military tool in deterring 
any aggression against Japan, and that is a fact that nobody can deny. But if the public in 
Japan does not perceive the fact that those bases are directly indispensable, and important 
for its own national security, the degradation process of the bilateral relationship will 
continue.   
As already implied in this thesis the Japanese public is very sensitive and 
sympathetic to the mass media, so a better understanding, by the ordinary people through 
a sustained media campaign, of the bases’ functions and attributes will help in perceiving 
the reality and reduce the tensions. “Furthermore, few civilians can appreciate the 
importance or extent of military contingency plans. Bases in Okinawa, which may seem 
under-utilized on a normal day, in a crisis would overflow with troops, equipment, and 
materiel.”276 In the same context of better informing the civilian society “[c]risis and 
wartime roles for bases will have to be explained more fully to the public, to the 
prefectural government, and to the government of Japan.”277 
2.  Gradual Reduction of the American Presence 
Some of the political analysts are of the opinion that a reduction of the troops 
from Okinawa is possible and must occur in the future. But this process should take place 
only on the basis of a premeditated plan based on reality and necessities.  Okinawa’s case 
is very important and should receive close attention, since the “Okinawan base issue in 
particular is a bellwether of the future of American presence in East Asia and the western 
Pacific. The base ‘footprint’ in Okinawa can and should be further reduced, in a carefully 
constrained and deliberate process.”278 An ongoing reduction process may diminish the 
resistance of the population and help to win “the hearts and minds,” and at the same time, 
a fundamentally different way of perceiving the presence of the bases may change the 
political climate in the near future.  
                                                 




There are opinions that are skeptical regarding the benefits of the reduction vice a 
complete withdrawal: “Some observers, Japanese and American, insist that the fewer 
Marines on Okinawa the better. Modernization and technological advances may promote 
the trend toward fewer troops in any given unit, but fewer Americans does not 
necessarily equate to a better environment.”279 In the possibility of a future desire of 
keeping the bases, modernization and use of the new technologies may allow a continued 
reduction without harming the operational capabilities, but to a certain point; in running 
and keeping control of such capabilities, when they are not completely removed, the 
human element is strictly necessary and central; it can not be completely replaced.  
3.  A Stronger Cooperation with the Japanese Self-Defense Force 
The integration of the bases with the Japanese Self-Defense Force, and physically 
stationing the Japanese units “…in what are now exclusively American enclaves…”280 
would generate many advantages; “…it would positively affect bilateral interoperability 
and the effectiveness of the alliance. More importantly, it would reverse the tendency of 
Self- Defense officers and Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) officials to dismiss issues 
surrounding United States installations as exclusively American problems.”281  
Related to the same issue, in his thesis, Stavale brings a few strong points to 
attention: 
In coordination with the United States, discussion should be initiated for 
establishing training detachments as tenant commands on U.S. bases in 
Japan. Having Japanese units on U.S. bases in Japan may help by putting 
more of a Japanese face onto the installation and assist the JSDF by 
providing them with better facilities. This creates the opportunity to make 
a Japanese officer the Deputy Camp Commander of U.S. installations and 
even use Japanese resources and troops to assist in force protection. 
Colonel Yamaoka believes that this should be pursued and stated that 
Japanese officers could act as a buffer between local community concerns 
and U.S. military officials.282 
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The integration of the JSDF seems to be a good option for the Americans and 
their Japanese counterpart, making such alternative profitable for both parties. A closer 
cooperation may be the vehicle for a future zonal Asia-Pacific cooperation as Keith W. 
Allen, a former NPS student suggests in his thesis, “…the U.S.-Japan Alliance could 
serve as the foundation of a multilateral security regime in Asia that would include the 
United States, Japan, the PRC, South Korea, Australia, and the ASEAN states.”283 
4.  Positive Contribution to the Local Economic Development 
For a better perception of the American presence in Okinawa, the point of bases’ 
contribution to the local economic development must be made clear. A better promotion 
of the size of the contribution and what it means at the local level would certainly 
improve the public’s perception.  
The number of working opportunities and the level of employment with the 
American bases are figures that count in the surroundings of the bases, and as previously 
shown in this thesis, there are people who care about this and have positive feelings. 
Their influence in the local opinion should be cultivated and enforced by other means as 
a better representation of the American position in the local press. In Okinawa the 
number of locals employed with the bases (as part of the HNS) is quite impressive: “[a]s 
of March 2004, GOJ employed 8,813 Japanese nationals as base employees throughout 
all U.S. military bases on Okinawa.”284 
Another opportunity for contributing to the economic development was the fact 
that American bases transformed some military billets (which could be performed by the 
local workers) into civilian jobs fully subsidized by them.  “Since 2001, the Marine Corps 
has provided an additional 357 full-time positions as bus drivers and cooks in support of 
Marines on Okinawa.”285 
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Some of the measures for contributing to the general effort came from the 
Japanese central authorities. The adoption of Okinawa Promotional Special Measures 
Law, in 2002, made possible the establishment of the Okinawa Special Free Trade Zone, 
which is the only one free trade zone in Japan. The reason for this free trade zone 
establishment was “…to encourage business enterprises to establish facilities in Okinawa 
and promote trade.”286  
According to the 2002 declaration of Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, 
The location that offers the most advantages as a site for trade and 
commerce industries is the Nakagusuku Bay Port Development District 
Special Free Trade Zone, the only free trade zone in Japan. Enterprises 
setting up operations in this district are supported through generous 
incentives such as a 35% corporate income tax exemption and youth 
employment development subsidies.287 
5.  Promotion of a “Good Neighbor” Policy and Improved 
Communication with the Local Community 
In treating this subject this part heavily relies on the personal experience of Mr. 
Stavale, and his conclusions as a military policeman, acknowledged in his thesis at NPS. 
Back in 2004 he was of the opinion that a large responsibility on improving the relation 
between the U.S. military personnel and local community in Okinawa resided with the 
U.S. Department of State (DOS), which had to continue its efforts, “…outside ordinary 
diplomatic dialogue to implement programs or take actions which could strengthen the 
security alliance and facilitate understanding between the U.S. military and local 
communities or, to counter biased and inflammatory media coverage has been mild.”288  
The efforts to improve the communication and local image of the bases should not 
be addressed only in English, which actually keeps informed the military personnel, the 
small American community, and few of the local English speakers. “There are many 
outlets on U.S. military bases to keep English speaking people informed; however, the 
                                                 
286 OPG, “Business,” OPG Online [home page on-line]; available from 
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/english/business/images/english.pdf:(accessed 10 January 2008), 7. 
287 Ibid., 1. 
288 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 113. 
 112
surrounding communities of U.S. military bases in Japan are dependent on their local 
media sources, which are more often biased against the U.S. military and do not offer the 
whole story or counter-balancing stories to issues and events.”289 Under these 
circumstances Stavale presented a few countermeasures that seemed viable for improving 
not only the communication but also the level of knowledge of the locals, and 
intrinsically the image of the Americans: 
• Make base newspapers bilingual in order to keep Japanese base employees 
and their families informed;  
• Make all U.S. military websites in Japan bilingual; 
• Consider having a Japanese speaking announcer on the Okinawa-based 
Armed Forces Network;  
• Establish an international school, [and granting access to the locals]; 
• Provide native English speakers to aide the Japanese teachers in teaching 
English;  
• English teaching program in schools and the prospects for expansion, 
volunteerism at orphanages, and beach clean-ups. 
These small steps together may have a big impact from the micro to macro level 
in improving not only the local image but also the bilateral relations at the security treaty 
level: 
… U.S. forces in Japan must be considered in strategic terms but smaller 
ways towards becoming better neighbors, through localized efforts, should 
not be dismissed as insignificant contributions to the overall maintenance 
of the alliance. In order to be better understood and accepted among the 
communities in Japan, U.S. forces must re-think their actual presence and 
weight them against the impact and sensitivities of their host nation 
neighbors.290 
Another point, which was raised by Mr. Stavale, referred to the improvement of 
informing the local community about the activities performed by the military, standards, 
and safety rules. An example of a successful handling of a situation was the incident 
“…of an alleged .50-caliber machine-gun round fired from a U.S. Marine Corps range 
(range 10, in the Central Training Area) and landing in a farmer’s pineapple field in 
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northern Okinawa in June 2002.”291 This incident caused complaints from the local 
community regarding the hazards of firing live ammunition. Interesting was the way that 
this incident was handled by the U.S. military authorities: 
This prompted Marine Corps officials to host a briefing and demonstration 
of the safety measures taken by the Marine Corps for Okinawan 
community leaders and investigators in order to ease their safety concerns 
posed by conducting live-fire on the training ranges. The investigation 
concluded that there were “no witnesses nor scientific evidence to prove 
that it was a stray round from [Marine Corps] ranges,”and leaving many 
officials, both American and Japanese, to believe that the .50-caliber 
machine-gun round was very old and perhaps a war remnant.292  
The conclusion here is that through an open dialog many problems may either be 
avoided or explained to the local community. 
Another aspect refers to the passing rights of the civilian through the military 
bases, when this fact simplifies aspects of the normal life, like shorting the way to school. 
The example of the German experience from Berlin is self-explanatory: “[a]nother 
Shimada Commission [chartered in 1996 by the former Prime Minister Hoshimoto]  
proposal would be to permit students on their way to school to transit base facilities. Even 
the Soviets in Berlin allowed Americans such privileges.”293 
These are just a few examples of what can be done with just little efforts.  
6.  Improvement of the U.S. Personnel Policy and Cultural Awareness 
In many cases the objective conditions generate problems. But still there are 
subjective conditions that are responsible for the remaining part. On this side, the human 
factor plays an important role. The way people are trained and educated and the way the 
U.S. military conducts its policy of personnel are factors that play an important role in 
Okinawa.  
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The first issue is the lack of continuity at both soldiers’ level and at the command 
level. At the soldiers level “…appears to be the short amount of time many U.S. service 
members serve on Okinawa and in mainland Japan. This is particularly true for the 
Marine Corps, which deploys units from the United States to Okinawa on six-month 
cycles under the unit deployment program (UDP).”294 The author argued that a six-month 
period is to short for the servicemen to get in contact with the local community and be 
aware of the local customs. In this case they fail to be “good neighbors.”  
In regard to the command level the same author explained: 
The lack of continuity is also prevalent among senior military personnel. 
Due to the very nature of high operational tempo and needs of the 
individual services, personnel frequently rotate billets and are unable to 
foster mature, professional relationships with local officials. Furthermore, 
constant rotation of billets effectively handicaps the ability to create the 
in-depth knowledge and expertise required to handle delicate issues rooted 
in deep historical context and perpetuates the perception that the U.S. 
military lacks consideration for the interests of the local populace. This 
perception undermines gestures of good will and attempts to be a good 
neighbor by the U.S. military.295 
A good example of remedying this situation was the decision taken by the Marine 
Corps to apply, starting with 2004, the DoD’s standards “…for permanent change of 
station (PCS) assignments to Okinawa and Iwakuni, Japan, which are 36-month tours for 
those accompanied by family members and 24-month tours for those who are not 
accompanied by family members.”296 The author adds: 
[this]new policy aimed at sustaining operational readiness but carried the 
by-product of creating an environment where Marines had the time to get 
to know the community they live in and become a more responsible 
member of that community. Specifically, the policy was changed to create 
greater continuity, unit stability and individual maturity, cultural 
knowledge and familiarity with local and regional military forces, 
governments and private citizens, and to improve knowledge of continuing 
operational requirements.”297 
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Another pertinent observation was that “the common denominator in crime and 
incidents involving U.S. service members on Okinawa is intoxication and underage 
consumption of alcohol.”298 In making this observation the author relied on his former 
experience: “Through my observations and experience as a military policeman, there are 
higher occurrences of incidents involving younger (18-20 year old) male, service 
members who are stationed on Okinawa without their families and for less than a 
year.”299 Taking into account those statements it would be wise for the U.S. military to 
revise its alcohol consumption policy. It is true that it may restrain some of the individual 
rights, but on the other hand may avoid many problems. Another possibility might be to 
limit the places where the American servicemen may go. It has two advantages; first it 
would be easier for the military policy to keep under control a limited number of 
locations, and secondly would avoid troubles for military personnel entering a “wrong 
neighborhood.”  
Special attention should be paid to the cultural training and building up of the 
cultural awareness to the new comers. Being aware of the local norms, habits, rules, and 
customs may have the advantage of avoiding a lot of misunderstandings, mistakes or 
even conflicts between the American military personnel and locals. As Stavale observed, 
problems may have had roots because the “…cultural training of Marines reporting for 
duty on Okinawa may be flawed.”300 It might have envisaged the amount of training, the 
thematic, the time when this was performed (in the accommodation period, when the new 
incomers had jet-lag, and their attention was diminished), the professionalism of the 
trainers, etc. It is true that there will always be room for improvement, but paying greater 
attention paid to this “small” issue may save a lot of time, manpower, and tension 
afterwards.    
 
 
                                                 
298 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 37. 
299 Ibid., 88. 
300 Ibid., 92. 
 116
G. SUMMARY 
The U.S.-Japan security alliance is a one of the few modern security and defense 
alliances that lasted more than 60 years; therefore, the general conclusions as well as the 
particularities in both civil and military relations, help in drawing valuable conclusions 
and lessons learned for Romania’s case or even those of other nations who host U.S. 
forces in the 21st century. The analysis of the legal framework of the American military’s 
presence in Japan, and the new developments intending the revision of those documents 
(including SOFA) are valuable grounds for further interpretation of future trends, which 
may occur someday in similar alliances. Asymmetrical aspects, which in the Japanese 
case are dictated by the constitutional constraints dictated by the provisions of Article 9, 
can play a significant role in generating contradictions of policy, strategy, society and 
economy. In Japan’s case, the need for revision of its constitution regarding its national 
security triggers necessary modifications in any other related official documents, 
including the bilateral agreements.  
The changes in the geo-strategic situation and the system of states may trigger a 
redefining of any security arrangements. The need for rethinking of the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance after the end of the Cold War has been living proof of such 
circumstances. This need may also take place in the realm of change of the external 
policy or identification of other internal or external political priorities. The new Japan’s 
reorientation of its policy on gaining its rightful place in the world’s hierarchy, completed 
by its struggle to become “a normal nation” is evidence of such a conclusion. Part of this 
process which extends the timeline-- the affirmation of the Japanese SDF-- may play a 
significant role. The latest new missions assumed by SDF (UN peacekeeping, counter-
piracy operations, and support for the U.S. War on Terror) may lay the necessary ground 
for improving cooperation with U.S. troops. In Japan’s case an improved cooperation 
seems to be a valuable solution for resolving some of the actual problems. Moreover 
extension of this cooperation to a multilateral level may solve part of the zonal security 
problems and increase mutual trust with countries like China, North Korea, Russia, etc.  
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The U.S.-Japan security alliance is an important tool for both countries. Beyond 
serving the U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific area, it currently satisfies the security 
needs of Japan. In this context it is in the interest of both countries to be more politically 
implicated in finding viable solutions for developing this alliance.  
The Okinawans’ resistance to the presence of the American troops has historical, 
political, economic, and social roots. The discriminatory treatment this part of Japan 
received from Tokyo’s central political power added to some particular conditions has 
generated first local-- and than more and more national disagreement. The central theme 
of this opposition is the 1953 and then the 1972 land expropriations in support of the 
strengthening of the bases in Okinawa, imposed first by the U.S. Civil Administration 
and later by the Japanese government. The large presence of the American troops in 
Okinawa generates unhappy sentiments as Okinawans see themselves as a Japanese 
colony leased to the United States, or that Japan has solved the problem of hosting 
American bases by putting this burden on their shoulders.  
The problems generated by the American servicemen, or by the activities 
occurring inside or around the bases, cover almost the entire spectrum. Some of the 
problems are due to subjective conditions and others are due to objective conditions; 
however, all of them are seen by the locals as a so-called “connect-the-dots” experience, 
which affects Okinawans’ judgment in a negative way. The collective judgment is that 
each incident is a long sequence of similar incidents, which will never stop. The Japanese 
society is sensitive to events that happen around the military bases and is heavily 
influenced by the subjective and often slanted way the press presents them. Being 
sympathetic to the mass media induces a more fully objective understanding of the 
incidents and how they relate to the public.  
Establishment of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in 
November 1995 proved that both countries were open to discussing the issue of the bases 
and to taking into account the public demands for reduction. The creation of SACO has 
had another effect: the fact that while discussing the reduction it was difficult to bring up 
any further discussion about increasing the area for the bases in the future, without taking 
into account the opposition of local government and people. 
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Japan’s financial contribution through the HNS is the largest among all the U.S. 
allies. However, the U.S. defensive umbrella has enabled Japan to limit its defense 
burden to 1% of the GNP since 1976. Mainly the HNS covers the salaries for the 
Japanese civilian workers employed by the U.S. military bases (“Omoiyari Yosan”) and 
costs such as utilities expenses. The HNS is negotiated every 5 years and concluded by 
adopting a special agreement through the so-called Special Measures Agreement. The 
next term is in 2008, and according to the facts presented in this chapter it might be that 
the anti-American movements will rise again.  
The economy of Okinawa is closely related to and influenced by its military 
bases. While on one hand there are certain benefits, on the other hand there are certain 
troubles generated by their presence. As benefits there may be listed the relatively high 
numbers of local employees with the bases, the rents paid to the landlords, construction 
industry, contracted services, etc. Many difficulties were generated by a wrong economic 
policy adopted by Tokyo: the development program for Okinawa had as a consequence 
Okinawa’s dependence upon capital investment from the central government and made 
Okinawa's economy heavily reliant on public works subsidies. The contracting method 
practiced by the bases inadvertently resulted in the fact that Okinawa has almost no 
significant manufacturing industry, while its service sector, largely dependent upon sales 
of imported goods, and its construction industry, which depends upon public works 
projects, are disproportionately overblown.  
The events of September 11 have generated fears about a reduction of Okinawan 
tourism profits. Local nationals fear becoming a target of terrorists because of their close 
proximity to U.S. military bases.  
Particular concerns are expressed by Okinawans regarding the SOFA and the 
legal status of the American troops in Okinawa. Okinawans are particularly concerned 
about the retention, custody, and handling of the American suspects involved in the 
incidents and accidents because in the past some of the suspects “had been brushed aside 
and gone unpunished by American officials acting in accordance with an antiquated 
SOFA.” After the 1995 protests, a partial solution to this situation was the “sympathetic  
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consideration” through which the “U.S. agreed to transfer the custody of individuals 
suspected of having committed heinous crimes, such as murder and rape, prior to 
indictment by Japanese courts.” 
Another concern of the Japanese public is related to the U.S. authorities’ 
immixture in the sovereignty of Japan, invoking the way that official investigation of 
accidents was conducted.  
Some of the problem has been the way the answer to the locals’ complaints was 
handled by the American officials, and the bureaucratic responses by the Americans 
complicated the situation so as to be hardly understood by the common people. The 
feeling was that they were not taken seriously.  
An aggravator of this status was the fact that in some cases there were 
miscommunications or wrong signals sent by officials. 
The ways of improvement presented in the last part of this chapter, may constitute 
useful tools for improving the circumstances, not only for a U.S-Japan security alliance, 
but also for similar partnerships. 
‘The U.S.-Japan security alliance is one of the few alliances, which lasted more 
than 50 years...”301 (concluded Tatsuro Yoda in his dissertation at the Pardee RAND 
Graduate School), and it would be a pity that such a viable bilateral relationship should 
be harmed by such issues of policy and diplomacy that statesmen and soldiers can well 
avoid or ameliorate with due reflection, tact and intelligence.   
 
                                                 
301 Tatsuro Yoda, 48. 
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IV. THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN GERMANY 
AND THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
The role of American military forces there [Germany] has evolved 
considerably over the decades -- from occupying a defeated enemy to 
deterring Warsaw Pact aggression to symbolizing Washington's post-cold-
war commitment to remain militarily engaged in Europe. Along the way, 
the size of the American presence has evolved as well. In the nearly 15 
years since the Berlin Wall fell, United States force levels in Germany 
have dropped by roughly 75 percent. Further reductions should not be 
ruled out. But the Pentagon's current plans are unduly drastic, 
unfortunately timed and suspiciously motivated.302 
The New York Times 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The history of the American military presence in Germany has been very much 
linked with the history of NATO. Such has unfolded through years of the Alliance’s 
development, the struggle for the defence of the Western free world, crises which 
affected the course of events, and interactions between the allies. The relations between 
the U.S. and Germany after WW II evolved from one of hostility to that of alliance in 
semi sovereignty and then to sovereignty, influenced by the other European countries’ 
actions and their economic and political interests over more than forty years. The context 
of such a relation was not placed under a military dimension only but also under a 
strategic, security and political framework. The fate of West Germany was central to the 
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cold war and the U.S. presence in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the U.S.’ 
political influence was a vital part of this strategic reality.303      
Since the end of WWII when the tension between the collective security 
aspirations and those of the collective defence defined the “transatlantic bargain” or 
“…how to engage in a long-term commitment from the United States for the security of 
Western Europe,”304 NATO has undergone different periods in trying to identify and 
achieve long-lasting peace. From 1945 until 1948, the Atlantic policy hanged from the 
liberation of Europe to its defense against the Soviet Union. The NATO allies went from 
occupiers to the architects of western defense in the nuclear age and the integration of the 
FRG into the alliance. In the aftermath of WW II the government of the United States 
clearly made the point that European security and its economic recovery, as an important 
feature of defence, vitally affected the security of Americans who in another generation 
had turned their backs on Europe.  In this way the point was made crystal clear that 
“…the security of North America, Europe, and the free world were inseparably 
bound.”305 In the early post war period “…the Marshall Plan and the Vandenberg 
Resolution, paved the way for a U.S. political and military commitment to defend 
Western Europe.”306 The U.S. and its Western partners expressed that “deterrence and 
containment, rather than reassurance and engagement, would be the preferred means of 
dealing with the potential Soviet adversary.”307  
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According to Stanley Hoffmann, a leading U.S. scholar of France and trans-
Atlantic relations in the 20th century, there are three distinct phases prior to 1989 in the 
history of Germany interlocked with the Western Europeans: 
The first phase lasted from about 1947 to the mid fifties: 
It saw the consolidation of two blocs in the two halves of Europe, and that 
included the communization of the East. It was the phase during which 
West Germany made what was not at all a preordained choice: to achieve 
the rehabilitation of Germany through belonging to the West, rather than 
to put reunification first. This was also the period in which Western 
European integration, starting first with six countries, was begun – largely 
as a way of overcoming the old Franco-German antagonism. And there 
was a very carefully preserved ambiguity about where this Western 
European experiment of six countries would go in the long run. It started 
as a kind of pragmatic, functional federalism. Western Europe was rather 
preoccupied with itself, more than with the outside world.308   
The second phase, or the phase of the clashes between different plans, lasted from 
the mid fifties throughout the early seventies:   
There was the Atlantic design of the United States, and particularly of 
John F. Kennedy, who favored a federal integration of Western Europe, 
but only as long as it was within an Atlantic framework in which the 
United States would essentially set the directions for Europe in foreign 
policy and defense. This design was, of course, based on the assumption 
that a division of Europe would persist. Against this there was a Gaullist 
design, which clashed with Kennedy's at every juncture. The General was 
hostile to any kind of federalism for Western Europe because he thought 
that this would primarily serve American interests.309 
The last phase, the third one,  
… the longest, which lasted throughout the seventies and much of the 
eighties, had two main features. One was that Atlanticism continued; to 
parody a Bushian expression of last year, we could call it Atlanticism-
plus. It was an Atlanticism that was less confrontational than before, since 
there was now a detente with the Soviet Union, but that still was based on 
the assumption of a continuing division of the continent. Indeed, the West 
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Germans explicitly acknowledged that division in the deals they made 
with the Soviets in the early seventies. An acute crisis over the 
deployment of American missiles in Europe in the early eighties, in fact, 
made this Atlantic perspective more confrontational again.310 
After this period, the end of the Cold War definitely marked by the Malta summit 
in December 1989, and by the emblematic fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, 
began a new period within NATO’s reform of collective defence and security by defining 
the new areas of partnership and enlargement as working tools opposed to the idea that 
the end of the Soviet-American antagonism would mark the end of NATO. This is the 
period of the political confrontations in Europe, which brought Germany at centre stage 
and rethinking of the geographic location of American troops around the world.   
This timeline of the American presence not only in Germany, but also in Europe, 
as proposed by Hoffman seems to be convenient for a structural approach because it 
reveals the most important intervals. 
Before coping with this however, a retrospective of American military bases and 
presence in the Federal Republic of Germany after WW II will set the background for 
discussions.  
B. THE AMERICAN MILITARY BASES IN GERMANY: PROCESS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 
1. The Initial Set-up  
The history of the American military presence in Germany begins immediately 
after the end of WW II when,    
[a]fter the final defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945, the triumphant 
Allied Forces divided Germany into four military sectors, each of them 
administered by one of the main allied partners-the United States, 
England, France, and the Soviet Union. The U.S. forces took control of the 
Southern and Central-Western part of Germany, today’s federal states of 
Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse.311 
                                                 
310 Stanley Hoffmann. 
311 Keith B. Cunningham, and Andreas Klemmer, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 
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The initial set-up is still present in today’s patterns “[b]ecause of the original 1945 
occupation zone, approximately 94 percent of U.S. civilian and military personnel [are] 
still located in the Southern and Southwestern German federal states of Bavaria, Baden-
Württemberg, Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate.”312  
 
Figure 11.   American bases in Germany 
Figure 11313 shows the actual American bases in Germany, and it can easily be 
observed the preponderance of their presence in the south-western part of the FR 
Germany, U.S. troops had begun their presence in western Germany as part of the 
occupation and made a transition in the late 1940s and early 1950s into so-called 
stationed forces, as part of NATO.  So the United States stationed permanent ground 
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troops (initially four divisions) in Germany as a trip wire to deter Soviet fait accompli 
invasion stratagems.”314  Further, the presence of the four divisions, as well as tactical air 
forces was offered by the U.S. as a reassurance to France that the armament of the FRG 
in the wake of the Korean War would unfold sensibly and sanely.  
2. Dynamics of the American Presence  
The transformation from this occupying force to the bulwark on the inner German 
border stands at the outset of this analysis.  “As relations hardened between the Cold War 
adversaries, Germany became the primary potential battlefield for World War III, and 
U.S. troop levels tripled from 1950 to 1953. Every year for nearly four decades, one-
quarter of a million troops were billeted in West Germany…”315 
As Figure 12316 suggests, when one considers the half a century of U.S. presence 
in the zones of occupation and the FRG, the total number of American troops stationed in 
Germany was over 10,000,000 personnel in total over the period of 1950-2000. This fact 
accounts for the highest number of deployed troops among the several countries who 
have hosted American servicemen and women since the close of the Second World War.  
So if in 1950 the total number of the American servicemen in Germany was 
97,820, the next year it doubled at 176,084, and by 1955 it tripled to 269,260.  
Since then the number has stayed between 200,000 and 250,000 military 
personnel, and only after the end of the Cold War, by 1993, has the number dropped to 
105,254.  
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Figure 12.   The total number of American troops stationed in Germany 
In 2000, just 69,203 American military personnel remained. Since 2000 the total 
number of American troops stationed in Germany has stayed around 70,000 servicemen. 
(2000 - 69,203; 2001 - 70,998; 2002 - 68,701; 2003 - 74,796; 2004 - 76,058; 2005 - 
66,418)317 
The order of battle in the FRG grew especially with the 1961 Berlin Crisis and 
then began a process of reduction, with the "Big Lift" exercise in 1963, followed soon 
thereafter with the Indochina war. The total of American troops had significantly 
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levels in the Federal Republic of Germany. By 1968, two thirds of one division and a 
cavalry regiment, 28,000 troops, had redeployed back to the United States to support its 
Vietnam commitment.”318 
Using the data from Figure 13,319 it may be iterated that except for Vietnam, 
Germany has hosted the highest number of American troops, which stayed at high levels 
for about 40 years (1955-1993). 
 
Figure 13.   Deployments between 1950-2003 
3. The Restructuring of the American Presence in Germany 
After the end of the Cold War, the American presence in Germany evolved as the 
military strategic situation on the European continent changed. If during the Cold War, 
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U.S. troops were strategically located to stop a Soviet and Warsaw pact invasion by tanks 
and aircraft into Western Europe, what with the departure of Russian forces from the 
territory of the united FRG by 1994, the drawn down of U.S. forces which had actually 
begun in 1991 at the time of the Gulf War could proceed apace.  The widespread 
infrastructure, the number of bases, landing strips and runways, and training areas for 
supporting such a large amount of conventional forces were not required anymore. “In 
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld listed multiple reasons for reworking the overseas military basing dispositions. 
He argued that the current arrangements were ‘seriously obsolete,’ oriented to deter and 
fight the large standing militaries of the Warsaw Pact in Europe rather than the current 
threats.”320 
As Pawel Piotr Zduniak, a former NPS student, argued in his thesis back in 2005, 
the “American forces in Germany are not positioned to meet the coming challenges of the 
21
st 
century. With the increasing need for operability outside Europe, bases in the heart of 
unified Germany no longer serve the strategic purpose they did during the Cold War.”321 
The same author supports the idea that “…the present American base structure in 
Germany is no longer efficient. This military configuration was developed to defend 
against a largely static and predictable enemy--the Soviet Union--during the Cold War 
era.”322  
Back in 2004, Raymond A. Millen (currently assigned as the Director of 
European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute), described the situation of the 
American bases in Germany:  
Although Germany offers extraordinary personal and professional 
rewards, military service in Germany can be a trial. Decaying living and 
work facilities in pre-World War II casernes require vast expenditures for 
maintenance and renovation. Even though it would be cheaper in the long 
run to raze existing casernes and build anew, this option has never been 
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exercised adequately. Living and working conditions remain spartan and 
demoralizing, especially when soldiers happen to see the modern German 
casernes. The scattering of brigade and smaller units throughout Germany 
in small casernes hampers coordination, training, and logistics, as well as 
creating a redundancy in supply and administrative services. Training and 
readiness issues suffer the most though. Few casernes possess a maneuver 
training area. The vast majority of units must conduct annual training 
(sometimes less often) at Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, or Baumholder for 
range qualification and some maneuver exercise training. Far from 
routine, unit rotations to these training areas require extensive preparation. 
Weeks of coordination and preparation are required for rail movement, 
wheeled convoys, in processing (establishing ammunition and supply 
accounts, signing for billets and maintenance facilities, drawing 
ammunition, and range control certification), and outprocessing (clearing 
the above accounts, cleaning and turning in issued property and items, 
initiating property accountability procedures, and billets and maintenance 
facility inspections), and rail and convoy deployment back to home 
station. Under this morass of bureaucracy, less time and effort is spent on 
training than getting to the training areas and back.323 
A change was needed, and the American government began to realize that the 
basing of its troops in Europe had to be adjusted: 
What is being considered the largest change in America’s troop 
deployment plan since World War II had its beginnings in the early 90s at 
the end of the Cold War. In 1990, President Bush was beginning a re-
alignment of stationing in conjunction with a major cutback of the total 
world force. The U.S. Army cut more than 500,000 troops overall and 
lowered the number of troops in Germany by 125,000.324 
The new configuration of the American presence in the world started right after 
the end of the Cold War and affected Germany also: 
…between January 1990 and February 1995, the U.S. Department of 
Defense announced twenty rounds of overseas base closures. The 
operation of the 953 installations has been ended, reduced or placed on a 
standby status; eighteen of those rounds affected 636 installation sites in 
Germany. The majority of the U.S. installations involved in the 
redeploying process have been Army facilities (556 sites), while 80 sites 
belonged to the U.S. Air Force Bases. During this period, the U.S. Army 
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abandoned some of the most powerful symbols of the Cold War, including 
Check Point Charlie, as well as the rest of its 42 Berlin facilities, all three 
Fulda border observation points and other holdings in that strategically 
important passage.325 
In Germany “[t]he U.S. Air Force cut more aggressively in the early rounds than 
did the Army. From 1990 to 1994, the United States withdrew approximately 28,500 Air 
Force soldiers and civilians, marking a significant 60 percent reduction."326 
After 2000 the presence of the American troops in Germany entered a new era 
regarding its relocation. “The process of redeploying the present U.S. military structure 
from Germany is closely connected with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) process.”327  
On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a program of sweeping 
changes to the numbers and locations of military basing facilities at 
overseas locations, now known as the Integrated Global Presence and 
Basing Strategy (IGPBS) or Global Posture Review. Roughly 70,000 
personnel would return from overseas locations from Europe and Asia to 
bases in the continental United States (CONUS). Other overseas forces 
would be redistributed within current host nations such as Germany and 
South Korea, while new bases would be established in nations of Eastern 
Europe, Central Asia, and Africa.328 
According to the advanced planning, “…the biggest changes would happen in 
Europe, where the military would shutter nearly 200 facilities and ultimately draw down 
roughly 40,000 troops (from 105,570 as of June 2005). Some of the forces remaining in 
Europe would periodically deploy from bases in Germany for temporary duty to locations 
in Romania, Bulgaria, or Central Asia.”329 
Regarding Germany, there will still be troops based-- especially where the 
conditions are good, and there is no need to re-invest for modernizing or adapting the 
existing infrastructure. “It would retain some of the large 'main operating bases,' as 
                                                 
325 Keith B. Cunningham, and Andreas Klemmer, 17. 
326 Ibid., 22. 
327 Pawel Piotr Zduniak, 2. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid., 6. 
 132
Ramstein AFB in Germany, which have all of the comforts of the United States — family 
housing, schools, supermarkets, convenience stores, theaters, and populations in the tens 
of thousands.”330 
The process of restructuring its military bases is not yet complete for the 
American troops, and developments will continue to occur in the near future. Conversely, 
there are critics who doubt the actual possibilities of relocating the troops from Germany: 
But such plans are unlikely to amount to much. The Pentagon's planners 
do not really seem to grasp just how many buildings the 71,702 soldiers 
and airmen in Germany occupy and how expensive it would be to build 
bases to house them elsewhere. Lt. Col. Amy Ehmann in Hanau, 
Germany, has said, "There's no place to put these people" in Romania, 
Bulgaria or Djibouti, and she predicts 80% will end up staying in 
Germany.331 
C. OCCUPATION, 1944-1955, MILITARY GOVERNMENT, NATION 
BUILDING, AND THE REHABILITATION OF GERMANY 
1. After the Period of WW II and the Start of the Cold War 
The U.S. presence in Germany began in 1944 with the battle for Aachen and its 
subsequent occupation.  This event was followed several months later by the total 
surrender of Germany and the advent of the zones of occupation among the four victors. 
At the end of WW II the entire area of Europe stood in ruins. The situation was even 
worse in the defeated countries like Germany, which had spent its entire human and 
economic resources in sustaining the war efforts.    
In 1945, entire stretches of Western Europe lay in ruin. In Germany, as 
well as in most of the continent, railways, bridges and communication 
lines were totally destroyed. More than a million and a half Germans had 
been killed in action; an additional two million were missing and another 
half million were prisoners who would not likely return. Industrial 
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production, key to any recovery, had slowed to less than half of what it 
had been in 1938; in Germany it was close to nonexistent.332 
The German population had no necessary means for a decent existence and the 
following period until 1948 marked an important reversion of the American presence: 
from an occupation to that of security building, postwar reconstruction and further of an 
alliance protection force. The immediate period after war’s end was very important due to 
the fact that the Americans left their imprint in building up a completely new society: 
Between 1945 and 1949 Germany was exhausted and in need of every 
conceivable form of assistance; the American army controlled the whole 
population and Washington could presumably accomplish whatever it 
wanted. It was a great opportunity for political reform, social engineering, 
and cultural transformation all of which would serve the interests both of 
America’s democratic ideals and its postwar foreign policy.333 
The split of not only Germany but of the entirety of Europe, in two blocks, played 
a significant role in the foundation of West Germany in the spring of 1949. The visible 
tensions between the U.S. and its Western allies, the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw pact 
followers set the scene for a new kind a confrontation: the Cold War. The establishment 
of the Iron Curtain was the new policy within Europe, and the initial mission of the 
American troops in Germany was now configured into a new protective dimension: 
Growing tension between the Soviet Union and the other Allied Forces 
quickly dominated post-war policies in Germany. Fear of assault on both 
sides of the Cold War border helped in the evolution of the role of foreign 
forces in Germany from one of occupation to one of protection.334  
The confrontation between the two worlds resulted in the necessity for unity and 
cooperation among all countries against the “Red Terror.”  Ash’s words have the power 
of describing, in a condensed form, the essence of western unity/singularity: “The West 
stood for freedom, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. These good things, they 
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thought, had grown mainly in the West and distinguished us from others.”335 A new 
civilization emerged from the profound belief that the world could be a better place and 
every single man has the same rights and should be free. The transplant of the American 
beliefs on a fertile European post war conscience gave birth to a new civilization, “in the 
grand narrative of ‘Western Civ.’, [where] the West began in Europe and ended in the 
hands of America.”336 
2. The Creation of the Federal Republic of Germany 
This new situation paved the way for West Germany to become a “normal nation” 
and an equal partner, though the effort was arduous and not without setbacks. “With 
America’s announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the introduction of the Marshall Plan, 
and impending merger of the Western zones of Germany into a single republic, Berlin 
became the flash point of the Cold War.”337 
The presence of the American bases in Germany in May of 1949, when with the 
support of the Western Allies, a new West German government was created, was already 
a fait accompli and under these conditions: 
West German government lacked the necessary independence to negotiate 
with the Allied commanders, and was in affect told to lease the ground and 
installations ‘required for defense purposes’ without any financial 
compensation. Furthermore, the German government paid all costs 
associated with re-building, maintaining, and establishing bases for the 
Allied Forces during this time as part of reparation transfers.338 
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3. The Relationship between the American Soldiers and the Civilian 
Population; the Central Role Played by the German Women and 
Youths  
The relationship of the American troops with the German civilian population had 
important implications in the way West Germany was perceived by U.S. officials. After 
the war, the German population had a high percentage of women and children, who 
played an important role in reversing the perception about the German population from 
blame to compassion.  
In the beginning “[t]o convert the Germans in the American zone from beggars to 
partners, the United States had to help re-establish the economic and cultural 
infrastructure.”339  
The well known writer, Petra Goedde in her book Gis and German Culture, 
Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949, depicted the beginning of the relationship 
between the American soldiers and German civilians in the most tumultuous post WW II 
environment. The author describes the significant role played by the German women and 
children in this relation, as being the representative part of the German society, since a 
large number of German soldiers were killed or taken as prisoners. As Petra Goedde, 
concluded: 
Cultural feminization became a powerful catalyst in America’s postwar 
rapprochement with Germany. The preponderance of women and children 
and the pervasiveness of hunger in early post-war Germany fostered in 
American GIs a shift from one traditionally male gender role – conqueror - 
to another – protector and provider. In doing so, Americans redirected 
their attention from those segments of German society responsible for the 
Nazi war crimes to those whom Americans universally recognized as 
victims of the war.340 
In postwar Germany Americans viewed the society as being under Allied 
occupation, and, as such, the policy was adjusted accordingly: “The relations between the 
German populations and the American soldiers were very much influenced by the 
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fraternization ban imposed on September 12 [1944] by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces.”341 In such an environment 
the American feelings “…displayed a wide spectrum of attitudes towards Germans, 
ranging from open hostility to a vague notion of cultural affinity. Yet it was the friendly 
relations between soldiers and German civilians that most troubled occupation officials. 
Those relations exposed the tensions between soldiers as private individuals and as agents 
of occupation policy.”342  
The occupation treatment was soon replaced with a softer behavior, since the 
most German did not fit into the American anti-Nazi propaganda: 
The non-fraternization directive failed in part because by the fall of 1944 
soldiers did not encounter many Germans characterized by the 
government’s official wartime image of a monolithic people unified by 
their support for the war. Instead they found a defeated population 
devastated by the destruction of the war and rather desperate in its desire 
to make peace with the Allies. While Army pamphlets warned soldiers 
about ‘the German’ – mostly in the masculine singular – soldiers saw a 
plurality of Germans, men and women, young and old, Nazis and non-
Nazis, locals and refugees, perpetrators and victims. The line that once had 
so clearly separated ‘us’ from ‘them’ became increasingly blurred.343 
Soon after the fall of 1944, the discrepancies between the American and German 
societal values began to disappear, and Germans were regarded as people who suffered 
during and after the war, as victims of the Nazi regime. Very soon the U.S. policy had to 
be readjusted. “The eventual breakdown of the ban signaled the demise of the idea of 
German collective guilt as a basis for the U.S. occupation policy toward Germany.”344 
The summer of 1945 marked the definitive abandonment of the ban, and as 
mentioned, the German society, represented especially by its feminine component, played 
a crucial role in this change: 
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Beyond being overly optimistic, Eisenhower’s reference to denazification 
indicated a major shift in American attitudes toward Germany. Rather that 
assuming Germany’s collective guilt, the military government began to 
distinguish between ‘guilty’ and ‘innocent’ Germans. Eisenhower’s 
explanation suggested that fraternization with non-Nazi was permissible, 
at least to a certain degree. More importantly, the move reflected the 
dominant perception of American military officials concerning 
fraternization, namely that German women did not belong to the pool of 
Nazi sympathizers. On the basis of this assumption, military officials 
calculated, fraternization no longer posed a threat to the mission of the 
occupation.345  
This turning point in the American policy made possible the view of the Germans 
as being part of the western community, Germany was no longer considered an outsider. 
The fraternization opened the possibilities that American soldiers could interact with the 
civilian society at an interpersonal level. To a certain extent this interaction was biased on 
the poor condition of the society. The economy was broken, food was scarce and other 
basic products, such as soap, were barely found. Under these circumstances an 
underground economy flourished, which “…depended to a large extent on American GIs’ 
interest in exchanging food and cigarettes for luxury items.”346 The circle was simple: 
Germans provided souvenirs and Nazi prohibited items in exchange for cigarettes, and 
then the cigarettes were exchanged for food with farmers. Regarding the relationship of 
the American soldiers with the German women “[m]ost GIs who sought the company of 
women at least initially did so for sexual rather than social reasons.”347 Due to the harsh 
living conditions “[s]ome women resorted to prostitution to save themselves and their 
families from starvation. For others it became an additional source of income.”348 For 
some, the situation was so desperate that, “[s]ome mothers even sent their teenage 
daughters – in one case the girl was allegedly twelve – into DP camps, or areas occupied 
by American soldiers, in order to obtain food and cigarettes in exchange for sex.”349 “Still 
others fell in love with GIs and regarded the material benefits of the relationships as 
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secondary. What ever the original motivation, food had become a central aspect of 
American-German interactions.”350 This material based relation triggered some awkward 
results, and “[t]he threat of venereal disease became the most compelling tool for the 
military government to discourage fraternization.”351 
Soon after the society began to normalize, American soldiers started to marry 
German women. This civil act played a significant role in the realm of American-German 
relations. “In the context of the occupation the act of marriage assumed public and 
political significance far beyond the concerns of bride and groom.”352 
Within five years of Germany occupation, the number of Americans in committed 
relationships with Germans grew exponentially, and soon the German spouses entering 
the U.S. were the second largest category of immigrants after Anglo-Americans ones. 
According to statistics, “… by June 1950, 14,175 German wives, six husbands, and 750 
children of ‘citizen members of the United Sates Armed Forces’ had entered the United 
States.”353 
Regarding the German children, contact with the American culture was a great 
opportunity for developing a new culture and getting rid of the Nazi heritage. “For young 
Germans, the wholesale or even partial adoption of an international youth culture offered 
an escape from the burdens of the Nazi past. Age would thus become a more important 
factor than nationality in defining their cultural and social identity.”354 
As an overall conclusion Petra Goedde sustains that “[t]he informal relationships 
between GIs and German civilians illuminate the social and cultural dimension of 
American postwar involvement in Germany.”355 
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4. The Cold War and the Berlin Airlift 
The events occurring during the late 1940s shaped the relations between 
Americans and Germans and "[w]hat had begun in the fall of 1944 as a punitive 
occupation of an enemy country had by 1948 turned into a protective occupation of a 
dependent people.”356 
The accumulation of tensions between the western countries and the Soviet block 
in the framework of normalizing West Germany evolved during the following period into 
what was known as the “Berlin airlift.”   
The story of the Berlin airlift has usually been told within the framework 
of the deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The showdown over the city was the first serious conflict of the 
cold war. … West Berlin was the prize the Soviet Union wanted to extract 
from the West in exchange for the creation of a separate West German 
state, a prize the United States was unwilling to relinquish. Germany 
served as the locus for the unfolding of the great power rivalry.357 
This new course of action greatly strengthened American-German political 
relations the necessity of reforming German status in Europe and in the world: “… the 
Berlin airlift emerges as a very different story, one that moves the relationship between 
Americans and Germans to center stage.”358 Firstly it changed the perceptions regarding 
Germany as “[t]he symbolic identification of Berlin with the free world became an 
essential tool in galvanizing international support against the Soviet blockade.”359 And 
secondly the American military fraternization with the Germans entered the final stage as 
they took part in the fighting against the Soviets. The help provided by the American 
pilots to the civilian population from Berlin contrasted with the Soviets’ actions, and 
“…perhaps the most powerful expression of the American paternalist benevolence came 
through the so-called ‘Candy Bomber.’”360 Delivering candies was an honest gesture, 
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which was a contrast to the fear of the Russian blockade. These actions included also the 
eastern sector of Berlin gaining psychological values in responding to the Soviets’ action.  
“As Berlin’s fate became identified with that of its candy-craving children, the contrast 
between Americans and the Soviets appeared even stronger.”361 
The American opposition gained even more value when the American pilots’ 
sacrifices proved their commitment in safeguarding those who just five years ago were 
the enemy: 
The heroic actions of the American pilots, involving even plane crashes, 
unfolded new dimensions. “Just as during World War II, Americans 
interpreted the casualties as a human sacrifice for preservation of freedom 
and democracy. Only this time the fallen soldiers had given their lives not 
only to protect their own families at home but those of their former 
enemies as well.362   
The beginning of the 50s marked a new era in the American-German relationship, 
and the rising opposition to Soviet actions paved the way for West Germany to become a 
sovereign state and gain the status of an ally under the NATO umbrella. The necessity of 
having German contribution to the common defence efforts speeded up the process and 
smoothed European opposition to German militarism. The projection of the American 
strategic interests towards Asia, starting with the Korean War, also had influence toward 
reconsidering the German position and role on the European continent.   
D.   LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY AND ALLIANCE FORWARD DEFENSE, 
ONSET OF BURDEN SHARING ISSUES, CLASHES BETWEEN 
DIFFERENT PLANS 
1. The Armament of the FRG and Integration into NATO  
The common history of the allies within NATO was also viewed “…as a 
bargaining process among states with many interests in common but some conflicting 
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ones as well”363 which “…is often described as a search for mutually advantageous or 
win-win solutions.”364 In the post war era when the reconstruction of Europe had a 
special meaning, spending on the defence budget meant fewer resources available for the 
welfare of the state.  
Burden sharing was important from the beginning of NATO because it allowed 
the member states to do more together than they could do individually. The Korean War 
in the mid 1950s was viewed as the first try of the Americans for involving the Europeans 
in this part of the world and for benefiting from the burden-sharing policy in achieving 
their political objectives. 
Regarding the basing of the American troops in Germany, there were mutations in 
the mid 50s, as West Germany became a sovereign state and was co-opted in the common 
defensive efforts of NATO. The process had started already back in September of 1950, 
when “… Acheson confronted the NATO partners with the U.S. intention of permitting 
and pursuing the partial reconstruction of Germany’s military ability to use it in the 
defense of the West.”365 The equation was simple and viewed through the burden-sharing 
lens, from a strategic point of view, “…to develop a strong defense in Western Europe, 
members of the alliance would have no choice but to begin the rearmament of Western 
Germany or dedicate large amounts of assets to defend it.”366 This new approach of the 
defense of Europe was seen in the new economic prosperity of the continent, and “…both 
America and Britain agreed that West Germany would eventually be needed to shoulder 
more, if not all, of the burden for its defense.”367 “Economically, the cost of occupation 
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the outbreak of the Korean War, it became even more imperative economically for the 
U.S. and UK to convince others that a re-armed West Germany was vital to NATO’s 
defensive structure.”368 
The transformation of Germany’s status also changed the basic arrangements 
regarding the stationing of the U.S. troops. 
West Germany completed its evolution to a Western ally in 1955 by 
establishing itself as a sovereign democratic nation and by joining the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Membership in NATO 
canceled out the previous basing agreement between West Germany and 
the Allied Forces; instead, the bases had to meet the terms of NATO 
statutes governing troop deployments in a Member State. Since that 
moment, the United States began paying all expenses to maintain, 
improve, or establish bases in West Germany; as compensation, West 
Germany agreed to lease the land to U.S. Forces for free.369 
The new status as an independent state allowed West Germany to reconsider its 
position towards the American presence, and “… on that date, the new all-German 
national government became fully independent, allowing Germany the power to review 
regulations governing stationing of foreign troops on its soil.”370  
2. Germany’s Interdependence with NATO’s Crises  
The first nuclear crisis erupted in 1956 on the fertile terrain of divergence 
between national and multi-national strategic views and different approaches inside the 
Alliance. The failed creation of the European Defence Community (EDC) in May 1952, 
the year of Greece and Turkey’s admittance had been declared as a closely related 
organization “…within the framework of, and reinforcing NATO.”371 The EDC was 
viewed as the preamble of the future crisis inside the alliance, and also “…as a means of 
slowly disengaging Europe from Atlantic, Anglo-Saxon control.”372 
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From 1958 to 1962, NATO crossed the most dangerous military crisis in its 
history, known as the Berlin crisis, which also played an important role in determining 
the roles, missions and NATO’s doctrine. Three main strategic concepts have been 
promoted as a military response to the change of the military situation and political 
conceptions: “…the shield, flexible response, and the multilateral force (MLF).”373 
In Europe the invasion of Hungary by the Soviet Union in November 1956 
created a new dangerous situation, which exercised more pressure on the allies. The 
change in the Soviet Union’s attitude and tactics required that NATO “…make its 
purposes better understood in non-NATO countries”374 through its rhetoric in actions 
such as the “battle for the minds of men.”375 The rising necessity of consultation in this 
period had not been implemented, and in the Cuban Missile Crisis the European allies 
had not yet been consulted by the U.S. even though there was danger of a nuclear war. 
In this period and afterwards, a new notion was promoted through rhetoric and 
ally interdependence, both economic and military, which played an important role in 
redefining NATO’s conception by depicting “…international communism as a cohesive 
threat to the free world.”376  The interdependence played an important role in the foreign 
policy of the member states in the following period, being soon completed by “…the 
concept of the indivisibility of the peace,”377 which clearly indicated the unity and a 
readiness for the action of the Alliance. The interdependence concept was part of the 
United States’ rhetoric “…in its attempt to cultivate European support for its evolving 
policy toward Southeast Asia.”378  
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3. The Vietnam War 
The Vietnam War from 1964 onwards marked a change of the American 
involvement from Europe towards Asia. It caused a significant change of understanding 
and different approaches of Europe’s defence on both sides of the Atlantic. The war itself 
triggered a change in the balance of the American troops and those from Europe, in the 
sense that on the “Old Continent” the allies were called upon for more substantial 
commitments.   
Also tearing at the internal workings of the alliance was the Vietnam 
conflict and U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia. Perceptions of U.S. 
commitment to Western Europe grew as the continuing war in Vietnam 
had a dramatic effect on U.S. force levels in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. By 1968, two thirds of one division and a cavalry regiment, 
28,000 troops, had redeployed back to the United States to support its 
Vietnam commitment.379 
For West Germany, the withdrawal of the American troops accentuated the 
economic decline and “[i]n 1966, for example, the Federal German economy fell into 
recession, and Chancellor Erhard was forced to seek relief from Washington in the form 
of asking to have the volume of their obligated weapons purchases lowered.”380 
The acute situation in Europe, due especially to the new aggressive stance the 
Soviet Union had adopted in late the 70s, provided for new grounds in transforming the 
bilateral U.S.-Germany relations. The U.S. could not afford anymore to backup Germany, 
being themselves caught between financial problems caused by the Vietnam War and the 
new challenges launched by the Soviets.  
Conversely, and at a bad time for Germany, the U.S. Congress was trying 
hard to find ways to limit money being spent oversees in the form of 
basing and troop deployments. Economic stagnation and the war in 
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such as the Prague spring offensive, in August 1968, the last thing that the 
United States and NATO could afford to do was appear irresolute with 
regard to members around the world.381 
As part of the burden sharing, Germany had to financially contribute to the 
expenses for the war in a qui pro quo of benefiting from the presence of the American 
troops on its territory: “It can be argued that the host country (which means principally 
Germany) has received windfall expenditures from the 'involuntary tourism' of United 
States' troops, and so should be prepared to pay local maintenance costs as long as the 
United States remains in a deficit position.”382 
The Vietnam War period was a time in Germany, as in most European countries, the 
pacifist and anti-war movements started to grow and raise their concerns regarding the 
American presence. The situation became more critical in the war aftermath with a growing 
antiwar position toward the American public and the perception of the American troops 
coming back from Vietnam. Complementary is the description of the American bases from 
Germany by Daniel J. Nelson in his book A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany. He 
illustrated the skepticism of the Europeans regarding the American commitment in Europe 
especially in the Vietnam War era, when he describes the picture of U.S. bases as “becoming 
stations in the route of Vietnam and populated by loutish, hash-smoking, malcontent 
soldiers.”383  
E. LATE 1970S THROUGH 1991, REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY, 
ATLANTICISM-PLUS, END OF COLD WAR, MASTER RE-
STATIONING PLANS, MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS  
1. Atlanticism-plus, Issues of Burden Sharing, Burden Shifting in 
Europe 
The rise of deterrence (“deterrence theory was in part the creation of governments 
in London and Washington intent on cutting defence spending by substituting threats of 
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nuclear retaliation for costly mass armies”384) and détente from the middle of the 60s 
until the 80s played an important role in reshaping and reformulating the aims and 
objectives of NATO, being a powerful engine for renewing the organization. More than 
that, deterrence and détente played a significant role in the post-1989 evolution. 
The following decade after the 80s brought an acute revival of the superpower 
condominium conception and marked the renewal of “…confrontation, principally 
between the two superpowers.”385 Slogans such as ‘peace through strength’ or ‘arming to 
disarm’ started to dominate NATO’s rhetoric and its policy started to return “…to 
ideology and the rhetoric of the Cold War.”386 The confrontation was moved to March 
1983, and deterrence gained new meaning when “Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative 
(SDI), popularly known as Star War promised to provide a space-based defence against 
Soviet missiles.”387 
In the mid 80s the quarrel about the commitment of the Europeans and their 
participation to the common efforts of defense was acute and growing along with 
resistance against the American influence on European policy. America was arguing the 
fact that Europe spent less and profited greatly by the American security umbrella in 
developing their economies by diverting resources, which otherwise would be spent for 
defence. The European nations felt the presence of the American troops more as a burden 
and as a threat to the country, population, and environmental safety.  
An accurate German point of view to this dilemma was provided by Gerhard 
Henze, Minister-Counsellor, at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
U.S. The diplomat delivered his speech at Town Hall of California, in Los Angeles, on 
May 6, 1986.  
Driving from Washington to Los Angeles and knowing that I 
would have to speak to you about Western defence I diverted some of my 
attention from the beautiful landscapes and life in the cities to looking for 
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American soldiers and military installations. I did not see very much. If I 
had gone in Germany from Cologne to Munich, a 370 miles trip, the 
picture would have been different. On many bridges I would have seen 
yellow signs with black tanks and ciphers on it indicating the maximum 
weight for tanks crossing the bridge. I would have heard the thundering 
noise of low flying military aircrafts and I would have passed a lot of 
military vehicles. This is not surprising in a country with the size of Utah 
or Oregon which has almost 900,000 German and foreign soldiers 
stationed on its territory. Compared with the size of the United States you 
would have to have 33 Mio soldiers to reach a similar density.  
 Where do all these soldiers come from? More than 55 percent are 
Germans. About 26 percent come from United States. The other soldiers 
are British, French, Canadians, Dutch and Belgians. 
 I mentioned these figures because you sometimes hear the 
argument in the United States that European Allies do not assume their 
adequate share of the common defense burden. This certainly is not true 
for Germany. In Central Europe – the main defense area of the Atlantic 
Alliance – the German armed forces provide 30 percent of the combat 
aircrafts, 50 percent of the ground forces and ground-based air defense and 
60 percent of the main battle tanks. We have the highest frequency of 
military exercises. Allied forces fly 580,000 sorties per year over our 
territory. Every working day there are 500 low level flights.388 
Mr. Henze also addressed the issue of SDI, and the fact that from a German 
perspective Federal Germany was doing more than any other European ally and the U.S. 
themselves: 
While it still seems difficult to find sites for the deployment of the 
new MX strategic missile in the United States the German Government 
started in 1983 the deployment of medium range nuclear missiles in the 
Federal Republic which had been agreed upon in NATO according to the 
schedule. Other European countries like Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and 
the Netherlands followed. To deploy new missiles was by no means an 
easy decision in a country like the Federal Republic of Germany where the 
population is ten times as dense as in the United States and where only a 
few of the deployed missiles would be far away from major settlements. 
There are more military forces and more nuclear weapons per square mile 
deployed in my country than in any other Western country.  
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There also is agreement among NATO countries that the defense 
infrastructure should be improved. Air bases need better protection. 
Communications systems have to be modernized. Logistical support must 
be strengthened. In 1985, NATO started its biggest 5 year infrastructure 
program which will require 10 billion dollars. Twenty-eight percent of the 
expenditure will be paid by the U.S. The Federal Republic, the much 
smaller country, will come up with 27 percent of the total cost.389 
2. The Fall of the Berlin Wall and Germany’s Reunification 
After 1989 the Soviets lost the initiative and the unification of Germany would 
take place in just a matter of months. After more than 40 years the Germans’ dreams 
were about to become true: 
The Soviet Union is in the unfortunate position of having lost all its cards. 
It has no effective way of preventing German unity. Several months ago 
an American visitor asked the Soviet minister of defense, "Aren't you 
going to use your three-hundred-and-something-thousand troops in East 
Germany to prevent unification?" The answer he got, much to his 
amazement, was "Oh, they are going to reunify around our troops." So the 
Soviets realize that they cannot stop it.390 
The events of 1989 brought not only the German unification but also a complete 
change in the European political and security landscape: “And then came the sudden and 
totally unexpected end of the division of Europe. The issue of German unity, which 
everybody had dreaded and had hoped could be postponed ad infinitum, suddenly was 
there. It wasn't even an issue to be discussed; it was a fait accompli, for all practical 
purposes.”391 The sudden changes in Europe re-opened the aspiration for an integrated 
Europe capable of counterbalancing the U.S. hegemonic tendencies. “And that's pretty 
much the French case. Their instinctive reaction has been, ‘Since this united Germany is 
going to be there, we must get a hold on it.’ And the hold takes the form of a real 
acceleration of Western European integration-what is known, in the jargon of the 
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European Community, as 'deepening.’”392 Even the French stratagem aimed at coping 
with the German rising influence instead of struggling against it, still, “[w]ith a united 
Germany, a number of French are afraid that even within a federal Europe, Germany will 
be the most important member.”393 And this is particularly true when the point is taken 
that “[s]ince World War II, Germany has become the leading proponent for European 
integration and since the end of the Cold War has acted almost exclusively through 
international or multilateral organizations in world affairs (NATO, OSCE, UN, etc.).”394 
Even more, when describing the balance of power in Europe, Ash is of the 
opinion that Germany is a central player: “For though Tony Blair might like to describe 
Britain’s role as pivotal, Europe’s real pivot is Germany.”395 
F.   GULF WAR IN 1990-1991, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BUNDESWEHR, 
2003 IRAQ CRISIS, REDUCTION IN FORCE, LOCAL LABOR ISSUES  
1. 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis 
In the following period, the Soviet Union’s leader Mikhail Gorbachev proved 
himself as a “…genuine and determined reformer who sought not confrontation but 
cooperation.”396 This opened a new era, which changed the rhetoric of NATO from a 
politics of ideology to a politics of pragmatism (“…especially in the area of military 
affairs” 397), and ultimately led to the relaxation of the East-West confrontation and made 
the end of the Cold War possible. This laid down the foundation for discussions on 
strategic nuclear forces’ downsizing, a verification process, and the limitations of nuclear 
testing. The notion of security for all from “the Atlantic to the Urals” became a great 
possibility by the openness of Moscow and good faith shown through unilateral troop 
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reductions. The allies’ answer came after the Brussels summit in May 1989 where they 
endorsed the Conventional Parity Initiative, which laid down NATO’s view and policy 
on reduction. The real challenge for NATO “…was that the Soviets were seeking not to 
widen their sphere of political, military, and ideological competition but to narrow it.”398 
It led to a vacuum of power, which further opened a new era in Europe’s affirmation of 
its own political agenda towards the security of the continent, which also placed Germany 
at centre of stage. Few other important events played as important a role in developing 
the American-German relations. 
On August 2, 1990, the beginning of the Persian Gulf crisis,  
… put German leaders in a very difficult position. They obviously 
considered the invasion itself a blatant violation of international law and 
felt an obligation to support not only the corresponding United Nations 
Security Council resolutions on the matter, but to show support for the 
United States as well. However, German leaders were also very conscious 
of Soviet and East German sensitivities concerning on-going negotiations 
and were keen not to make any moves which could upset this situation or 
the first all-German national elections scheduled for October 1990.399 
An intermediate solution was found as an alternative to sending troops in the Gulf 
area: “It was agreed that the Federal Republic would provide economic aid to those states 
most affected by the invasion, logistical and financial support for the military coalition 
aligned against Iraq but they would not send German troops to the region.”400 
2. “Out of Area” and the FRG, the German Basic Law and the 
Bundeswehr  
In the following period of time Germany embarked in a process of reconsidering 
its security policy. Defining the role and missions of the German Armed Forces 
(Bundeswehr) within the new political and security context was part of the process.  
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The question of the constitutionality of Bundeswehr deployments in the NATO-
WEU naval embargo in the Adriatic in Somalia in 1992, and in the AWACS monitoring 
in the Balkans, was coming to a resolution in 1994 when: 
The Constitutional Court ruling of July 1994 freed Germany from 
constitutionally mandated military abstention, but it raised a political 
dilemma at the same time. Although German troops are cleared to join 
international peace missions, the legal ruling does not necessarily translate 
into wider political and popular support in Germany for sending soldiers 
abroad.401 
In May 1995, the Bosniac conflict required another assessment of the German 
involvement in the new formula of UN-NATO Rapid Reaction Force.  
… the June 30, 1995 decision was historic and, as stated by Chancellor 
Kohl, “a major turning point in foreign and defense policy.” While 
fortunately the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) plan was never fully 
implemented, Germany did provide increasing amounts of support to 
operations in the Balkans, including German ECR-Tornadoes participating 
in their first air strikes on Bosnian Serb military positions as part of a 
NATO operation on September 1, 1995. Although these flights were 
reconnaissance missions and did not drop ordinance, it was considered the 
country’s first combat mission since World War II.402 
As Kevin L. Hill concluded in his thesis, “[t]he events of 1991-1995 had enabled 
the government to gradually consolidate support for an 'entirely new security policy 
construct,' one which permitted out-of-area operations and led to the Bundeswehr’s 
sizable participation (4,000 soldiers) in NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) later that 
year, and  in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996.”403 
3. The Split over the War in Iraq, 2001-2005  
Another important fact that played an important role in the U.S.-Germany 
relationship involves the deteriorating of transatlantic relations and the fact that “…the 
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Bush administration in August 2002 aggressively and openly elevated the issue of Iraq 
onto its national security agenda.”404 Most of the countries were not in favour of pre-
emptive military actions envisaged by Americans in settling the Iraq issue, declaring that 
a UN Security Council’s approval was necessary before force could be used.  Moreover 
after the UN Security Council Resolution 1441, the European opposition led by France 
and Germany was directed against the Bush administration’s push for acting against 
Iraq’s disobedience to comply with the provisions of resolution.  
Another fact that worsened the relations was the U.S. Department of Defense’s 
official declaration on the split of Europe into two groups, the "old" party represented by 
Western countries which were against the U.S. policy, and the "new" party represented 
by Eastern Europe, “…including such states as Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and the Baltic 
countries, [which] were forward-looking and progressive in meeting new security 
challenges.”405 The predominant actors in the European policy-split complicated the 
situation on the Old continent: “Crucially, the four countries at the heart of any history of 
the modern West – Britan, France, America and Germany – were divided two against 
two.”406 This was a real confrontation at the world scale as these four countries were 
“…the states with the first and seventh largest economies in the world (America and 
Britain) lined up against the fifth and sixth (Germany and France).”407 
NATO’s transformation clearly continued with the allies’ split “…and open 
debate over the organization’s role with the Iraq crisis in 2003”408 culminated with efforts 
to promote consensus regarding the decision to provide security guarantees to Turkey, 
under Article 4. The Alliance continuously evolved and included new historical 
explanations. The dispute among the allies over the issue of protecting Turkey against  
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Iraq threats and the defence of the European bases against terrorists, resulted in the lack 
of consensus between the American and continental Europeans views immediately before 
the outbreak of the Gulf War in March 2003. 
The anti-Americanism has represented, on many occasions, the binder of different 
political parties, or even more the escape route or reserve option, in building political 
confidence and unity. In Germany, for instance, the general political attitude towards the 
U.S. dramatically changed after 9/11 and even more anti-Americanism was used as an 
electoral weapon: “The September 2002 German election, where for the first time in the 
postwar period a leading candidate concluded that major electoral gains could be had by 
running against the United States, should be taken as a warning that American 
unilateralist could indeed come at a price.”409  
The NATO 2003 crisis affected also the U.S.-Germany bilateral relations and in 
“… the new political environment in Europe, the United States faced serious 
impediments and difficulties from the German government in realizing the fundamental 
aims of American foreign policy.”410 It was more and more observable that “…the burden 
of supporting more than a million soldiers on German soil became unbearable-not only 
for the United States, but also for the reunified German state.”411  
4. Re-Basing and Reduction 
It became clearer that the “American forces in Germany are not positioned to 
meet the coming challenges of the 21st century. With the increasing need for operability 
outside Europe, bases in the heart of unified Germany no longer serve the strategic 
purpose they did during the Cold War.”412 The “…present American basing structure in 
Germany is expensive and too large. Instead of spending precious resources on military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) still maintains 
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a complex base structure in Germany with thousands of U.S. soldiers and their 
families.”413 The necessity of downsizing the American presence in Germany was not a 
follow up of the German position regarding the war in Iraq, as William Safire observed: 
The proposed radical change is not finalized and is not punishment for 
Chancellor Schroder's antiwar pandering or his subsequent isolationism 
(although the recent weakening of German resolve, as one diplomat told 
me, ''certainly makes the timing opportune''). German officials are right to 
worry that U.S. forces now headed from Germany to the Persian Gulf may 
not, after the war and occupation, return to their old bases.414 
Future disagreements may easily hamper the projection of the American troops 
from their bases from Europe and especially from Germany:  
The U.S. basing of units also obviates the reliance on European states for 
support of a diplomatically contentious operation. For instance, ground 
units stationed in Germany could be immobilized if the German 
government demonstrated its opposition to a military operation by denying 
or delaying the use of airspace, rail, airbases, and seaports, despite treaty 
obligations. Additionally, other European neighbors to Germany, such as 
Austria, Switzerland, and France, could complicate deployments by 
denying the use of airspace either as an invocation of neutrality or as a 
sign of displeasure regarding U.S. policy. As the EU gains prominence 
and given that it is often at loggerheads with the United States over 
virtually every issue, the problem of cooperation in Europe likely will 
grow. Even though obstructionist governments could derail the “lily pad” 
option as well, the United States would retain the flexibility to bypass 
Europe.415 
But “[d]espite its criticisms of the Iraq war, Germany imposed no restrictions on 
the use of American bases during that conflict. It continues to deploy thousands of 
German soldiers to protect those bases, freeing American troops for other uses. Berlin 
also contributes $1 billion a year to the bases' support."416 
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Among other reasons that may trigger such withdrawals may be the fact that the 
German regulations imposed additional pressure on the American troops especially 
regarding the protection of the environment. “For the United States, the preservation of 
the current base structure in Germany for operational, strategic, economical and political 
reasons is becoming more and more difficult. Training has become more difficult in 
Germany due to rigorous environmental regulations. American bases in the heart of 
Europe, together with thousands of U.S. soldiers, family members, buildings, installations 
and other facilities, are too extensive and relatively inefficient.”417 “With the end of the 
Cold War, exercises in the German countryside are practically nonexistent. German 
environmental concerns, payments for maneuver damage, maneuver restrictions, and the 
dangers to civilians are too great to make them worthwhile.”418 Starting with early 1990s 
“[o]ver the past decade or so, the Pentagon has felt increasingly constrained by training 
restrictions placed on the U.S. forces by their European host.”419 “For example, training 
has become more difficult in Germany due to stringent environmental regulations. 
Germany has severely limited America’s ability to fly helicopters at night, conduct live-
fire exercises, and conduct training maneuvers in heavy, tracked vehicles.”420 “Although 
these restrictions are understandable because of Germany’s dense population and 
politically powerful environmental movement, they have forced the Pentagon to look 
elsewhere to train.”421 
Gregory R. Copley asserted in one of his articles that “[m]ost of the 65,000 Army 
troops in USEUCOM have been based in Germany. It is anticipated that as many as 40,000 
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the local economies, quite apart from infrastructural development (and the additional impact 
of Air Force and Naval basing). There would be a commensurate loss to the German 
economy.”422 
Robert D. Critchlow, citing the former Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, in 
his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, argued that:  
… relocating personnel and facilities in some cases could reduce frictions 
with host governments and enhance cooperation with allies. He also 
indicated that nations that imposed restrictions or conditions on the use of 
U.S. forces from their territory would be viewed as less satisfactory 
locations. He did not specifically cite the countries he saw as sources of 
friction with respect to the presence of U.S. forces or the conduct of U.S. 
operations. However, it was widely assumed he was referring to friction 
with Germany over the invasion of Iraq and German restrictions on U.S. 
training exercises.423 
In any case, the schism between the German Europeaniazed point of view and the 
American approach of its policy towards world security has led to the fact that “[t]oday, 
the prevailing American feeling about Germany is one of disillusionment and 
disappointment.”424 From an American perspective the effect of relocation of its troops 
will generate long term effects: “Lack of presence could find the United States reducing 
its voice in European or Asian affairs, and finding it harder to motivate international 
coalitions or support when needed.”425 Moreover, “[f]or the last 60 years, American 
taxpayers footed most of the bill to protect Europe, most recently deploying forces to stop 
the Balkan wars. Somehow Europeans appear to believe Americans will continue doing 
this indefinitely, regardless of European behavior and attitudes. They are badly 
mistaken.”426 The disengagement of the U.S. from Europe will inevitably have, as a 
consequence, the fact that “…Europe will distance itself from the United States as well. 
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European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) proponents will pounce on any 
opportunity to marginalize U.S. leadership in Europe, and a withdrawal would serve as a 
pretext to advance the EU agenda.”427  
5. Financial Aspect: Externally and Internally Orientated 
The dispute between the U.S. and Germany has grown over the financial issues as 
well. The failure of the European partners to meet the necessary requirements for 
European security and support for the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, has laid the 
ground for an exacerbated quarrelling. The lack of participation was viewed by the 
American side, as a lack of political will.  
Germany insists that it is not a lack of political will that prevents it from 
doing more in Afghanistan, where it has 2,000 troops. It says that with 
missions also in Kosovo and Bosnia, its forces are stretched thin. But if 
the world's third biggest economy is already exhausted by deploying 7,500 
non-fighting troops abroad out of a total force of 270,000, what other than 
a lack of political will can account for this sorry state of its military 
affairs? 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, last 
year the U.S. spent $417.4 billion on defense or $1,419 per capita. 
France's total spending was $35 billion or $583 per capita, while Germany 
spent $27.2 billion or $329 per capita and is planning to freeze defense 
spending at current levels over the next few years.428 
In accordance with the Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense 
2003 published by the U.S. DOD, in 2001 the size of Germany’s Host Nation Support 
was $862 million much smaller than the Japanese contribution ($4.62 billion) even the 
amount of U.S. stationing forces is 71,434 in Germany. The German 21 percent of the 
U.S. stationing costs was the lowest when compared with Japan’s contribution (79 
percent in 2001) or South Korea’s (39 percent). As shown in Figure 14429 the share of the 
costs in Germany is the smallest one from a list of the first top 10 U.S. allies.   
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Figure 14.   Size and share of the U.S. overseas stationing costs (2001) 
In Germany, the withdrawal under the new 2005 BRAC process may bring some 
problems related to financial and social issues. 
According to the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), the 
short-term consequences of U.S. withdrawal may be predicted and 
measured in three ways. First, more than 32,446 Germans have lost their 
jobs in U.S. bases since 1991 [1995 data]. Second, the United States has 
returned more than 92,000 acres of property. To put it into perspective, 
this amount of land is almost the same size as the German federal state of 
Bremen, and is twice as large as the U.S. District of Columbia. Third, the 
loss of more than $3 billion in annual spending by the U.S. military in the 
German economy will adversely affect local retailers and contractors.430  
The 3 billion dollar sum included “…salaries of laid-off German civilians, and the 
loss of American military residents’ consumption in the German economy. However, 
most of the laid-off workers either found new jobs or were compensated though a special 
joint American-German benefits package."431 
However there are differences between the rural and city situation: 
The completely different situation is in rural, underdeveloped areas 
without industry and other prospects than working in the large American 
military base. The German Counties hosting the Air Bases in Hahn and 
Bitburg demonstrated the link between the U.S. withdrawal and an almost 
instantly rising unemployment rate.432 
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Usually the closure of American bases in the rural areas affects those who heavily 
rely on American revenues, such as landlords for housing or civil employees. As an 
example in Bitburg the country had been closely linked with the Bitburg Air Base. 
When the Air Force closed the base in 1994, it removed the district’s chief 
employer. Thousands of Americans left the area; a withdrawal felt 
painfully by their former German landlords. The lack of alternative job 
opportunities caused a temporarily, and sometimes lasting, dislocation of 
laid-off workers and contractors, who previously worked at the base. 433  
In William Boston’s 2003 article, “Auf Wiedersehen, it’s Been Good to Know 
You,” treated the financial consequences of a possible American withdrawal for a couple 
of the most important locations: 
However, the impact of troop withdrawals would hit some German 
communities hard. The Ramstein and Spangdahlem air bases, the largest 
U.S. military communities outside the U.S. are home to 40,000 American 
soldiers and relatives. Around 6,000 Germans are employed there. An 
economical study by the University of Trier concluded that the bases 
contributed 1.4 billion euro to the local economy in 2001, supporting some 
27,000 full time jobs in a region with few other economic possibilities.434 
And referring to the same withdrawal subject, Zduniak concluded: 
Additionally, the withdrawing of American Forces would mark the end of 
the certain era for the German society. U.S. bases, since the end of the 
World War II, were present on German soil and guaranteed the peace and 
stability for recovering the post-war state. During the Cold War, with the 
American military and support, Germany was the important political actor 
on the international arena. Nowadays, many Germans are afraid that with 
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G. SUMMARY 
The presence of U.S. troops in Germany for more than half a century has left an 
enduring mark on the local society. It is visible in the world of sports and entertainment, 
business, culture, and politics.  
The immediate period after the occupation was very important through the fact 
that the Americans left their imprint in building up a completely new society. The 
transplant of American beliefs on fertile Europe’s post war conscience gave birth to a 
new civilization. 
In the late 1940s the establishment of the Iron Curtain was the new policy within 
Europe. The initial mission of the American troops in Germany had been re-configured in 
a new protective dimension, especially because the confrontation between East and West. 
The necessity of unity and cooperation of the all European countries against the Soviet 
Union, paved the way for Germany in becoming a partner. 
It is very important to mention the importance played by the composition of an 
after-war German society in the normalization between the conquerors and conquered.   
After the war the German population had a high percentage of women and children, 
which played an important role in reversing the perception from blame to compassion. 
The summer of 1945 marked the definitive abandonment of the ban on 
fraternization and the end of the first stage in the way of normalizing the German society. 
Regarding the German children, contact with the American culture had been a great 
opportunity for developing an international culture and ridding itself of the Nazi heritage. 
What started as a punitive occupation of an enemy country had, by 1948, turned 
into a protective occupation of a dependent people and was forged further through the 
Berlin Airlift events. 
Further on, the Truman Doctrine, the introduction of the Marshall Plan, and 
impending merger of the Western zones of Germany into a single republic paved the way 
for the establishment of West Germany as a country and as a Western partner. In the 
beginning, the West German government lacked the necessary independence to negotiate 
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with the Allied commanders, and the lease of ground and installations necessary for 
defense purposes were without any financial compensation.  
Regarding the basing of the American troops in Germany, there were mutations in 
the mid 50s, as West Germany became a sovereign state and was co-opted in the common 
defensive efforts of NATO. 
With the outbreak of the Korean War, it became even more imperative 
economically for the U.S. and UK to convince others that a re-armed West Germany was 
vital to NATO’s defensive structure. Since that moment, the United States began paying 
all expenses to maintain, improve, or establish bases in West Germany; as compensation, 
West Germany agreed to lease the land to U.S. Forces for free.  
The interdependence concept was part of the United States’ rhetoric in its attempt 
to cultivate European support for its evolving policy toward Southeast Asia, especially in 
the outbreak of Vietnam War. The Vietnam War period was the time when Germany and 
other European countries saw pacifist and anti-war movements begin to grow and there 
was a rising concern regarding the American presence. 
In the mid 80s the quarrel about the commitment of the Europeans and their 
participation in the common efforts of defense was acute and growing, along with 
resistance against the American influence on the European policy. The European nations 
felt the presence of the American troops more as a burden and as a threat to the country, 
population, and environmental safety. 
The events of 1989 brought not only German unification but also a complete 
change in the European political and security landscape. The sudden changes in Europe 
re-opened the aspiration for an integrated Europe capable of counterbalancing the U.S. 
hegemonic tendencies. Germany has become the leading proponent for European 
integration, and since the end of the Cold War has acted almost exclusively through 
international or multilateral organizations in world affairs, distancing itself more and 
more from the American influence.  
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The Constitutional Court ruling of July 1994 freed Germany from constitutionally 
mandated military abstention, and allowed Bundeswehr to assume missions outside of 
Germany. 
In 2003 the NATO countries split over the war in Iraq, and the opposition led by 
France and Germany was directed against the Bush administration’s push for acting 
against Iraq’s disobedience to comply with the provisions of UN resolutions. Starting 
with this occasion in Germany, anti-Americanism has become the binder of different 
political parties. Europe distanced itself from the United States as well. ESDP proponents 
pounced on any opportunity to marginalize U.S. leadership in Europe, and any American 
withdrawal of troops from Europe would serve as a pretext to advance the EU agenda. 
The failure of the European partners to meet the necessary requirements for European 
security and support for the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, has opened the door for 
exacerbated quarrelling. The lack of participation was viewed, by the American side, as a 
lack of political will. 
The actual American bases in Germany, of which a preponderance are in the 
western part of Germany, are a legacy of the first initial setting-up back in 1944. 
American troops stationed in Germany were over 10,000,000 personnel strong for 50 
years (1950-2000).  
After the end of the Cold War, U.S. officials started to observe that the present 
American base structure in Germany is no longer efficient. This military configuration 
was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy--the Soviet 
Union--during the Cold War era. The entire widespread infrastructure, the number of 
bases, landing strips and runways, and training areas for supporting such a large amount 
of conventional forces were not required anymore. 
The new configuration of the American presence in the world started right after 
the end of the Cold War. After 2000, the presence of the American troops entered a new 
era regarding its relocation. The process of redeploying the present U.S. military structure 
from Germany was closely connected with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) process. 
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Among other reasons that may trigger such withdrawals may be the fact that the 
increasing German regulations impose additional pressure on the American troops, 
especially regarding the protection of the environment. 
Overall it may be iterated that usually the closure of American bases in the rural 
areas affects those who heavily rely on the American revenues, such as landlords for 
housing or civil employees. As an alternative to the accompanying problems for base 
closures, compensation though the special joint American-German benefits package may 
be a solution. 
The American presence in Germany has for along the last 60 years contributed the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
The signing of the 2005 Access Agreement concerning the use of military 
facilities in Romania by the USA armed forces was a political decision of 
undeniable importance, which gave fresh impetus to the development of 
bilateral relations.436 
Minister of National Defence, H.E. Mr. Teodor Melescanu 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has endeavored to identify possible ways for making the Romanian-
U.S. bilateral relationship a successful one in view of the inherent pitfalls of such defense 
agreements. In trying to provide useful tools to those officials responsible for the issues 
of policy associated with the guest forces in the host nation, this thesis offers conclusions, 
lessons learned and recommendations based not only on the character of Romanian 
society but also on the experience of other countries with similar experiences. The 
following conclusions are filtered, in turn, through the collective experience of 
representative U.S. allies and their experience of host forces in the past half century.  
 With the aim for minimizing the political and operational negatives, and hence to 
avoid the bi-lateral problems that have affected host countries elsewhere in Europe, as 
well as the wider world, this thesis seeks to emphasize the positive aspects and valuable 
lessons learned from the Japanese and German experience.  
From the beginning, this thesis assumed that the presence of the American troops 
on Romanian territory could have both positive and negative civil-military consequences. 
And as such it will plainly affect the entire spectrum of the Romanian society, politically, 
economically, and socially.  
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By identifying the Romanian concerns and expectations, this thesis has tried to 
offer an answer by using past experience and possible remedies which can be found in 
similar cases of force and statecraft.  
The author hopes that this study shall be of aid to the Romanian MOD as the 
designated authority for implementation of the AA in succeeding in performing its tasks 
from the perspective that the views of the Romanian society on the U.S. military may be 
projected onto its Romanian counterpart, and the military, in ensemble, may be made 
responsible for any dysfunction, misunderstanding or mismanagement. 
Finally, this study seeks answers as to how one can reinforce the potentially 
positive aspects of such stationing while minimizing the potentially negative aspects. 
B. POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES 
1. Conclusions 
The relocation of the American troops in Romania is part of the new “lily pad” basing 
conception, which breaks with customs of the Cold War as concerns the U.S. force posture 
and makes "…’new NATO’ far more strategically responsive to the Middle East and 
Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Maghreb (North African states).”437 This 
concept is to ensure, as well, a better common training with the new host nation’s military 
while better serving the Americans’ “…own strategic interests.”438 This concept would 
reduce costs for the U.S., and “[i]nstead of building its own bases as it has in the past, the 
Army would use other countries’ existing facilities.”439 Another important issue for the U.S. 
is for it to avoid the environmental restrictions imposed by some countries in Europe.  
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http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 4, 2007). 
438 George Allen, "American Soldiers Should Be Moved to the East": GEORGE ALLEN: [London 1st 
Edition]. Financial Times, May 6, 2003, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 5, 
2007). 
439 David C. Chandler, JR, “‘Lily-Pad’ Basing Concept Put to the Test”, Army Logistician, 
March/April 2005, Vol. 37 Issue 2, 11-13, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=16343
151&site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed January 10, 2008). 
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The physical location of the American troops in Romania takes place in the 
context of recognizing the Black Sea region’s importance in the zonal, continental and 
world’s security.  
Romania, as the vanguard of both NATO and EU in the new century, has to deal 
in the Black Sea region with a variety of asymmetric challenges and threats, beginning 
with the Russian hegemonic tendencies and its political, military and economic 
countermeasures, and ending with the proliferation of terrorist activities, drugs, arms and 
human trafficking. 
Some countries may see the positioning of the new bases as a counter measure to 
the Russian Federation’s growing control and hegemonic aspirations over such hot spots 
as Transdnistria, Chechnya, and Abkhasia. The Russian interest in this part of the world 
is aimed at the control of natural resources, especially that of energy resources. In this 
context the Russian reaction is one of opposing the closeness of NATO troops to its 
borders and sphere of influence. Under these circumstances, the Russian reaction was to 
suspend its participation in CFE and vehemently condemn the new bases in Romania and 
the new plans of anti-missile capacities in Poland and the Czech Republic as a flagrant 
trespass of the convention. Another problem that needs consideration is the possibility 
that nuclear proliferation may increase in the Black Sea area, and a possible rocket 
missile threat may be directed towards Romanian territories.  
The Russian policy towards Europe is not only political or military, but also 
economic. Since Europe is dependent on the Russian exports of energy, natural gas, and oil, 
Moscow has found political leverage in an “on-off faucet” strategy, or preferential 
contracting, which has already affected and may continue to affect Romania in the future.   
Romania may face challenges not only from the East but also from West. The rise of 
the opposition to U.S. policy and strategy among the Western European countries and the 
formalization of the schism in NATO, opposed to the openness of Romania in hosting the 
American troops, may alter the relations between Romania and those EU countries opposing 
the U.S.’s hegemonic tendencies (Germany, France, and others). Romania may be 
challenged by some of the EU’s members in its political, economical, and other fields 
related to its integration in the EU. 
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The consideration of using Romania for basing troops first came in the spring of 
2003 when Turkey decided against its involvement in Iraq. The MK Airport was a viable 
alternative solution for the refueling and supplying of the American troops, to the Turkish 
facilities. 
The American presence in Romania currently lacks a Navy component due to the 
provisions of the Montreaux Convention of 1936. Even though an American naval 
presence in the Black Sea would increase the security, Russia and Turkey are opposed to 
any change of the status of the Black Sea due to political and economic reasons. This is 
because it may affect their interests and influence. In this case, Romania is seen as 
“…assuming the role of the Trojan Horse at the Black Sea coast.”440 
Besides external concerns, internally, some of the public fears that the bases in 
Romania will be used for launching attacks against Iran, which will contribute to the 
degradation of security. 
The presence of the American troops in Romania has strong political support and 
the overall opinion is that “…together with the American and European partners this 
region will be transformed in a security, and democratic zone, and will represent a future 
alternative source of energy for Europe.”441 
Romanian officials have emphasized on different occasions the fact that Romania 
“…retains the ownership of all the terrains, military bases, and other facilities that are 
going to be used.”442 This argumentation is made for making the point crystal clear that 
“…there will be no American bases on the Romanian territory.”443 
                                                 
440 The views presented in the original article ”Wars for Hegemony at the Black Sea” of the Turkish 
author Barcin Yinanc in Turkish Daily News has been cited in the Romanian newspaper Romania Libera, 
July 05, 2007. 
441 Alexandra Babiciu, “Taubman, Onorat că Găzduieşte Serbarea de 4 Iulie într-o Românie Membră a 
UE, Lucru Promovat de SUA” [Taubman Honored to Celebrate 4th of July in the EU’s New Member 
Romania, Whose Membership was Supported by US], MEDIAFAX, July 04, 2007. 
442 Razvan Belciuganu, “Vin Americanii!” [The Americans Are Coming!], Jurnalul National, July 18, 
2007, http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/97430/vin-americanii (accessed August 5, 2007).  
443 Ibid. 
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As part of the benefits it is envisaged that the security provided by the presence of 
the American troops will make Romania a stable country and, implicitly, more attractive 
to foreign investments. 
As part of the general security situation in Romania, there are opinions that 
terrorist organizations may target the American troops, which may certainly affect part of 
the civilian population. Those organizations may take advantage of chemical and 
biological weapons’ development, using these kinds of weapons as a primary means in 
their attacks against the U.S.’s partner states. The necessity of improving the defense 
against cyber and informational attacks must also be considered. 
Regarding the formal framework, the signing of the AA and the creation of the 
Joint Committee completed the conclusion of the additional implementation 
arrangements, creating the legal responsibilities and basic rights of the parties. 
Additionally, the creation of the inter-ministerial committee ensured the civil control and 
oversight and the necessary political tools through the access of the decisional factors. 
The network at the national level involves all three related levels: political, political-
military and military, for assuring the necessary expertise and for creating the related 
responsibilities. 
Until now the military institutions have manifested an openness in informing the 
public. The transparency adopted by the Romanian MOD ensures that the civilians will 
have direct access to the process and offers the necessary information in assessing the 
achievements in implementing this bilateral agreement. 
Regarding mass media, it may be observed that some Romanian newspapers are 
biased in presenting the reality and most of the time they hunts for the “sensational.” The 
information offered to the public is many times ambiguous, incomplete, and manipulated 
by implying rumors and speculation rather than the reality-- which disorients the public. 
2. Lessons Learned  
The changes in the international situation may trigger a redefinition of any 
security arrangements. The need for a rethinking of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and 
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the German attitude after the end of the Cold War, are living proof of such circumstances. 
Differences in the political and economic interests may have also a big influence toward 
reshaping any bilateral relation. The Japanese and the German cases sustain the idea that 
a political and diplomatic subordination and an increased dependence on others in 
providing security end in a crisis because of the effects that such policies can have on the 
political image of the host countries.  Part of the recovery process, the use of the armed 
forces in different missions under the auspices of the UN, EU, OSCE and other 
international organizations may create higher visibility and an improved perception by 
the international community. 
The changes in the future security situation (i.e. some major set back to the U.S. 
geo-strategy or gross escalation of conflict) may well trigger a necessary re-evaluation of 
a foreign military presence on the territory of another state, imposed firstly by the 
economic and financial reasons and secondly by the international opinion.   
Deterrence of any possible aggression as part of a security alliance may fade with 
the passage of time, as the perception of the threat diminishes as well as the political 
culture grows and matures as has been seen elsewhere in the case of Europe and Asia. 
For continuing such an alliance a reevaluation of the aims and missions is needed. An 
increase of such a relation through the extension of a multilateral cooperation may 
represent a partial solution. As in the case of Japan, the possibility to include China “…in 
a strong multilateral security structure”444 may be crucial in dealing with the zonal 
security challenges.  
The military actions conducted by the American troops around the world may 
trigger anti-war protest movements and raise the level of the anti-American sentiments. 
As this thesis has presented, the public opinion in both Japan and Germany became 
negative and opposed American policy and hegemonic tendencies during the time of the 
Vietnam War, Iraq wars, Afghanistan and others.  
                                                 
444 Michael O'Hanlon, "A new Japan-U.S. security bargain." Japan 
Quarterly 44, no. 4, October 1, 1997, 12-19.  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 
3, 2007). 
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The analysis of the legal framework of the American military’s presence in Japan, 
and the new developments intending the revision of those documents (including SOFA) 
may represent valuable grounds for further interpretation of future trends, which may 
occur someday in similar alliances. 
In both country-case studies, there was a re-discussion of the formal agreements 
in the first five to ten years. Particularly for Japan the “Special Measures Agreements” 
were discussed every five years.  
In any country the press’ attitude may have a crucial role in influencing public 
opinion and political circles, and thus creating an opinion which most of the people will 
accept. The main observation is that in both Germany and Japan the more attention the 
press pays to an issue directly linked to the American military bases or security, the more 
that specific issue grows. Moreover for Japan the overall conclusion provided was that 
Japanese public opinion is event-driven.  
As in Okinawa, public opinion may develop a hypersensitivity to events that 
happen around the military bases, which may cause a rising opposition to the presence of 
American troops. The tendency of the local media to report effectively from the 
“viewpoint of local residents, particularly under adverse conditions,” as a result, 
constantly reporting only negative issues and not covering issues that would place U.S. 
forces “in a favorable light” may create biased opinions. The example of Okinawa is self-
explanatory.  The example of Germany more or less tracks with this generalization, as 
well, especially with the rise of the environmental movement in the 1980s to say nothing 
of the pacifist segment in part of German political culture.  
Miscommunication and wrong signals sent by officials may crucially influence 
public opinion. The case of Lt. Gen. Earl Hailston in Japan who called Okinawans “a 
bunch of wimps” in one of his e-mails which was published in the local press could be a 
valuable lesson learned. 
Using not only English, but also the local language in sending messages targeting 




1. The opening of the MK military base should be presented in an efficient 
interconnection system with the other bases from Turkey, Bulgaria, and 
even the Middle East, and for no reason should it be seen as a supplement 
or a replacement of the bases from Turkey. It is the obligation of the 
Romanian military policy to promote this idea taking into account the new 
context of Turkey’s zonal and continental relationship with U.S. 
2. It should be made very clear by the military informational sources about 
the status of the common use of the military site by both American and 
Romanian armed forces.  The fact that Romania retains the ownership of 
all the terrains, military bases, and other facilities that are going to be used 
should be made very clear to the civilian mass media and population. 
3. There should be better promotion of the political, military strategic and 
zonal security importance of the bases. Local authorities should be 
supported and backed up by the central authorities in their endower to 
represent the link between the official position and local perception of the 
American presence. The public should be informed and be convinced of 
the fact that the American presence in Romania is beneficial for both 
countries.  
4. The necessity for transparency and correctly informing the civilian 
population on the scope and number of the American troops in Romania is 
very important and should be the attribute of the military press. A better 
understanding by the ordinary people through a sustained media campaign 
of the bases’ functions and attributes will help in perceiving the reality and 
reduce any possible tensions. 
5. The cooperation and interoperability through common training of the 
Romanian military and the U.S. troops represent another positive aspect of 
the partnership.  The Romanian military should take full advantage of this 
opportunity. A rotation of the Romanian troops involved in the common 
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training activities would be a good idea. Increasing the zonal cooperation 
with the military of riverane countries of Black Sea (not only Bulgaria) 
and their involvement in the American-Romanian common training 
activities may help in relaxation of the actual situation.   
6. Regarding the internal and local security, the central and local authorities 
should pay increased attention to this aspect and take the appropriate 
measures for improving the security. The idea that “…this kind of thing 
did not happen until now in Romania”445 could be a weak excuse for not 
acting. 
7. Re-discussion of the additional implementation arrangements of the AA, 
on a five-year basis, may be necessary for adjusting the legal framework 
to the new future conditions, which may avoid discrepancies between the 
understanding of the obligations and rights of the parties and the real 
conditions.  
8. The Romanian and American officials have to be aware that there will 
always be a part of the civil society that opposes the American military 
presence on national territory. In response to that, the openness of the 
military institutions in informing the public should continue; a complete 
ignorance of the opposing part is not a solution and its actions may gain 
more value and force along the time. In this context all levels of the 
Romanian society should be aware of the fact that the presence of the 
American troops on Romanian territory will have both positive and 
negative civil-military consequences; only some of them may have 
subjective cause, while the majority of the other events normally happen 
in relation with any kind of military activities. 
9. The U.S. counterpart may consider making the base newspapers bilingual 
in order to keep Romanian base employees and their families informed. 
                                                 
445 ROMPRES, “Ministrul Apărării Anunţă că Soldaţii Americani vor Sosi în Bazele din Constanţa la 
Sfârşitul Lunii August” [The Minister of Defence Announces that the American Soldiers will Arrive at the 
Bases in Constanta at the End of August], June 20, 2007. 
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Another useful tool may be making the U.S. military website (if any in 
Romania) bilingual. Having a Romanian-speaking announcer on the base 
may also improve the communication. 
10. Regularly informing the local community about the activities performed 
by the military, standards, and safety rules may constitute a good way for 
preventing problems. Briefing the local authorities on a regular basis by 
the base commander on this matter will help in constructing a continued 
dialog and reciprocal trust. 
C. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
1. Conclusions 
Regarding the American military presence in Romania, the civil society has 
expectations and concerns. Some of them originate from human nature while others are 
influenced by facts and local conditions and culture. The differences between the 
Romanians and Americans in understanding and approaching diverse issues may have the 
roots in the differences and dissimilar ways of perception and considering the reality, in 
differences between national and cultural backgrounds, in differences between life 
experiences.  The local customs and traditions may also add some issues to the general 
perception. The differences in the purchase power between the American soldiers and 
locals may also affect their relation and interaction, making some of their actions biased.   
Part of the social expectations, the opening of the MK site, “…brings jobs for 550 
Romanians, with another 50 jobs possible as supplementation as soon as the operations 
start.”446 Considering the American presence at almost 3000 people, the employment 
ratio is 1/6. 
For a community of approximately 10,000 people, as Mihai Kogalniceanu is, such 
an employer as the military base could be the most important one in the area.   
                                                 
446 Sânziana Ionescu, “Peste o Mie de Militari ai US Army vor Veni să se Antreneze la Constanţa” 
[Over 1000 US Army Troops are Coming to Constanta to Train], MEDIAFAX, August 09, 2007. 
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The sums to be invested by the American counterpart at MK in the near future 
(approx. 35 million dollars on top of the 30 million dollars already spent) may not 
represent too much at the macro level, but it will make a difference at the micro level, 
and could play a major role in developing the local area and increasing the level of local 
business. 
Some Romanians are concerned with what the central and local press label as an 
inevitable “drunkenness, rapes, fighting, scandals” from the American military. 
For neighborhoods around the bases, the formation of a black market (drugs, 
arms, human trafficking) and local security degradation are seen as the main problems. A 
“colorful fauna” around the American military bases comprising drug dealers, arm and 
human trafficking brokers may appear, gravitating towards the “prosperity” mirage of the 
Americans. This situation may negatively influence the local society and may generate 
the extension of drug use among the civilians. At the end of the road, local security may 
be affected by the struggle between different gangs for controlling the local market. 
Concerns were also expressed regarding the SOFA provisions. In this context, 
there is the opinion that the American soldiers may be prosecuted only over the ocean, by 
American martial courts, which, of course cannot punish them in favor of some 
‘collateral victims’ from Eastern Europe. 
Regarding the environmental concerns, all possible hazardous implications were 
included in the pages of the Romanian newspapers: pollution, vibrations, phonic 
pollution, and all possible ranges of accidents from possible plane crashes or aviation and 
artillery live fire. A part of the public opinion expressed worries about “… real 
catastrophes for locals,”447 which these kinds of incidents may generate. 
Regarding the relative positive approach to the permissive environmental 
legislation in Eastern Europe, it may trigger disputes in the future when countries from 
this part of the world will align their policies to European standards. 
                                                 
447 Maria Petrean, “Americanii vor Investi 34 de Milioane de Dolari la Kogalniceanu”, [The Americans 
Will Invest 34 Million Dollars at Kogalniceanu], Gardianul, August 01, 2007. 
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The general picture of the social realities shows that while at the central level, 
mainly politically represented, the attitude may be positive, the local level of society may 
encounter different conditions, which if not well evaluated may generate opposition. The 
discrepancy between the political and social is more evident where the central authorities 
do not back up the local ones in dealing with a foreign military presence. It is also true 
that the level of nuisance is directly proportional to the number and size of the bases. 
Another issue that should be mentioned is the discrepancy between the expectations of 
civil society and the reality. The bigger the difference is, the bigger the level of 
disappointment grows.  
2. Lessons Learned 
The previous experiences of Japan and Germany show that, over the years, the 
local community’s perception regarding the presence of the American troops suffered 
mutations in the way of considering more the problems and less the benefits of such 
presence. In Okinawa’s case, the locals saw “… incidents and accidents involving U.S. 
military personnel and other problems, real or invented, [as] a ‘burden.’”448 
The beginning of the American presence in Germany points to the fact that a 
material based relation between the American soldiers and locals, especially when there 
is a discrepancy in purchasing power, may generate social problems such as development 
of an underground market, prostitution and spreading of venereal diseases. If, as in the 
German case, the American soldiers seek the company of women “… for sexual rather 
than social reasons,”449 some of them may develop these relations and may marry local 
women.  
The American military presence in other foreign countries generates high 
employment ratios related to the number of deployed American soldiers. The analysis of 
the employment ratio in Japan reveals a 1/2 ratio (“58,000 military personnel … 
                                                 
448 Giuseppe A. Stavale, “The Evolution of Japan’s constitution and implications for U.S. forces on 
Okinawa” Thesis at NPS Monterey, December 2004, 28-29. 
449 Petra Goedde, Gis and German Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949, Yale 
University Press, 2003, 86. 
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supported by approximately 5,500 DoD civilian employees and more than 25,000 
Japanese workers”450) while in Germany this is slightly higher at around 3/4 (40,000 
American soldiers and relatives, supported by around 6,000 Germans employees and 
contributing 1.4 billion Euro supporting some 27,000 full time jobs).  
Usually the local population is not aware of the provisions (stipulations) of the 
documents regulating the presence of the foreign troops in their country. Especially in the 
cases of refusal of the American authorities regarding the transfer of custody of a suspect 
involved in a crime on the national territory of the host country, there is the perception 
that such action is against the national laws and rights of prosecuting the felons. Even 
though similar crimes, such as murder or rape, are committed by locals they do not 
receive similar attention from the local society as in the case when American soldiers are 
involved.  After 1995, both the U.S. and Japan agreed on revision of the SOFA.  
The revision of the SOFA was possible, as in the Japanese case, on the basis of a 
so called “sympathetic consideration” “… to allow Japanese prosecution of any military 
member accused of a crime against a Japanese national.”451 Under these provisions 
''heinous crimes such as murder, robbery and sexual assault''452 were considered.  
The reality shows that the number of crimes committed by foreign soldiers may 
be larger than the known number, because some cases such as sexual assault or rape may 
go unreported because “… of fear for retaliation and shame.”453 
Reformation of SOFA was also called for allowing the local authorities to be 
involved in the examination of accidents. 
                                                 
450 Thomas C. Waskow, Lieutenant General, Commander U.S. Forces, Japan, Speech at the Japan 
National Press Club, Japan, August 26, 2004. usfj.mil/newsreleases/transcripts_04.html. (accessed August 
30, 2007). 
451 Keith W. Allen, “Future of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Foundation for a Multilateral Security 
Regime in Asia?”, NPS Thesis, June 2003, 22. 
452 Thom Shanker, "Okinawans Ask Rumsfeld to Thin Out Troops." New York 
Times, November 17, 2003, Late Edition (east Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed August 1, 
2007). 
453 Calvin Sims, "Marines Apologize to Okinawa Over Sex Case." New York Times, July 7, 2000, Late 
Edition (east Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed August 1, 2007). 
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Bureaucratic responses offered by the American officials, who use a complicated 
formal language, may inflict upon the local population the sentiment that their complaints 
and requests are not taken seriously.  
Any military activity may cause incidents which are related to this special 
activity: crashes and near collisions of jets and helicopters; danger from munitions during 
live-fire exercises; lumbering trucks that aggravate the traffic congestion; threats to 
endangered species; noise pollution caused by the thundering noise of low flying military 
aircrafts, etc.  
The fact that Germany and other European partners have less permissive 
environmental legislation, which involves a morass of bureaucracy requirements, stands 
as part of the motivation for re-basing the American troops; actually, it influences the fact 
that less time and effort is spent on training than getting to the training areas and back. 
A short period of tour of duty of the American troops in the foreign countries 
triggers lack of continuity at both soldiers’ level and at the command level. During a 
short period, the command personnel are unable to foster mature, professional 
relationships with local officials. A six-month period is too short for the servicemen to 
get in contact with the local community and be aware of the local customs. In this case 
they fail to be “good neighbors.” 
When deploying troops, the U.S. authorities should pay special attention to the 
cultural training and building up of the cultural awareness. Being aware of the local 
norms, habits, rules, and customs may have the advantage of avoiding a lot of 
misunderstandings, mistakes or even conflicts between the American military personnel 
and locals.  
3. Recommendations 
1. The American military presence plays a major role in developing the local 
areas and providing jobs and increasing the level of local business. The 
American counterpart should be aware that any misunderstanding or 
syncope in this area might generate a degradation of the civil-military 
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relations, in a sense that the American presence could be seen as a burden 
and not as an advantage. The lessons learned from Japan and Germany 
shows that the employing ratio in Romania is lower than in the case of 
these two countries, which may signify that in the near future the number 
of the local employees may (should) be increased.  
2. As in Japan’s case, the integration of the Romanian troops, and physical 
stationing of units together with the American troops may generate positive 
perceptions from the public. The assignment of a Romanian Deputy Camp 
Commander and the participation of the Romanian military to the base 
protection may also increase the popularity of the American troops.   
3. Positive contributions to the local economic development should be 
considered. For a better perception of the American presence in Romania, 
the point of bases’ contribution to the local economic development must be 
made clear. A better promotion of the size of the contribution and what it 
means at the local level would certainly improve the public’s perception. 
4. The U.S. authorities should be aware of the benefits that a promotion of a 
“good neighbor” policy may generate for improving the communication 
with the local community. Under its auspices some local actions may be 
considered: 
• Establishing an international school, [and granting access to the 
locals]; 
• Providing native English speakers to aide the Romanian teachers in 
teaching English;  
• English teaching program in schools and the prospects for 
expansion, volunteerism at orphanages, and beach clean-ups may 
be considered. 
5. U.S. may consider the changing of the U.S. personnel policy and cultural 
awareness. Assignments which are 36-month tours for those accompanied 
by family members and 24-month tours for those who are not 
accompanied by family members, to get to know the community they live 
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in and become a more responsible member of that community, may 
improve the relations with the local community. 
6. The MK base commander may consider limiting the places where the 
American servicemen may go. It has two advantages; first it would be 
easier for the military police to keep under control a limited number of 
locations, and secondly would avoid troubles for military personnel from 
entering the “wrong neighborhood.” 
7. The military police from the MK base should consider a close cooperation 
with the local police and authorities in identifying the threats and the 
dangerous persons in the area of responsibility. The military garrison from 
Constanta should establish MP patrolling and filters in the area of MK 
base and inside the Black Sea coast spas. 
8. The SOFA’s provisions should be better promoted through the 
communications channels to the civil society. The Romanian authorities 
may consider renegotiation of this document (as in the Japanese case) and 
in that case should pursue this issue in relation to the U.S. authorities.  
D. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 
1. Conclusions 
The relocation of the American troop plans after the mid 90s took into 
consideration the reduction of the military expenses by redeploying a certain number of 
troops in less expensive areas and improving the stationing and rotation planning. The 
selection of the new locations occurs by identifying those sites that require minimum 
investments for setting up or modernization. The infrastructure and depositing facilities 
have to be adequate for the purpose of basing American troops. After all, the Americans 
are after “…very efficiently and economically built”454 bases. Even more, there are critics 
                                                 
454 Esther Schrader, "AFTER THE WAR; U.S. Expedites Reshuffling of Europe Troops; The Pentagon 
Pursues a Leaner, Faster Force at New Bases in the Former East Bloc. Publicly, Officials Deny any Link to 
Iraq War Politics”: [HOME EDITION]. Los Angeles Times, May 1, 2003, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 4, 2007). 
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who doubt the actual possibilities of relocating the troops from Germany as Lt. Col. Amy 
Ehmann, who said that "’There's no place to put these people’ in Romania, Bulgaria or 
Djibouti, and she predicts 80% will end up staying in Germany.”455 
The actual presence of the American troops in Romania at the MK base had taken 
into consideration the appropriateness of this base to the Fetesti airport and Constanta 
seaport and rail hub. Those locations permit a quick inflow and outflow of troops in 
emergency cases, plus this area is the nearest located to the Black Sea allowing for 
interconnection with the other bases in Turkey, Bulgaria, and even the Middle East. It 
should be added that Dobrogea (the south-eastern part of Romania) is the closest location 
to the troubled areas of Transdnistria, Middle East, Caucasus, and Balkans. 
In the last ten years, Romania has experienced a series of American investments, 
and a series of American companies have opened their business in Romania, especially in 
the food area. The opening of the MK base may generate economic benefits at the local 
level: “… local contracts for goods and services, the local employment for functioning of 
the base, and for necessary construction of the local and zonal infrastructure’s elements. 
At the same time, the American presence will help on promoting tourism capabilities of 
the zone, with a substantial impact for the near future.”456  
The reverse of this situation is that the locals “hunting for overnight profits” may 
cause the escalation of the prices, which may harm the local population. The rising of 
prices in the real estate business represents another aspect of the social implications. This 
issue is possible when one takes into consideration the increased purchasing power of the 
Americans. This situation might be good for doing business, but certainly will eliminate 
competitiveness on the local market since none can compete with the Americans. Until 
now, nobody was interested in acquiring properties in Mihail Kogalniceanu; however, the 
American competitiveness may generate negative feelings and anxiousness vis-à-vis the 
idea that the Americans dictate the prices and terms in the local real estate business. 
                                                 
455 Chalmers Johnson, "Bases for an Empire; U.S. military power girdles the globe. It is imperialism by 
another name -- and it incites terrorism: [HOME EDITION]." Los Angeles Times, 
January 18, 2004, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 11, 2007). 
456 Razvan Belciuganu. 
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The absence of any local economic programs may worsen the situation especially 
in the reduced activity’s period, when the level of employment or services contracted by 
the bases are decreasing.  
2. Lessons Learned 
As part of “burden sharing,” the host nation, not even obliged by the formal 
provisions of an agreement, may pay part of the costs related to the basing of the 
American troops on its national territory. The related payments may be considered as a 
reimbursement for the security provided by the presence of the American troops 
(Japanese case) or from benefiting of windfall expenditures from the "involuntary 
tourism" of United States' troops (German case).  HNS may involve expenditures related 
to local maintenance costs (gas, electricity, etc), salaries of the locals employed by the 
military bases, or other similar costs. Starting in 1978 the HNS for the U.S. forces in 
Japan has been negotiated on a step-by-step basis every five years and concluded by 
adoption of special agreements through so-called Special Measures Agreements. 
The HNS costs may differ from country to country. In the Japanese case it 
covered approximately 79 percent (as of 2001) of total cost for basing the American 
troops, representing a total of $4.62 billion. In the German case it was $862 million, 
which represented 21 percent of the total cost.  
HNS may start as an expression of sympathy for the U.S. efforts in providing 
security, and may be a semi-legal artifice (as “Omoiyari” in Japan). 
When military bases are established in a rural area, it may cause a dependence of 
the local population on the revenues coming from the bases, which otherwise wouldn’t 
have become part of the local economy. In the rural areas, where the principal economic 
activities are based on agriculture, fishing, food processing, and the manufacture of 
textiles and pottery, the increasing need for services and entrepreneurial contracts may 
cause, in the beginning of such a relation, a development of economic activity. For the 




fiercely competed for. Usually, the closure of American bases in rural areas affect those 
who heavily rely on the American revenues, such as landlords for housing, or civil 
employees. 
The tourism related to the military presence and for recreational purposes may 
also constitute benefits for the local community. After 9-11, there are more and more 
concerns about a reduction of their profits from tourism because this activity was 
“…vulnerable due to the fear of terrorism directed at the U.S. military bases.”457 
Okinawa represents a case where the local economy had developed in relation 
with the needs for the American bases. The manufacturing industry has been neglected, 
“… while its service sector, largely dependent upon sales of imported goods, and its 
construction industry, which depends upon public works projects, are disproportionately 
overblown.”458  
When, in such a case, a military base is closed it can cause difficulties for the 
local economy, which, in absence of alternative economic programs, will collapse.  
Wrong economic policies adopted by the central authorities may cause more harm 
in a similar situation. Again the Okinawa case provides valuable lessons learned by the 
fact that that the development program for Okinawa adopted by Tokyo, had as a 
consequence Okinawa’s dependence upon capital investment from the central 
government, and made Okinawa's economy heavily reliant on public works subsidies.  
Additionally, economic facilities may attract local investors and a resurrection of 
the local economy. The establishment of the Okinawa Special Free Trade Zone, which is 
the only free trade zone in Japan, was created “…to encourage business enterprises to 
establish facilities in Okinawa and promote trade”459 and may serve as an example.  
                                                 
457 Thom Shanker. 
458 Paul S. Giarra, "Host Nation Support, Responsibility Sharing, and Alternative Approaches to U.S. 
Bases in Japan." Naval War College Review 50, no. 4 (October 1, 1997), 49-66, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed August 3, 2007). 
459 OPG, “Business,” OPG Online [home page on-line]; 
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/english/business/images/english.pdf , (accessed 10 January 2008), 7. 
 184
The German experience provides proof that in the urban areas the work power 
released by closing down a military base is easier absorbed by the local economy and in 
this case causes less harm to the local society.   
3. Recommendations  
1. The responsible Romanian authorities have to adopt the necessary 
measures for maintaining the continuous interest of the American 
counterpart in using the offered facilities. An advantageous offer with a 
long perspective, instead of a short one with immediate benefits, is 
preferable. The Romanian MOD’s central structures together with the 
local authorities should assist the American side in obtaining fair deals on 
the local market, thereby eliminating speculative offers. 
2. The local authorities should be involved in ensuring a loyal competition 
and promotion of the serious contractors and firms for entering economic 
activities with the bases, eliminating “overnight profits hunters,” measures 
which may serve to generate mutual trust and cooperation.  
3. Development of local economic programs which ensure economic 
facilities or tax exemptions may encourage and attract local investments, 
an expansion of the local economy and deter development of any 
dependency upon the needs of the military base. 
4. The local authorities may sponsor re-qualification programs for the jobs 
needed by the base, and for learning English language, which may ensure 
a higher employment rate from the local population. 
5. Advertising employment opportunities and services needed at the local 
level may improve the economic and financial benefits by attracting more 
locally-available resources. Using the same standards the local firms 
should be given priority by the base.   
Even though the primary target of this thesis has been the Romanian civil political 
authorities and policy makers, as well as the Romanian MOD, the conclusions, lessons 
learned and recommendations provided may also be useful for the U.S. Department of 
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Defense in adjusting its ongoing presence in central and eastern Europe. Such an effort 
cannot be suffused with a false romanticism that assumes away the normal frictions 
associated with the stationing of foreign troops on national soil.  The ease with which the 
experience of Japan and Germany has or has not been sufficiently factored into the so 
called "lily pad concept" in the first years of the present decade requires a more balanced 
assessment and reflection.   This thesis may also be useful for other countries, which face 
similar issues in hosting foreign troops on their territory.  The author of this thesis 
suggests this in view of the unknown future of U.S. force posture in the Middle East and 
Southwest Asia.   While the differences of politics and society, as well as contemporary 
strategies diverge, nonetheless this analysis has suggestive implications for those 
concerned with force posture in the Middle East as well.   
This thesis has tried to provide a part of the necessary background for making the 
bilateral relationship under the AA a successful one, and may constitute a small piece in 
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